Feb.22.2011
11:08 pm
by Ed Beakley
Washington – Commander, Leader: Petit Guerre, All the difference in the world
Boundary Condition #3 (2)
Preserve harmony, create chaos and achieve victory by continually keeping the enemy off balance through a superior capability to adapt. Sun Tzu
Today, February 22nd 2011 is George Washington’s birthday. As a country we don’t really pay homage to our first President, commander of the Continental Army or Father of the Nation. Rather what we do, is have Presidents Day which is intended to honor both Washington and Lincoln, and in reality is a Federal Holiday, day off for many, and opportunity for mass sales, the last being the most noted aspect.
For Project White Horse, this is an opportunity to continue discussion of the 2011 boundary condition focused on Washington’s leadership in trying times. The first post discussed the Battle of Trenton and its significance in American history in making the Declaration of Independence more than just fine words surrounding an abstract idea of “we the people.”
In the best noted modern research The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution, Ira Gruber concludes:
“Trenton and Princeton were supremely important in destroying the illusion of British invincibility, making patriots of potential loyalists, and spoiling Howe’s hopes for an end to the war and a start to a lasting reunion. Both General and Admiral Howe were forced to rethink their entire plan. General Howe wrote “I do not now see a prospect for terminating the war but by a general action, and I am aware of the difficulties in our way to obtain it.”
Indeed as David Hackett Fisher says in his Pulitzer Prize book, (the major source for this post) Washington’s Crossing, “By the Spring of 1777, many British officers had concluded that they could never win the war. At the same time, Americans recovered from their despair and were confident that they could not be defeated. That double transformation was truly a turning point in the war.”
What had occurred here since the dark days of mid-December when even many who signed the Declaration had become resigned to defeat?
The answer lies in a little known portion of the Revolutionary War encompassing the “Forage War” or petit guerre, wherein the actions of both the Continental Army and the Jersey militias resulted in 2,887 of Howe’s British and German troops killed, captured or seriously wounded. By the end of that winter campaign more than half of all British and Hessian troops who had joined Howe’s army in 1776 were casualties – killed, wounded, captured, missing, dead of disease or so severely ill as to be officially reported as ineffective. On January 31stHowe had asked for 20,000 more troops but was informed by his government that he could expect 7,800. After Trenton and Princeton, after the January to March petit guerre, the British effort faced a chronic shortage of strength that continued throughout the remainder of the war.
While the Revolutionary War is not representative of unconventional crisis as defined, the period after the Continental Army retreat from New York in the summer of 1776 until the spring of 1777 does reflect a time of severe crisis, and one in which the total nature of the situation completely reversed. The elements of decision making and leadership that at the same time created novelty and confusion for the other side while enhancing vitality and growth for itself is certainly consistent with the previous post on the thoughts of John Boyd and therefore seem fair game for a study of decision making in severe crisis.
David Hackett Fischer historical analysis Washington’s Crossing provides the most research and critical analysis of the period surrounding the Battle of Trenton and the following period. This book is the major source for this effort. In even a casual reading of Fischer’s final two chapters, the idea of control of tempo and time as a weapon jumps off of the page. For almost three months the British and Hessian commanders were never able to get out of a reaction mode after Trenton.
Fischer’s analysis reflects well John Boyd’s ideas, not only control of tempo but also the aspect of OODA as a learning process for vitality and growth. In support of using Boyd’s way as instructive for decision making in severe crisis and in accord with Chet Richards question, “What type of organizations operate at rapid OODA loop tempos?” the elements of OODA will be used to organize Fischer’s conclusions. None of his conclusions are altered, they are just rearranged. As such, the intent is to suggest lessons for possible implementation for severe crisis decision making and leadership. All errors are mine and should not reflect on David Hackett Fischer’s original work.
