Project White Horse Forum

   Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

 This is the first in several planned posts under EEI on the impact on  how we fight in future conflict of decisions related to mission definition, policy, and force structure .

From  Stratfor (re-published with permission) Summary - U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ attempt to halt production of the controversial F-22 “Raptor” air-superiority fighter got a boost July 21 when the U.S. Senate voted against funding additional airframes. It appears that the Senate is heeding U.S. President Barack Obama’s promise to veto the defense authorization bill if it includes additional funds for new F-22s.  

Why would  the cancellation of additional buys of Air Force F-22 fighters be considered an essential element of information for a culture of preparedness on a website focused on time critical decision making in worst case disasters? Consider this from STRATFOR’s article:

Gates is attempting to change not just what the Pentagon is buying, but its fundamental understanding of what it is procuring weapon systems for and why. Cold War-era weapons with such focused utility as the F-22 are not what he believes the Pentagon needs with an uncertain future, while the promised flexibility of the F-35 is appealing to him.

With so much in flux, fixed force structure requirements have gone right out the window, even as the Air Force struggles to reconcile what it wants with what it can afford. Meanwhile, Gates is attempting a more fundamental reorientation of the entire Pentagon, with greater emphasis on the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘hybrid wars’ and ‘fourth-generation’ warfare (embodied by the 2006 Israeli conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon).

(PWH emphasis added)

As we move in time from 9-11, the DOD force structure decisions will impact decisions on risk mitigation, risk management, level of risk acceptance the homeland security, public safety and first responder organizations nation wide will have left on their plate. Understanding these issues, it would seem, is then essential and critical for citizens, private sector and local government. Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) was the focus of the Fall ’07 PWH edition beginning with Dr. Chet Richards’ article and has been offered repeatedly as a necessary ”window” for understanding the problems of this century.   The nature of warfare and the decisions on future force structure decisions and the potential impact on disaster response will be a continued focus in future EEI posts.

For the entire STRATFOR article

Analysis – The U.S. Senate voted July 21 against funding the production of additional F-22 “Raptor” fighter jets for the U.S. Air Force, marking a significant victory in U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ effort to terminate the program. Gates has fought attempts to extend production beyond the planned 183 airframes (now increased to 187) in what has become a hotly contested issue — both inside and outside the Pentagon.

The matter is not settled completely. The U.S. House of Representatives has tentatively inserted language and funds in its version of the defense authorization bill to extend F-22 production, and the two versions will have to be reconciled before the legislation goes before U.S. President Barack Obama. Obama has promised to veto the bill if it includes any additional funds for new F-22s, and the 58-40 Senate vote is a strong indication that the president’s threat is being heeded on Capitol Hill.

Gates wants to shift funding from the Raptor to more aggressively field the F-35 Lightning II, the product of the international Joint Strike Fighter program and the other fifth-generation fighter in the pipeline. (Fifth generation means the design incorporates stealth characteristics, advanced avionics and other integrated features that will characterize fighter-jet design in the coming decades.) Gates’ move is part of the larger orientation of the Pentagon toward current and likely future wars, and the issue is the long-term makeup of the Air Force’s manned fighter force and more than a trillion dollars worth of aircraft.

Both the F-22 and the F-35 have their roots in the Cold War and are similar in outward appearance. The underlying differences between the two designs have been the subject of the most intense debate. In the simplest terms, the F-22 may be understood as the high-end, air-superiority fighter intended to replace the larger, F-15 Eagle, which is more expensive than the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Conversely, the F-35 was designed from the ground up as a more affordable, multirole fighter intended to replace the smaller, less expensive F-16 (and to be exported for use by other militaries).

In terms of cost, the F-22 is the product of a $65 billion investment and is widely regarded as both extremely expensive and extremely capable as the best air-superiority fighter in the world. The investment, however, is already sunk while the unit fly-away cost per airframe has dropped below $140 million — though there have also been reports of excessive maintenance requirements and costs for keeping F-22s flying. Conversely, fewer built airframes means heavier wear and tear on those that are built, requiring more maintenance down the road to extend service life, and sooner replacement.

By comparison, the F-35 has cost closer to $45 billion to develop (like the F-22 program before it, the F-35 is running billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule) while the objective unit fly-away cost per airframe once production picks up is anticipated to be around $80 million. The U.S. military currently intends to acquire nearly 2,500 F-35 airframes, making the ultimate unit price critical. A difference of a million dollars per airframe will be a matter of billions of dollars in total acquisition cost. But for the moment, the initial production airframes (which are still in testing) cost more than an F-22 airframe. Whether the $80 million objective will be achieved, as well as the ultimate maintenance costs, remain to be seen.

