From Thucydides, to Michael Yon today in Iraq and Afghanistan, confrontation, conlict, warfare, wars AND War have been recorded for some 2500 years. We are discussing differences in this series. But Thermopylae to Gettsburg to Midway to Baghdad to mountains of Afghanistan, much remains the same for those who do the fighting. This is the carrier Navy piece – in color.
Hat tip to Jim Dunkle for this one. Sometimes Supply officers do come through.
Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.T.E. Lawrence
In a new think piece, one of the best writer/thinkers on line, Mark Safranski at Zenpundit in “The Post-COIN Era is Here; Learning to eat Soup with a Spoon Again”-provides not only more detail on the COIN (”or not”) debate and its significance (real or imaginary), but also gives serious thought to the possible fallout, noting the following:
… to father a doctrine does not mean that you can control how others interpret and make use of it.
COIN is an excellent operational tool, brought back by John Nagl & co. (Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam) Continue Reading »
Haiti – Essence of Decision – Operation Unified Response
In attempt to establish a framework for discussion of the many facets of the Haiti disaster, and as a precursor to addressing the question – What kind of a community or organization –or indeed, group of organizations – can survive and thrive in unconventional, uncertain and severe crisis environments? - multiple articles from varying perspectives on Operation Unified Response are being posted on DaVinci’s Horse, the Facebook Page.
Note:You do not have to be a Facebook Member to view the page and follow the links to articles.Facebook may present an interim page with requirement to click Continue. To go to DvH , after following a link click the page tab rather than using the back arrow.
Miranda Rights, IEDs, Counter -Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, “reasonable doubt,” Counter Insurgency, cyber war, Geneva Conventions, enemy combatants, gang warfare and Drug wars, etc., etc, are all elements that must be considered in defining or even just establishing boundary conditions in a search for “what kind of war.” While certainly this series has not answered the question, the intent was to put in one place, discussion of at least some of the non- core World War II, non-core Cold War elements crucial to bounding the problem, leveraging serious writers with multiple perspectives. For ease of reference here are the posts/links with the main author or provider of the core thread in parenthesis:
While the question what kind of war is it remains unanswered, this appears an appropriate place to suspend the series, at least for now, with one final thought from British General Sir Rupert Smith:
… we are living in a world of confrontations and conflicts rather than one of war and peace; one in which the clear categories of security and defence – the basic purposes for which force is used – have merged…
This is no longer industrial war… absolute and clear threats in recognizable groupings, and… stable political contexts for operations… our opponents are formless and their leaders and operatives are outside the structures in which we order the world and society… The threats they pose are not directly to our states or territories but to the security of our people, of other peoples, our assets and way of life… They are of and amongst the people – in the flesh and in the media – and it is there that the fight takes place.
The famous ballad from World War I days -”Over There” – cannot be this century’s hosting one for the boys song of record. For those interested in further reading, the following four books are most highly recommended.
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
Without strategy the science of war overtakes the art of war
The human decision-making process, Boyd argues, deals with this conundrum through a constant dialectic of creation and destruction of mental patterns and perceptions in response to a changing and complex observed reality. We cannot escape from chaos, rather we are most successful when we embrace it by shattering the rigid mental patterns that have built up and then synthesize the new realities we observe to create a new understanding. Such a process of structuring, dissolving, restructuring, and dissolving again must be repeated endlessly.
This series has attempted to highlight that no matter how well analyzed, no matter the length or the depth of discussion, no matter how well addressed in writing by a Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Winston Churchill, or Sir John Keegan, et al, success in war and warfare, must always be seen in light of “an evolving, open ended, far from equilibrium process of self-organization, emergence, and natural selection.” Those words from John Boyd’s last effort, Essence of Winning and Losing, seem a perfect match with the original question from Napoleonic times. The mismatch of “labels” with events and resultant ill-formed actions as described in these posts by multiple writers and analysts, would seem to signify the importance of answering the question, what kind of war is it, and the crucial need for destruction and creation – analysis with synthesis.