Analysis
Observation > And of course, the best force multiplier is good intelligence. Lack of intelligence on British movement in New York was a major factor in the American loss in the New York campaign. In New Jersey, Washington was the central figure in developing a system of intelligence, personally recruiting agents with orders to report to him alone. He employed Nathaniel Sackett of the New York Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies to construct an entire network in New York with both male and female agents of every rank and station. He also asked Continental generals and militia commanders to run their own agents. Although encouraging some degree of separation of these networks for security and broad based sources, his attitudes toward intelligence-gathering were different from those in closed societies, who sought to monopolize intelligence and prohibited efforts they did not control. Washington was comfortable with an open system permitting and even encouraging a high degree of autonomy.
With the efforts and results of multiple sources, the maneuvers of militia and regular Continental Army units were made much more effective. The best example may be the “Forage War” as the central focus of the Winter Campaign.
While Lord Cornwallis provided uniforms and food for his troops out of his own personal fortune, the British had a critical shortage – feed for its animals. Washington was quick to pick up that small numbers of men could do real damage to the British, reporting to Congress that intelligence reports “confirm their want of forage.. If their horses are reduced this winter it will be impossible to take the field in the spring.”
Orientation> Throughout the Revolution, George Washington’s strategic purposes were constant: to win independence by maintaining American resolve to continue the war, by preserving an American army in being, and by raising the cost of the war to the enemy. He was always fixed on these strategic ends but flexible in operational means. No single label describes his operations.
He learned to control initiative and tempo in war. Along with his officers he did more than merely surprise the Hessians garrison at Trenton the morning after Christmas. As the winter campaign continued beyond the Second Battle of Trenton and the Battle of Princeton, they improvised a series of surprises over a twelve week period, seizing initiative and keeping it. Recognizing the impact of the New Jersey militias, which at times frustrated him due to his lack of complete control, and realizing how effective many small engagements could be in reducing the fighting strength of the British and German regiments, he ordered most of his Continental troops to reinforce the Jersey Militia.
Understanding the critical role the Continental Army played not only in fighting battles but just in surviving as a fighting force, Washington himself did not take to the field in that critical January to late March ’77 time frame. Rather he was busy with recruitment of the new three-year regiments and expansion of the army for the spring campaign. Much of his time and energy went into relations with the members of Congress and leaders of the states. Critical war fighting decisions were on going in the Forage War, and Washington was at the center, but functioning as a leader of the republic, always listening, inspiring, guiding, urging his officers always to be the drivers of events, never “to be drove.” Continental brigadiers and militia commanders received independent commands with very broad instructions. Washington’s lieutenants like Horatio Nelson’s captains, knew what was wanted of them. Not only did it drive the British, force them to move in more troops than they could actually house and feed, it allowed the American army to learn and gain strength beyond numbers.
Decision> After Trenton and the surprise disengagement at the Second Battle of Princeton on January 2nd leading to the next day victory at Princeton, the thoughts of British commanders who in mid December thought they were on the verge of finishing the Continental Army were no longer about attacking but being attacked. Cornwallis ordered retreat and Howe’s generals began blaming each other. The British had no desire nor saw any advantage to seeking battle in the winter. Washington realized he could make a major impact with small attacks and limiting the potential of British mobility in the spring. The context of decision making changed drastically for both armies.
Throughout the British maintained the rigid hierarchal structure and command process of a European Army. By comparison, Lord Cornwallis ignored the advice of very able subordinates at the Second Battle of Trenton, while Washington listened and took the advice that led to the night disengagement and further victory at Trenton. While he did not begin the petite guerre begun by the Jersey militia, he cognized its potential and made a crucial decision to support it with Continental troops. Time and again, while the British were forced to react, Washington’s lieutenants, understanding their generals overall intent made the decisions to attack or disengage so as to continue to drive the British and German armies.
