Mar.01.2009
by Ed Beakley
II. [Part 2] Scenarios – To the ‘Ace’ Level
There are two critical elements missing from most current HLS/HLD training programs. First is the notion of dedicated opposing force and second, the need to include non-scripted decision making situations.
… is there a need and a receptive ear for a Scream of Eagles II from the first responder community? If so, we have suggested that resolution would be in context of a TOPGUN or “combat training center” type approach for homeland security and defense education, training, and exercises.
We have asked, and now in Part 1, a small group, experienced from New York to LA, to waters of the North Atlantic, to Jerusalem, to New Orleans, to Fallujah have discussed.
The next step – scenario design impact on breaking “associative barriers,” and learning ‘how’ not ‘what’ to think.
The term scenario has its origins in the theatrical world, where it usually refers to an outline or synopsis of the plot of a play, a novel or other work. In the context of exercises and training, it is a credible hypothetical situation or chain of events that creates an internally complete and consistent world so that participants and later audiences are willing to suspend their inherent disbelief in hypothetical situations.
The “Scenario” creates the conditions necessary to allow player activities and decision-making opportunities necessary to meet the exercise’s objectives – indeed to allow learning to take place.
Education, training, learning for response to hyper complex disaster occurences requires scenarios that not only reflect reality as closely as possible (”train as you intend to fight”) but also and most importantly, those that assist in breaking down “associative barriers” to creative exploration. These last may be counter-factuals or even pure fantasy but are a key element for changing “how you think” and learning adaptability.
They are essential for a “bloodless” battlefield and for educating, training, and learning “to the ‘Ace’ level. to the Ace Level discussion continues.
The following subpages provide several scenarios gathered from multiple rersources and provided by the discussion group. Feasible, realistic, even technically/scientifically correct is not the issue. As possibilities, as what the citizens of this country might fear, as counter factuals for exploration, they are provided as worth considering as how they might provide education and training for the low probability high impact event.
[For Part 3 see: II. [Part 3] Methodology – To the ‘Ace’ Level]
This page has the following sub pages.
7 Responses to “II. [Part 2] Scenarios – To the ‘Ace’ Level”
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I have trained in and been trained in a number of settings noted on the slide and have only heard about some others. The common denominator, whether it is law enforcement, fire or other disciplines, is that it has to be realistic scenarios and they have to be able to role play in my opinion. I understand that this also plays a role in stress inoculation training that is gaining support. I would like to be able to have a high tech sim room with 360 degree and 3D, but that is not a realistic option for local agencies. A regional center might be able to do this with support and funding.
The two best cost effective tools I use are projected Google Earth maps with incidents laid over them in 3D with an exaggerated vertical and a “model city” prop that has streets, houses, all manner of buildings as well as toy responder vehicles, trains and other vehicles for scenarios.
These work from the tactical level up to the strategic level and make a great common ground to discuss both. The model city, I am currently using is based on the one at CDP in Anniston, but was built with a budget of $250 to show that any agency can re-create their full or part jurisdiction for exercise training purposes. This idea was of course stolen from the military sandbox concept.
We use the “city” in discussions involving CBRNE, ICS, bomb/explosives, safe approach and crowd control in a first responder class that involves street level folks all the way up to Sheriffs in local agencies. My reason for noting this is that there are tools we can use tomorrow while we wait for funding for the really good training sites to come available.
Every face to face training we do across agency and disciplines is of value in my opinion. The prop based training also seems to allow us to make mistakes without repercussions and allows us to train our fellow responders whether we intended to or not. We follow this up with real exercises in the field, but the basis of getting the field stuff right seems to come from the 3D tabletop interaction. I know there are scores of other props out there and certainly some that are much better. This is where a sharing of best practices is valuable.
Re: Scenario #2 – 330,000 dead from 4 pounds of anthrax
What an absolutely MAGNIFICENT drivel that is! I hope none believe it. Anthrax, even if genetically modified will take about a week to kill you – bacteria do that at their own speed, and nobody can do much about it. So does smallpox (a virus). If you inject 300.000 people with botulinum toxin, you will have the effect in a few hours – providing you do injections right into the bloodstream. Trichotecene toxins can be rapidly deadly and their concentration needs not be high – also easily dispersed, but only local effect.
Weaponized stuff requires aerial dispersal, i.e., an nice little Cessna. Nothing biological will kill you in a few hours unless the toxin is delivered directly into the bloodstream and at sufficiently high concentration. However, articles like the one quoted are a perfect disinformation weapon – can you imagine the level of jitteriness they cause, and the potential expenditure if believed? The poor idiot selected the worst bacterium for such action: anthrax is really difficult to disperse unless it is weaponized. It is not contagious either. There are much better things around.