But the question of cost is more than just whether an airframe is worth it. Such expenses impact matters like operational readiness, pilot training and how many airframes the USAF can afford to procure. Indeed, in June 2008 when USAF Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley and USAF Secretary Michael Wynne were both fired by Gates in part for their unwavering support for the F-22 program, they were accused by some of mortgaging the Air Force’s future in order to pay for the F-22. In other words, the opportunity costs for the Air Force in terms of everything from space and cyberspace to doctrinal development, training and research and development are also a concern.

Then there is the issue of capability. Though much of the data about the F-22’s true capabilities is classified and the capabilities of the F-35 remain to be seen, the debate over the appropriate mix for the Air Force has been intense. Even after Moseley and Wynne were fired, Gen. John D.W. Corley, the commander of Air Combat Command, composed a letter in June to Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga. (a vocal F-22 supporter) expressing concern about allowing F-22 production to end long after Gates had made his intent to terminate F-22 production unequivocal.

The issue centers on the fact that the F-22 was built specifically as an air-superiority fighter (with some secondary strike roles) while the F-35 program had air superiority as only one of many missions. That program was actually created in part by combining a series of late-Cold War aircraft development programs from across the service branches. The F-35 is a multirole fighter, which means that it makes sacrifices in each mission area in order to be capable in other mission areas. Some critics suggest that the F-35 is trying to do too much, and has made too many design compromises. But Gates is more interested in its close-air support capability and multimission functionality. The former is valuable now in Iraq and Afghanistan and the latter makes it a more flexible aircraft with utility across a much broader spectrum of mission areas.

However, the F-22 program is also a decade older than the F-35 program, and the F-35 thus incorporates more advanced technologies in many areas. So while the F-22 is more maneuverable than the F-35 (only the F-22 has vectored thrust engines that can use engine thrust to maneuver) and has a larger internal weapons capacity (eight air-to-air missiles compared to four), the F-35 has some more advanced capabilities even in the air-to-air role, such as the capability to target a missile at a threat behind the aircraft itself without turning.

Military capability does not exist in a vacuum. Claims about how many airframes are needed — particularly the claims of ‘too few’ and ‘enough’ — are rooted in threat assessments and estimates about potential adversaries’ capabilities as well as future mission requirements. The problem is that these are just assessments and estimates. With the future unclear, it is easy to exaggerate or downplay potential threats in order to bolster a certain position.

But further complicating matters, the most comprehensive review of one the Pentagon’s fundamental force structure requirements since the end of the Cold War is now under way. It is increasingly clear that the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review already in progress will end the requirement for the U.S. military to be able to fight two near-simultaneous conventional major regional wars (essentially a 1991 Desert Storm campaign and a war on the Korean Peninsula).

Gates is attempting to change not just what the Pentagon is buying, but its fundamental understanding of what it is procuring weapon systems for and why. Cold War-era weapons with such focused utility as the F-22 are not what he believes the Pentagon needs with an uncertain future, while the promised flexibility of the F-35 is appealing to him.

With so much in flux, fixed force structure requirements have gone right out the window, even as the Air Force struggles to reconcile what it wants with what it can afford. Meanwhile, Gates is attempting a more fundamental reorientation of the entire Pentagon, with greater emphasis on the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘hybrid wars’ and ‘fourth-generation’ warfare (embodied by the 2006 Israeli conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon).

It has long been STRATFOR’s position that the U.S.-jihadist war is winding down, and that near-peer military competition for the United States cannot be considered a relic of the past. But there is a third matter that clouds the understanding of long-term force structure requirements: the extremely rapid development of technology.

Even Gates has begun to characterize the F-35 as likely to be the last manned fighter jet. Autonomous (as opposed to simply ‘remote-controlled’) flight software is becoming more and more capable. Last year, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency program demonstrated such software’s capability to compensate for major structural damage to an airframe mid-flight (more quickly and precisely than a human pilot). Meanwhile, modern surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles are becoming increasingly difficult to evade — and the human body is becoming the limiting factor.

This is not to say that humans do not have a role in the cockpit or that human decision-making can be replaced. It remains to be seen how quickly and how broadly unmanned systems can be fielded in the coming decades. How rapidly that horizon approaches will also have considerable bearing on appropriate size and composition of the Air Force’s manned fighter jet force.

Ultimately, the Air Force has not been meaningfully challenged in terms of air superiority in decades, and it retains its advantage. But such advantages do not maintain themselves and very capable late-model Russian Su-30 series “Flankers” are being widely proliferated. Though not fifth-generation, quality can compensate for quantity only so much. And just as the decision that Gates made about the F-22 can be traced back to decisions made by the Clinton administration, the ramifications of Congress’ vote on the F-22 will not be apparent for a decade or more.

Tags: 4GW, Adaptability, Culture of Preparedness, F-22, Future Warfare, Raptor, STRATFOR