Another key decision, despite multiple incidents of maltreatment American troops by the British and Hessian armies, was Washington’s directions as to treatment of prisoners after the Battle of Trenton – they were to be accorded the same rights of humanity for which American’s were fighting. Supported by John Adams, American leaders believed that it was not enough to win the war. They also had to win in a way that was consistent with the values of their society and the principles of their cause. What Adams created in words and policy, Washington put into action. In comparison, British and Hessian commanders only selectively offered “quarter” to American troops attempting to surrender, and treatment of prisoners was routinely horrific. And as American success grew by in large British attitude and actions hardened, with unwanted consequence that resistance by Americans, some loyalists, grew stronger. Washington staked out the moral high ground, to the surprise of British and Hessian prisoners. Not all American leaders agreed, but in general the Continental Army’s adoption of Adam’s “policy of humanity” enlarged the meaning of the American Revolution.
While morale plummeted on one side, the Americans now knew how to fight and knew they could win. The performance has been judged one of the most brilliant in history.
Action> In the Winter ’77 Campaign/New Jersey Campaign and Forage War, American troops repeatedly defeated larger and better trained regular forces in many different types of warfare: what we now label special operations, maneuver warfare including a night river crossing and assault on an urban garrison, a fighting retreat, a defensive battle in fixed position, a disengagement to a night march into the enemy’s rear, a meeting engagement, and a prolonged petite guerre – the small war. The British on the other hand were on the wrong side of tempo, constantly harassed, forced to bring in more troops which exacerbated housing and feeding and spread of disease. Despite the maintenance of rigid command structure, British and German field commanders understood what was happening and attempted to lure the American militia and regular army into head on attacks or set ambushes for the attacks on foraging. But under mission type orders, Washington lieutenants continued to maintain initiative, disengage where necessary and even ambush the ambushers. By the spring of 1777, many British officers had concluded they could never win the war.
Synthesis
In the most desperate of struggles, Washington listened to and trusted his lieutenants, provided broad instructions with few direct commands, learned to leverage the emerging American culture and adapted. Not easy with the militias or their leaders, observation led to an orientation around usefulness of small units and harassing style warfare. Leveraging boldness, flexibility and opportunism, initiative and tempo, speed and concentration, and intelligence, he and his commanders defined a way of warfare that would continue throughout the war. Specifically leveraging “implicit direction, they drove the decision cycle in true reflection of John Boyd’s OODA Loop, finding a way to defeat a formidable enemy, not merely at Trenton and Princeton but over and over through twelve weeks of continuous combat. Fischer notes:
In New Jersey, American leaders learned to make time itself into a weapon. They did it by controlling the tempo and rhythm of the campaign. Day after day through the winter campaign, the Americans called the tune and set the beat. By that method, they retained the initiative for many weeks and kept British commanders off balance. The material and moral impact was very great, especially when a small force was able to control the tempo of war against a stronger enemy. Events happened at a time and place of their choosing. From all this another American tradition developed.
The context is pure John Boyd not only related to fast transients but also in context of Boyd’s theme for vitality and growth: insight, orientation, harmony, agility and initiative. Indeed in Washington’s Crossing, Fischer’s arguments mirror John Boyd’s as represented by Chet Richards in answering his question “What kind of organizations operate at rapid OODA loop tempo:
Organizations whose leaders have, over time, imbued certain qualities into the fiber of their very being, with these four qualities”
- Superb competence, leading to a Zen-like state of intuitive understanding. Ability to sense when the time is ripe for action. Built through years of progressively more challenging experience. Magic.
- Common outlook towards problems. Includes mutual trust. Built through shared experience. Superb competence and intuitive understanding at the organizational level. Values, doctrine, teamwork, mission.
- Concept that answers the question, “What do I do next?” in ambiguous situations. Gives focus and direction to our efforts. Key function of leadership.
- Understood and agreed to accountability. Conveyance to team members what needs to be accomplished, get their agreement to accomplish it, then hold them strictly accountable for doing it – but don’t prescribe how. Requires very strong common outlook.
In Patterns of Conflict, John Boyd defined a “unifying vision” as follows:
A grand idea, overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances – yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or adversary systems.
Washington’s grand vision was never more important than in that winter of 1776, ’77.
