Jan.29.2009
6:59 am
by Ed Beakley
RC#27 RC – AI (Part 3)
We now move to Discussion Thread 3.
- >> Intelligence implications for a resilient community response force team in a low probability/high impact worst case disaster environment:
- critical information – what, where and how
- education aimed at preventing "victimhood"
- planning on multiple levels
- being a responder not a victim
- building leaders AND followers – who, how
By necessity that team will most likely include professionals (public safety and military – Guard and Active Duty), private sector, and individual citizens or community organizations
If all would agree on the "team" response requirement and given the above – how do you inform, plan, and educate/train/learn across a team with few common linkages on a very practical basis? How do you get ready for the "Black Swan?
It is easy to identify the problems, not too hard to come up with solutions, BUT the how and the doing is something else.
Invest in preparedness, not prediction…I will never get to know the unknown since, by definition, it is unknown. However, I can always guess how it might affect me, and I should base my decisions around that…you always control what you do, so make this your end.Nassim Nicholas Taleb – The Black Swan; The Impact of the Highly Improbable
Filed in 4GW, Adaptive Leadership, Intelligence, Resilient Community, School Security, Team of Leaders, Terrorism | 8 responses so far
From PWH
For me, while “intel” is the context, in the hyper complex, unconventional, chaotic, worst case event, the key is understanding the dynamic well enough to take action, i.e., the need for “actionable intelligence.” It would follow then that obtaining such and knowing how to use is critical to community resilience when up against the low probability but now high impact occurence.
Using Boyd concepts, that means establishing out of the conflagration common orientation, common outlook, and common mission across professionals (military and civilian)
however many are still standingin concert with private sector organizations – however many can stand up, brush themselves off, and provide resources and capability – and finally along with Uncle Herb and Aunt Sally, and Larry next door – whatever “just folks” can throw off the mantle of victimization and man the rails.Common orientation, outlook, and mission won’t just emerge when it hits the fan, not even for the professionals, and certainly not for this pick-up team. We all know that one in spades. Creating a Team of Leaders across that trifecta of an American community, is a requirement and will require learning unlearning, relearning – and most of all – no matter how low the event probability or asynchronous the nature of occurence –
the will to prepare.
From Dag vonLubitz, note from PWH
(PWH note: As indicated in RC#25 comment 9, this is the extracted paragraph – the “beginning thought” for thread #3 from Dr. von Lubitz)
By emphasizing Rupert Smith’s (PWH: see note below) contention (which I believe is correct) we also need to emphasize contention of Generals Bradford and Brown (TOL concept presented in America’s Army) that current means are inadequate, misleading, and often counterproductive (which is John Sullivan’s (RC#25 comment 6) indirect contention as well, i.e., “buzzword”).
The Teams of Leaders concept changes this state of affairs, and to a large degree acts as a “measure of self-corrective analysis” (in science it would be the equivalent of repeating the experiment by another group – if the same thing comes out, it is true. If not we do not know: it may be true or false, and more work is needed to determine fact). It also acts as the currently near-perfect source of meta-analytic approaches, since ToL involves cumulative application of broad-territory brain power rather than single-field expert analysis.
I am not a fanatic of new IT based ideologies as substitute for clear thinking but do bow my head to Bradford and Brown. Theirs is a concept with the broadest possible applications since it is the way to act rather than a method of doing. Ed must therefore (and I do not hesitate to italicize this) emphasize the role of ToL in these activities. This is his “how” – and from there much else that is needed will automatically emerge.
... but there are hard-core issues at hand, and if anything at all is to come out of this and similar efforts, a gentlemanly discussion in a gentlemanly circle is neither helpful nor really badly needed: its outcome is a new question – “SO WHAT?” While the problem faces all of us involved in this circle, the owners of the site need to address it as their foremost task.
It is, as Ed says, HOW that needs to be specified, and in order to offer most service, whatever is being used needs to be offered as multi-sourced “raw data” as the subject for a discussion that leads to a precise set of recommendations (or conclusive statement) rather than an exchange of lose opinions on the subject peddled forth and back by a group of “involved citizens.”. To revert then to General Smith and his book: cohesiveness of effort is essential. Which leads me to the argument made above: ToL may help us to attain this state since, despite appearances, it is an extremely well disciplined process which we may consider implementing.
But in all cases, warfare does not just spread into the civilian population, confrontation, conflict, full scale war are purposefully and always “amongst the people.” Indeed that is the major defining characteristic. This book is a must read for those concerned with “survival on our own terms.”
From John sullivan
I agree with all you say. Teams of Leaders is the only viable way to address uncertainty. So too are treams of analysts. I suggest you look further on GropupIntel. The actual grist is in the membership network segment at http://network.groupintel.com.
Bias and political orientation color all analysis, but ultimately “the truth will set you free.”. The shortfalls to actual truth in a networked site come from groupthink and failure to participate in rigourous alternative analysis. The dated material or lack of oppossing thought can only be solved by more participation. Remember too that the site is an unfunded experiment… I hope you join and help broaden the mind-view.