But read the below and your hair WILL raise – and there are quite few exchanges like this one on the web. I wonder if Michelle-the-Scientist has a husband who recently signed up for a lovely life insurance.
(Note: Request sent to legitimate website focused on Mycology -the branch of biology dealing with fungi.)
On a different note, the next series of comments focus on the issues that a disaster with 300K casualties would present.]
We discussed the pandemic scenario with local public safety and health experts and later at the Naval Postgraduate School with national leaders including representatives from the CDC. The dialog exposed a huge gap in understanding the roles, capability, and mission of the enforcement agencies. Any discussion or interactive training dealing with mass casualty or pandemic events helps to prepare TOL’s for some of the most challenging interaction possible.
As an example, the proposed pandemic policy of CDC, and probably most public health agencies, was to quarantine all infected persons in place by placing a police officer outside their home. If they did not comply with house arrest, they were to be taken to jail by using the necessary level of force. That brings back the mental image of several large national guardsmen pulling an 80 year old woman out of her home forcibly to conduct an evacuation for her protection.
The realities the public health community did not consider included the following facts:
> Forced house arrest conflicts with the manpower requirements needed to protect vaccine distribution sites.
> The manpower expectation also ignores the fact that under-staffed agencies will also lose 30-35% of their forces to illness or the needs of their families. It was actually much higher during Hurricane Katrina.
> If you expect law enforcement officers, or the military, to participate in quarantines, you will have to provide them and their families with vaccine and medical supervision.
> If an infected individual attempts to leave their home and is arrested, you could not place them in a jail where thousands of inmates and staff would then be exposed by their presence.
> If hospitals are over-crowded and jails are not an option, there would be little else available except deadly force. Are they really expecting to make that a policy and do they really believe officers are going to start shooting sick people?
> Do they expect to authorize force against family members or others who visit those who are under quarantine and thereby risk infection?
These tabletop discussions changed national and local policy because teams of leaders tried to work through complex issues together. We are all better prepared to respond as an effective unit because we addressed these issues and pursued them to the point of failure. A lot of work still needs to be done on the issues of mass casualty and pandemic events, but the application of TOL concepts can certainly help to move us in the right direction.
From Gen Rick Brown
Exactly and for really important issues the lower in the hierarchy the team building the better. In fact good work was done at Ft Lewis some years ago having such
discussions cascade from “top to bottom” Then grouped, now can be supported virtual with social networking. DoD increasing use of Adobe Connect but there is more
and more IM and KM available.
“Top” provide the scenarios and doctrine, techniques, procedures then stand back “bottom” will take it from there teaming across various boundaries.
From Col G.I. Wilson
Bob, great comments and confirms what I see way too often….people not knowing their job and what others do…as you noted: ” Huge gap in understanding the roles, capability, and mission of the enforcement agencies” . This were I see ALM (Adaptive Leader Model) and ToL coming in to play.
From Battalion Chief Ranger Dorn
Sheriff Brooks highlights an intersection to consider. Aspects related to evacuation and quarantine cross every level of government, most if not all types of response agencies as well as military, the public with conflicting interests and have long term impacts on both the public and agencies if things go wrong. Now might not be the right time to consider adding another intersection to discuss as we have quite a thread going, but I think it warrants discussion by this group at a later date when things are quiet.
From Dr. Dag von Lubitz
Absolutely perfect comment, Ranger. Concur!
I want to pursue now a different aspect of scenario use – Scenario selection (good, bad, ugly, does its technical correctness make a difference?) impact in light of teaching “how,” not what to think.
As noted previously from Medici Effect, “associative barriers” prevent people from being creative – in designing exercises and in responding under hyper complex situations. It is possible for bright, experienced operators to “screw their own pooch” – so to speak.
One of the most used “tools” in use today I’m told is the 1907 book by E.D. Swinton, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift. Gen Brown used it in his work for IDA on adaptability and writing related to TDEs (Tactical Decision exercises). Since 1900s tactics employed are no longer in use – lying, kneeling, standing riflemen – does story have no use?
Training in one’s cockpit is crucial and limiting at same time. As young, inexperienced, just designated Naval Aviator, I fell in to “Briar Patch” getting to qualify in and fly three very different jets (F-8 Crusader, F-9 Cougar, and T-33) routinely, sometimes all in same day. Their time frame of design was so different that a/c flying qualities, emergency procedures were very different in crucial aspects. It taught me early to be “an airman,” not just pilot in an F-whatever, though I did not recognize at the time.