Filed in 2011 Boundary Conditions | 8 responses so far
You have written a convincing and compelling account of Washington’s leadership skills; his comfort with delegation, and his trust in his subordinates. I agree with you that Washington displayed many of the virtues that Boyd recommended for “vision,” “vitality & growth.” Namely, Washington communicated broad goals and objectives to his subordinates and got out of the way. The virtues that jump off the page with a correlation to Boyd are harmony (using the Boydian definition of implicit understanding, mutual trust, cooperation, simplicity, & focus), initiative, orientation, and adaptability.
My comment earlier this week with respect to “anchor points” are the Fischer paragraphs paired with the elements of OODA; I’m not sure there is for me a clear “fit” for all elements. “Orientation” seems apropos, but Observe, Decide, Act not so much. There is a implication of fluidity in OODA, from my perspective, that is apparent in the apportionment of elements. That’s not taking away anything from the content. I believe the paragraphs noted are excellent examples of Boydian vitality and growth mentioned above.
Observation. Fischer in the paragraph you labeled as “observation” noted that W. was central in developing a system of intelligence that “reported to him alone” and in the same paragraph extolled Washington’s “comfort” with open systems (as opposed to monopolistic intelligence). These two lines of thought seem contradictory. My impression is that W. wanted to monopolize intelligence while allowing his operators autonomy in action—-and from the perspective of the operator expectations were established and W. could sleep at night knowing he was at the top of the bottle-neck, as it were.
Orientation. Clearly in these paragraphs a correlation can be found, in addition to the virtues of providing broad discretion and intent to his lieutenants.
Decide. The anchor point is a complete reversal of context for the Brits, due in large part to W’s excellent leadership. W’s decision with respect Brit prisoners was excellent, and definitely staked out the moral high ground, but I don’t see the overall fluidity of this decision in context of the other activities (perhaps they do—I have not read Fischer’s book and it has been years and years since I read Washington bios (Southall Freeman & RN Smith).
Act. The pointy-end of the stick worked as a result of W’s leadership policies listed above. I get the action, but not an OODA, as it were.
You simply knocked it out of the park with your Synthesis. Fischer’s observation about “time,” “tempo,” and “rhythm” reek of Boyd’s ideas.
As an aside, your observation about leaders who have “over time, imbued certain qualities into the fiber of their being” is the single best description of Michael Polanyi’s concept of “indwelling.” Be sure I’ll keep those words in mind when I describe.
This is an excellent post and I look forward to future installments.
Scott,
Great reply and thanks.
What I have long believed and I think Frans Osinga discusses very well (but maybe gets lost in the necessary nature of his book) is that most certainly Boyd, but also the OODA loop must be seen as more than Rapid decision cycles or “flow” of the looping. Next is Chet Richards well taken point to me of Boyd’s view of “vitality and growth” in the viewgraph in Patterns, and then a third aspect, (and I’m not sure anyone addresses this), is the value of “O, O, D, A” (commas intended) and “O>O>D>A” (flow) as complementary but distinguishable aspects of analysis/synthesis.
Think of it this way:
First, Boyd, Richards, many in fact put primary emphasis -almost to exclusion of the other parts -on Orientation. You, if I understand correctly are most interested in Observation, while Terry Bernhart appears focused on figuring out how to make Orientation migrate towards zero. I on the other hand focus on Decision and have bounded it such that things that work in simple or ordered situations are relevant only as necessary” but not “sufficient” to the problem at hand. Nobody talks Action since that falls into the realm of the end operators – the assumption being they can execute, all things being equal. But for me Action has this undiscovered country, if you will, of “first action” in the face of the complex or chaotic, that requires acting so as to gather more information, because “real” action as generally accepted might make things worse. This to me is a very specific OODA contained within the “A.”
This personal interpretation is why I believe that in some types of occurrences, Orientation and Situational Awareness (SA) are separate aspects that can overlap to various degree, sometimes being one and the same, but in other more complex trending toward the chaotic occurences, recognition is needed that I may have SA but at the same time not really have actionable understanding, i.e. I have poor orientation.