From Lt. General Frederic ‘Rick’ Brown (USA, Ret), co-author of America’s Army; A model for Interagency Effectiveness
(PWH Note: For a book review see PWH Post RC#13:
http://blog.projectwhitehorse.com/2008/05/10/rc13-part-2-model-for-int eragency-effectiveness/ )
Dag etal: Well-commented re ToL in this thread. Thanks for the support.
All need to realize that EUCOM Teams of Leaders (EUR ToL) is proceeding well. There are several pilots that will provide, by their diverse nature, excellent examples of ToL application joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM). EUCOM includes new NATO Balts, Ukraine, Georgia, Israel – a significantly JIIM operating environment. Also COM EUCOM is SACEUR NATO - complex requirements within a very diverse command.
Inappropriate to explain detail now – but EUR ToL pilots address theater ballistic missile defense, expanded State Partnership Programs (current version of Partnership for Peace post Cold War – US States supporting countries abroad – 40 some in EUCOM. Example Maryland supports Bosnia – military to military, military to civil, civil to civil). Another example focusing US resources in capacity building in selected nations. Another: ToL support to crisis action (real world – Georgia, recently Gaza). ToL support to conventional Nunn-Lugar – getting enormous highly unstable old Soviet ammo out of the Balkans.
For an operating ToL intro, suspect each of you can go to your State National Guard in the next month or two and ask about the EUCOM State Partnership Program (SPPNet) rolling out the most current IM and KM in execution of ToL. NORTHCOM J3 aware- overwatch for applications
That commented, the purpose of Teams of Leaders (IM times KM times high performing leaders) as stated well by Dag is shared SKA developing actionable understanding appropriate to whatever combination of events the particular team (teaming leaders right, left, up, down-high performing) faces. Much more art than science, objective is the leader team that can “connect the dots” ahead of others to influence outcomes. Boyd OODA of sorts.
No more no less. Suffice to know that pilots are going well – all will be formally documented in time. For now, the ToL chapter in America’s Army provides sufficient explanation – all that I am at liberty to discuss for now. Sensitivity but I am also very busy over in EUCOM - doing not explaining.
From Fred Leland
(PWH Note: This is from RC#26 Comment #3 and repeated in part, because it strikes at the heart of leadership demands across dissimilar organizations in times of severe crisis.)
...Intel is a up-down-left-right “gathering and sharing process, one compliments the other. Again in my view I don’t care where the INFO comes from (most good info comes from people not even in the business, a person on the street) as long as it has a potential of being actionable Intel, pass it on, up or down and let those on the ground corroborate …the sharing of information is the biggest problem that effect responses. I have seen this information sharing process fail at a local level with law enforcement responses to a variety of calls on a much smaller scale than a Katrina or 9-11 type incident, someone knew something and it did not get passed on, or it was passed on and ignored… What I am trying to say is both theater and local Intel fails, because people are complacent and choose to keep information to themselves at both levels. I will not even get into the human traits we all must fight; egos and personalities which is a big part of the problem as well when it comes to gathering and passing on info!
OPENMINDEDNESS, WIILINGNESS TO CONTINUELY LEARN AND SHARE WHAT WE KNOW opens up avenues of INSIGHT (individual and organizational, local and hierarchical) which leads to INNOVATIVE IDEAS AT HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS and the INITIATIVE to get it DONE! This may sound a simplistic view on Intel but it does come down to the simple process of communicating what we know, to those who need it.
Additional comment later:
... reform is what we are talking about and I agree it would make a great case study of these efforts. I guess my question would be “how many local communities are walking the talk and preparing????” My sources in this area are not positive, a lot of talk but very little action, although there are exceptions where a proactive approach to preparedness is taking place. Sad to say more the exception than the rule. The bigger locals have done some work and preparation, but the suburban areas even just outside the cities are still way behind. Work to be done! Starting with waking those up with the complacent mind.
You MUST read Bradford and Brown (America’s Army: a Model for Interagency Effectiveness). The issues you speak about are exactly those that ToL addresses in a way that could not be attained before, bypassing, at the same time constraints posed by rank, power, agency affiliation, etc. General Brown offered additional insights into the issue in his earlier message. Reading the book is, however, essential… A comprehensive treatment is forthcoming in Journal of Homeland Security and Disaster Management. However, going to the main source is of cardinal value here, and we are extremely fortunate that Generals Bradford and Brown are kept abreast of this discussion since we have access to the ultimate source of learning.
From John Sullivan
There is much needed to build effective intelligence support for the range of events that will face us in the coming years. I believe the current state is one of “back to the future.”. That is status quo ante (pre 9-11) with a focus on criminal intelligence for cops, a focus on the federal for the IC, and fire, health, and the private sector moved to the side.