As this series draws to a close, Science, defence and stategy, by Adam Elkus, was recognized and excerpts selected as striking this issue point on. The full article can be found at the website openSecurity.
Adam Elkus is a past PWH contributor as co-author with John Sullivan of the Operational Art for Policing series (EEI#9). He is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, Defense and the National Interest, Foreign Policy in Focus, Red Team Journal, , and other publications. His Blog writing can be found at Rethinking Security and at GroupIntel Network where he hosts the Group Boyd, 4GW Theory, and Criminal Insurgency.
Science, defence and strategy; (excerpt)
by Adam Elkus
War has always been such a tremendously complex undertaking that every force waging it has sought to simplify and standardize. At the same time, this simplification and standardization is usually inimical to the kind of creativity needed to win. Finding a balance between the art and science of war has always been difficult, especially in an era thoroughly dominated by science in all major areas of everyday life.
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
( From The Counter Terrorism Puzzle; A Guide for Decision Makers, used with permission of the author, Dr. Boaz Ganor, the Associate Dean of the Lauder School of Government, at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, and the founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism )
The above graphic placing terrorism in context of war and the definitions below of many of the terms used throughout the “What kind of war” series are intended only as reference, not as anyone’s formal authorized definition. They have been gleaned from multiple sources. Of particular note should be the degree of overlap and ambiguity.
Definitions: Special Operations, Asymmetric Warfare, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, The Long War, Fourth Generation Warfare, Hybrid Warfare:
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
There seems to be a trend toward treating events of terrorism as if they were specifically a law-enforcement problem , rather than enemy operations in the context of war and warfare. Both require application of force “but for force to be effective the desired outcome of its use must be understood in such detail that the context is defined as well as the point of application.”(The Utility of Force; The Art of War in the Modern World by General Sir Rupert Smith)
The issue here is not crime or war, the context is rather that war plays out “amongst the people” – not only in the villages of Afghanistan, but as readily in the airports, cities, communities, and courtrooms of all nations. The application of force, -whether by police or military – AND of law are essential.
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
America has an impressive record of starting wars but a dismal one of ending them well.
Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is a retired Army Colonel, graduate of West Point, serving in Vietnam in 1970 and 71. In his books [The Limits of Power,The Long War, and The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War ], he is critical of American foreign policy in the post Cold War era, maintaining the United States has developed an over-reliance on military power, in contrast to diplomacy, to achieve its foreign policy aims. He also asserts that policymakers in particular, and the American people in general, overestimate the usefulness of military force in foreign affairs. Bacevich conceived The New American Militarism not only as “a corrective to what has become the conventional critique of U.S. policies since 9/11 but as a challenge to the orthodox historical context employed to justify those policies.” His new book Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War is due out in the spring.
This article found on The American Conservativewould appear consistent with his past writing and the excerpt is offered as yet another view of “what kind of war.”
No Exit (Excerpt)
by Andrew Bacevich
President Obama’s decision to escalate U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan earned him at most two muted cheers from Washington’s warrior-pundits. Sure, the president had acceded to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s request for more troops. Already in its ninth year, Operation Enduring Freedom was therefore guaranteed to endure for years to come. The Long War begun on George W. Bush’s watch with expectations of transforming the Greater Middle East gained a new lease on life, its purpose reduced to the generic one of “keeping America safe.”
Yet the Long War’s most ardent supporters found fault with Obama’s words and demeanor. The president had failed to convey the requisite enthusiasm for sending young Americans to fight and die on the far side of the world …
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
To say “warfare is changing” is banal, obvious and thus irrelevant. When did warfare ever not evolve? The acts of Sept. 11 changed nothing in the Thucydidean and Clausewitzian nature of war, or even its modern practice. America’s choice of response did change U.S. foreign policy and defense planning, but the attacks themselves were in no way indicative of any change in the aims and purposes, or even methods, of political violence.