There are those who dismiss OODA as not existing in real events. I totally disagree. Sometimes the event, recognition, and action are so tightly linked that the parts are indistinguishable or have been brought into degrees of overlap by training and/or past experience – Klein’s RPDM, but neither the micro –time reaction nor the play-out over much longer periods (Washington’s winter campaign) negate the OODA as a flow process.
Therefore, my thinking in the post was that by way of OODA “analysis,” Washington’s actions can be seen in three separate but complimentary ways:
1. OODA flow
- On occasion rapid OODA based action
- Long term adaptation and control of tempo over time not just by incident(driving the British and the prisoner treatment are offered as examples).
2. OODA analysis by parts allows one to see the second bullet above and leads to learning for vitality and growth:
3. OODA as learning process of vitality and growth in both Washington as leader and Continental Army as a fighting force. Valley Forge was yet to come and was as difficult or more a survival-problem winter than that of the Forage War. But eventually the Continental Army would have to fight the stand-up European version of warfare. Cornwallis eventually had to be beaten in the field. The vitality and growth of winter ’77 provided the basis for survival and transformation via training in winter ’78 for a conventional fight.
Ed, great thread here. I to believe the BOYD Cycle fits into both spontaneous and progressively unfolding circumstances. I wrote on this in Critical decision Making Under Pressure and maybe this group can expand on it as part of this thread. Of course I am taking into consideration trained and able responders. Below is a piece from the article adapted slightly, that I think fits into this thread.
The Winning Combination: Gathering Explicit (slow transient) and Implicit (fast transient) Information???
Ed and All, I freely admit to not being as well read as I should/could be on history and military doctrine, but I fully believe this discussion hits at the heart of early decision making for many first responders including supervisors. – Critical Decision Making Under Pressure – as Fred has noted and written about. Since that is my frame of reference, I will offer some thoughts on some of the key factors related to OODA Loop and first responders.
For Observations, I have found that some responders develop their SA once and then do not re-observe until things get bad or a sudden change occurs on the incident. Kind of the frog in the boiling water analogy. The other big problem I have seen is the use of the opposite of SA, which I refer to as little “sa” or “speculation and assumptions”. This kind of observation is often found in multi agency, multi jurisdiction incidents where things have gone wrong.
I have noted that Orientation often stays confined to where a responder starts at an incident. Some also freeze their orientation to a specific point in time as they make decisions, usually their first encounter at the scene. They do not use OODA as a loop.
Decide and Act are two areas we seem to be good at, but not always in the correct order. In fatality events, I believe we sometimes follow the process of Act, Decide, Observe, Orient. This is completed at about the point of no return.
These opinions come from witnessing close calls and reviewing several fatality scenes and reports involving first responders who had discretionary time to make decisions, but failed to make the right ones. Thoughts?
R. Ranger Dorn
Ventura County FD
Ranger, you got me thinking. OODA Loop ala the Boyd Cycle, is called the OODA loop but it much more complex as you allude to. It is more like a damn pinball machine of observation-orientation-decision and action, than it is a loop. I heard Chet Richards (Chet I believe it was you, if not my apologies) say once he wished Boyd had named OODA Loop something else, because it simplifies the complexity of the decision making process and what it actual means to observe, orient, decide, and act in the context of conflict and crisis.
I agree that first responders do observe and orient and they also often get stuck there. Why? Due to the confusion and uncertainty of the event, both internal and external friction, as you stated the “frog in boiling water” sitting there waiting to get cooked. The psychological and physiological effects of fight or flight (survival stress), not familiar with the environment, not exactly sure what’s going on, worry over doing the wrong thing, liability issues, disciplinary issues, attitude, POOR OR INCONSISTANT TRAINING, the list goes on. I just wrote this on friction and will help explain, my thoughts least partly of the “why” behind getting stuck in OO http://www.lesc.net/blog/critical-decision-making-under-pressure-ldquofrictionrdquo-why-simplest-thing-so-difficult
I have found we often get stuck in the Decision and action phases as well. The call comes in and we with a false sense or hyper-sense of urgency just GO AND GET THEM, GO AND GET IN, GO AND RECUE, etc. I call these emotional responses or reckless responses! There is observation but none other than the initial radio call and the front door to the scene, nor is there an attempt to orient to what’s taking place so, there is no real-time situational awareness. As Boyd stated, Decisions without actions are pointless and actions without decisions are reckless. This creates often times self induced jeopardy or “Officer Created Jeopardy” this can affect any first responder, anyone, who finds themselves in crisis and is unprepared.