The TEW model attempted to bridge these by providing ops-intel fusion at the operational level. That included brdging intelligence and risk management to craft aleternate COAs’ pre-, trans-, and post-incident. Hopefully those concepts can be reinvigorated.
Essentially, I believe intelligence needs to reside at tactial, operational, and strategic echelons. All three echelons. need to interact. We are missing the operatioanl level of manuver and are thus often unable to share tactical knowledge in a multilateral manner. Much more needs to be done here!
In reference to comment #6
From Dag von Lubitz
Nice summary. A question though: by “operational” do you mean “theater” or “grand-tactical”? We probably need to decide on clearly defined terms to avoid misunderstandings, and to facilitate production of “summary documents.” I think, the current round indicates that such documents may be forthcoming, as I see the nascence of a “think tank” here.
From JS
Very good question. I think it is a little bit of both depending on the circumstances and issues. Think of transnational gangs or drug trafficking organizations as oppossed to a campaign fire or wide-area natural disaster. The definition of theatre is likey diffirent depending upon scale, multplicity of agencies and disciplines involved, etc. Yet in all cases you need to bridge tactical and strategic. So I think operational should embrace both grand-tactical and theatre. This needs to flexible and adaptive. Both requirements are near-non-existant in current US policing. The concept of theatre is influenced by context, especially in sub-national, non-state settings.
From DvL
Perfect. Then we are in total agreement, although I think we may stretch the concept of “theatre” to the “grand theme” areas – e.g. gangs and their relationship to terrorism – where several issues intersect and the total picture is only adequate when all aspects are incorporated, which, in turn, provides a much better approach to tactical considerations and subdivision into “expertise analyses” which then feed back into theatre considerations.
From JS
The approach will be much the same. Defining the impacted area is vital to getting the problem right. Think of the on-going criminal insurgency in Mexico. You could view the theatre as Mexico, or you could view it as the ten state cross-border zone (4 US states, 6 Mexican), etc. The cartels themselves view their theatre as the “plazas” or corridors in Tijuana, Juarez, etc. That they are battling for. Defining the theatre properly is one of the first steps in developing intelligence requirements.
PWH Note: Some closing comments
From Matt Begert
John, I really like the specialist/generalist concept and I like all the discussion that I’m seeing. How do we engage in the real world and get something done, however small? ( I don’t expect you to answer, I expect to get thoughts from all). Hakim makes the same point. (See Rv#25 comment #5) It has to touch the street. Somebody has to be on the perch so we can say “Tally Ho.”
From Hakim Hazim (Relevant Now http://relevantnow.net/)
As I’ve followed this thread since yesterday, I’m in agreement with John and hope we can carry this into the GroupIntel site. Also I’m grateful to see so many joining up.
From Fabius Maximus ( http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/ )
Just a thought about communities, FWIW.
America’s communities proved highly resilient during the Great Depression. Although the current downturn is unlikely to approach such severity, our communities might prove less well able to handle the stress.
We might experience a wide range of social disturbances. Nothing new in America’s experience (we’ve had National Guard troops occupying our cities on several occasions, not to mention the WBTS). But with the development of 4GW, such things might prove more difficult to control—or mutate into new forms.
From GI Wilson
yes, like vigilante groups, hybrid gangs-tribes , and more loner disrupters
From FM
Yes. We might long for Martin L King-type demonstrations and even Rodney King-type riots.
From Ed Beakley @PWH
John, To me what has happened here, and indeed is still ongoing, is what “the intersection” of varied life experience, education, personal aspects – I believe all those things inside John Boyd’s Orientation element – is all about and why the concept has such value, particularly when dealing with the highly chaotic, highly stochastic.
Given 4GW, war amongst the people, the openness of the internet and last but certainly not least good ole Mother N, “highly chaotic, highly stochastic” or low probability-high impact seem the defining elements of this century.
This exchange has been great in my estimation. My criteria, beyond what I learned, was the fact that you, Gen Brown, GI, Ranger, Fred, Dag all engaged. Question is: does this have value useful for others and should this stream of thought be distributed?
From JS
I think it was valuable. I also think it demonstrates the need for real intelligence reform. In that vein, I think it would be great if you transformed it into a discussion thread (virtual symposium) on PWH. Resiliant community and Actionable intelligence sound like a good title.
From Ed @PWH
Thanks to all. Great learning experience.
PWH out
A social network for intelligence professionals
Check out the discussion ‘Resilient Communities and Actionable Intelligence’
Discussion posted by John P. Sullivan:
This discussion RC#25, 26, 27 Resilient Communities and Actionable Intelligence builds from a series of off-line discussions about the nature of intelligence for emerging threats and unconventional disasters. The discussion was moderated by Ed Beakley, director of Project While Horse. After reviewing Project White Horse Blogsite, readers are encouraged to continue discussion here.
Discussion link:
Resilient Communities and Actionable Intelligence
http://network.groupintel.com/forum/topics/resilient-communities-and
(PWH note: Requires joining GroupIntelnetwork)>