There are no easy metrics for this but I’ll share an opinion. The former Air Force F-4 driver, Aircraft safety businessman, Airline pilot who walked away from the Hudson with his passengers was an airman not just a pilot. The Capt who flew into icing and then attempted to press on rather than recognizing that icing gets worse going down rather than up, and immediately AND I do mean immediately climbing was just a qualified pilot. And there’s a whole world of difference
.
There is a catch 22 involved here. CTC at Ft Irwin is for folks immediately on the way to war zone and latest “in-country” stuff needs to be introduced – they need to train as they intend to fight.
What we discuss, requires possibly doing the (somewhat) opposite: Scenarios designed to break down associations so one can go “body response on auto pilot,” brain going to the area I defined previously as into “Yeager’s Delta Margin” brain region. I would offer that Gen Honore’s actions was perfect example of this in New Orleans. How did he get there? How do the lessons in “how to think” in severe situations get transferred and learned?
I think this worthy of discussion by the group. For what we want is decision team with that excessive brain space to draw on – ultimately, highly performing Team of Leaders.
From Ranger Dorn
Ed, my reply will likely be seen as heresy to exercise planners, but I think we over script many scenarios for mid to upper level managers who will have roles in managing large incidents. These are opinions based on observation and have no scientific basis other than that to draw from.
We often use hundreds of inputs tied to a clock. This is artificial and I believe contrary to skills development involving interagency or interdisciplinary incident managers.
I think there is value in letting participants develop processes and relationships as they game out an inject. I prefer to react with an inject based on where they went vs. what item is scripted next. This means that sometimes they get off on tangents, like any incident managers might. The next inject might be chosen to put them on track, make them derail or allow them to see they are headed for a cliff.
There are 3-4 hour exercises that I have run with less than 10 injects. I prefer using sideboards vs. following a center line in scenarios. Tempo is the determining factor for the next inject vs. a clock. Also, the exercise does not end just because lunch arrives…. There is much time and effort that goes into scripted scenarios such as the TOPOFF and AWI exercises and there is a value to them, but I think development of the players that will go to these should include unscripted scenarios.
There are probably scores of studies that will show why I am mistaken, but this approach seems to work.
From G.I. Wilson
Agree completely…we need exercises/scenarios where everyone fails (but this not revealed)..AND…. and then “they” are required to start all over again….real leaders get up when knocked down…pretty-boy-appointmenteees go home
From Rick Brown
You have two excellent responses -Dorn and Wilson.
I can add only that you have to address two paths of development. They are 1) developing necessary individual, team and organizational competencies (task condition standard) and 2) develop the shared individual and team skills, knowledge , attitudes associated with high performance – actionable understanding. The former described in Chap Six America’s Army, the latter in Chapter Seven. (FYI AA not for profit – any go to the First Infantry Div Scholarship Fund (kids of KIAs).
I can provide voluminous content associated with both – for competencies going back to establishing structured training in 1993. Five or six IDA reports. Russ (Honore) can bring all fully up to date. As Cmdr First Army he directed for all Guard units enrte MidEast.
For ToL implementation, documentation from Army Leavenworth and EUCOM.
Most all seem applicable one way or another to below.
Swinton (Duffere’s Drift) drawn upon by Paul Gorman to describe ” a way”. Still used a year or two ago in command prep training at Leavenworth and essentially in Leader Team
Training initiated by Jim Dubik at Ft Lewis as the Brigade Combat Team design was being developed
From Capt Charlie Meinema Tacoma PD
I just had to comment when I saw the reference to Duffer’s Drift. I read this pamphlet somewhere in the last 20 years – along with Carlos Marighella’s Rules for Terrorists and another book called Rules for Radicals – and loved it. Main reason being the book channels one into decisions that sound good and which any new commander – especially one who had not been in theatre – might make. Then, the book exposes the major flaws in the decisions. Best of all, the preferred solution is not going to win the day as is stated. The commander is in a bad situation and can only make the best of it – with no guarantees of success unless he is sent reinforcement.
This is exactly where we are today – we can not train people to perceive there is one right way or that implementing any of the potential right ways guarantees success. The commanders – as several have all remarked – have to learn to think in moment and to think through the immediate problem onto what to do next, since something worse is probably around the corner.
‘Winning” can not even be determined during the period of conflict – has the opfors been defeated or is he merely preparing a secondary or flanking attack? In Mumbai, I doubt anyone “knew” it was over until at best the next day. In your line of work, Ed, solving the cockpit emergency in your Crusader was not enough – you still had to be prepared to immediately engage hostiles once you had the plane back under control.