How do we keep the decision making cycle intact, how do we keep it fluid, so we outpace the circumstances and bring control to chaos or order to disorder? Does OODA have to be in order or can we act, decide, observe and orient as Ranger described? To act, must we first at least sense something even if its subconsciously or intuitively sensed. Observation is utilizing all your senses all six seeing, hearing, smell, touch, taste and intuition (the sixth sense). When things happen fast, it may feel like we observed nothing but in reality we did, the brain just processes the information so fast we subconsciously respond.
Short version of a long story: I was shot at once and never saw the person doing the shooting until about 2-3 minutes after the shooting was over. I heard the shots, but I was inside the patrol car coming to a stop and did not know exactly where they were coming from. My initial thoughts “someone was trying to kill me!” After I rolled out of my patrol car that was struck by a round, I focused in on a door 50 yards away. I had no conscious clue why I focused there. I was confused and fearful because I did not know where the bad guy was. I would break what I thought was tunnel vision on the door and scan the wooded area to no avail and come back to the door. Moments later the shooter (A GUY TARGET PRACTICING) on the other side of the door came out to investigate what the police were doing in front of his house. This is a true story! The guys was target practicing with a ¼ inch piece of plywood and bull’s-eye target pasted facing the street and neighborhood. He had no clue he shot at me or that he put 130 rounds in the house across the street from him. Thanks God the neighbors were away on vacation. Ok enough on that! My point of the story, would be, I subconsciously knew (observed) this is where the guy was. I suspect from hearing the shots and the subconscious took over. I have never been able to explain it without some great laughs and jokes about Yoda and the force being with me. ?
When I study, research, discuss, and write about, decision making under pressure and the Boyd cycle I often recall this incident and remember the power of the subconscious and how it relates to and effects the phases of the Boyd Cycle. There is something to be said about this piece of the equation (INTUITIONS ROLE) when we explore this in the realm of conflict and violence. What we cannot sense explicitly, like actually seeing the guy with the gun, we often times ignore and that can be detrimental to solving complex problems. Other times we can be so overly focused on one thing we miss the 300 pound gorilla in the room standing in front of what we are focused on. Implicit guidance and control, which Boyd talks about in his discourse and is integral to OODA, is relevant to the fast transient, unconventional and complex situations we find ourselves in. Slower transient, progressively evolving situations means we can get more explicit. But always be prepared to adapt. There a relationship here between the implicit and explicit worlds, exactly how there related I am not sure but I feel this understanding may make us more effective in dealing with the simple, complicated, complex and chaotic in whatever order they are thrown at us.
Questions; does OODA always flow in order? How does this effect situational awareness and hence decision making?
Ranger great insights.
I need a nap after writing this, not quite sure it’s much more than thinking out loud. Look forward to your dissection of this.
Ed, et al:
The Boyd’s Cycle (OODA) Loop is certainly a good tool for modeling crisis decision-making. It describes a dynamic process that decision-makers negotiate to identify and resolve problems or tactical/operational situations. It must be emphasized that the O-O-D-A formulation is actually more detailed the “top-line” description usually discussed. The complete model actually has several detailed interactions within each “phase.” In my experience, the hardest phase or “stage” is “Orientation” since many cognitive failures (including “intelligence” and “decision” failures occur in this stage/phase). Orientation has many integrated components. These are grounded in the “analysis/synthesis” process (breaking the situation apart and then reassembling the components and related influences into a cohesive picture that represents threat, risk, opposing forces action, etc.). Orientation is influenced by cultural, social, and organizational factors, prior training, biases, etc. Essentially orientation is influenced by knowledge.