In order to provide a very different perspective on “what kind of war is it,” excerpts of William Owen’s essay on Armed Forces Journalare provided below. Owen is former British Army and currently a full time writer, theorist and critic concentrating on infantry and doctrinal issues. His writing is most easily found on highly recommended Small Wars Journal.
My guess would be that he would disagree with much written in this series. My argument with his article would focus on the idea of serious need for clarity by use of appropriately defined terms as compared to consideration as “buzzwords,” simply because they did not appear in the text of On War by Carl von Clausewitz.
Essay: The war of new words: Why military history trumps buzzwords (excerpt) by William F. Owen
War isn’t just transforming — it’s ushering in a whole new language to describe conflict, and this language is used in a way that pays little attention to logic or military history. Thus the forces we used to call guerrillas are now “hybrid threats.” Insurgencies are now “complex” and require “complex and adaptive” solutions. Jungles and cities are now “complex terrain.” Put simply, the discussion about future conflict is being conducted using buzzwords and bumper stickers.
The evidence that the threats of the 21st century are going to be that much different from the threats of the 20th is lacking. Likewise, there is no evidence that a “new way of war” is evolving or that we somehow had a previously flawed understanding.
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
… familiar arguments about what can and should be done to reduce America’s vulnerabilities are again filling the airwaves, editorial pages and blogosphere. Several of these arguments are based on assumptions that guided the U.S. response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks — and unfortunately, they are as unfounded now as they were then..
Stephen Flynnis the president of the Center for National Policy and author of “America the Vulnerable” and ”The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation.” He is a retired Coast Guard Commander and spent a decade as a senior fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The original article was published by the Washington Post on Sunday January 3, 2010.
5 Myths about keeping America safe from terrorrism
by Stephen Flynn
With President Obama declaring a “systemic failure” of our security system in the wake of the attempted Christmas bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner, familiar arguments about what can and should be done to reduce America’s vulnerabilities are again filling the airwaves, editorial pages and blogosphere. Several of these arguments are based on assumptions that guided the U.S. response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks — and unfortunately, they are as unfounded now as they were then. The biggest whopper of all? The paternalistic assertion that the government can keep us all safe without our help.
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
A ”lesson in aerodynamics” might be of interest as painting- hopefully- a useful “picture” of the period from shortly before the September 11, 2001 8th hour, 46th minute, 40th second impact of American Airlines Flight 11, on through the remainder of the day as initial reaction and response took place, and on into the 12th as intial world level response was planned.
Boundary conditions – the set of conditions specified for the behavior of the solution to a set of differential equations at the boundary of its domain – are important in determining the mathematical solutions to many physical problems.
Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness
As stated previously this site is not specifically focused on war and warfare, and most specifically, it has never been intended as one providing political commentary. The “kind of war” – as essential element of information- series is being extended because today’s war, how we define it, and how we defend our country in that defined context is a critical element of survival in our tightly coupled system in unstable equillibrium world. (PWH Edition #8, DaVinci’s Horse 5 by Dag von Lubitz)
To whatever extent you believe or not von Clauswitz’s ”war as extension of politics by other means,” the political arenas of the world and war are certainly intertwined beyond separation. In this kind of war – whatever ”this” is - a critical difference beween kinds is noted by the fact that there is no political entity on the other side to negotiate with to come to terms for cessation of conflict. The war then continues so long as one side desires to carry out attacks. This is very distinctly different from the kind of war of Roosevelt’s World War II or Lincoln’s War Between the States. How then do we win in the “war on terrorism”, how then do we make this end? What are the boundary conditions of victory, defeat, co-existence, survival?
The Obama administration refuses to admit that we are at war.
By Charles Krauthammer
Janet Napolitano — former Arizona governor, now overmatched secretary of homeland security — will forever be remembered for having said of the attempt to bring down an airliner over Detroit: “The system worked.”
Project White Horse Forum Forum for exchange of ideas augmenting the PWH electronic magazine by publishing discussion threads and articles “between” editions.
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War? What War?