For responders to complex situations (disasters, battles, campaigns, etc.) Orientation is—on r should be ubiquitous and embedded in the on-going processing of situation and action-counter action—hence the O-O-D-A… This requires an adaptive approach that is executed by command and supported by intelligence. Inputs are captured by “sensors” which include humans and a range of technological tools, processed and analyzed (in the orientation phases), a decision is made based on an assessment of viable or implementable course of action that optimize the balance between situation, commander’s intent, and resources available. Often optimization is actually “satisficing” or finding the most likely option to succeed in the time available. (See Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision for a discussion of this dynamic). Time is often the critical component, however this does not mean the “fastest” decision or “speed” alone leads to success. Rather the relative speed of accurate perception (orientation) and decision to action is key. This process is actually an interactive set of interlocking O-O-D-A transactions. Here, I see analysis/synthesis as the core of “orientation” and the engine of the entire O-O-D-A cycle
(See for example my work on the Transaction Analysis Cycle in previous Project White Horse discussions: http://www.projectwhitehorse.com/pdfs/6.%20CASIS_Sullivan_paper1.pdf ).
Achieving success in this dynamic relies on training/education, exercising, red teaming (or adaptive red teaming/alternative analysis during preparatory phases–pre-incident—and actual response—trans-/post-incident). Here I see the need to bring theory (i.e., principles of land warfare, principles of special operations, decision and theory) into the professional development of public safety responders.
Best,
John
Outstanding points John.
“Achieving success in this dynamic relies on training/education, exercising, red teaming (or adaptive red teaming/alternative analysis during preparatory phases–pre-incident—and actual response—trans-/post-incident). Here I see the need to bring theory (i.e., principles of land warfare, principles of special operations, decision and theory) into the professional development of public safety responders.”
Washington was a master of timing. He knew what his army was capable of and rarely engaged unless he thought he had the advantage. Often avoiding the fight was one of his greatest strategies. In emergency response we often try to take on more than we have the resources for in the initial stages of crisis. We don’t have the option of avoiding the crisis but must step back and apply recourses where they will have the greatest impact at a time. The first arriving responders are often more effective in the outcome of the entire crisis by getting a good “size up” (orientation) and communicating that information back to the organization so that resources can be deployed where they can have the greatest impact.
There is great national movement within the fire service that has cried out for resources not to “self deploy” to disasters. I disagree with this philosophy in part. In cases of major Katrina type disasters the first 72 hours are critical to making rescues of those trapped an injured. There will never be enough local resources to make all the rescues during that time frame. Self deployment of the closest resources will actually save lives. While it is true that these resources will not be following any official Incident Action Plan and may not be tracked and accounted for by whatever command post might be established, the guy hanging out of his roof doesn’t care who rescues him. During the first 72 hours there is usually no command set up that can effectively manage the number of resources needed. After a command is established then I can agree not to self deploy because by that point a resource ordering process is in place and they should be deployed through the system to ensure the right resources get where they need to be.
One of the deficiencies in current incident command training is how to “orient” your self to the situation. Responding to an unfolding event is totally different that commanding a planned event. Smaller units within emergency response system will already be working on the problems prior to the arrival of commanders. There will already be a momentum developed that even though might not be as efficient as it could be, cannot be stopped to go with a cleaner plan. To do so will cost lives. This is one of the most difficult lessons to be learned by the incident commanders. When the incident is of a large scale you have to just let the responders do their thing and start planning and getting resources for 2 or 3 days down the road, if not command will be just as overwhelmed as the responders are. Accept that the local departments, stations, precincts will self organize and do what they can with the resources they have without you giving them a plan to go by. After 72 hours however they will start to run out of resources and become ineffective and possibly even become victims themselves.