Jan.27.2009
1:45 pm
by Ed Beakley
RC#26 RC – AI (Part 2)
>> Thread #2 Intelligence meaning and usage in natural disasters with Katrina as an event example
As we move further down the time line from September 11, 2001, multiple issues and events tend to push professional response organizations toward an "all hazards" approach. Those focused by agency or function speciffically on intelligence, anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, gang response, emergency management, fire, or law enforcement can argue both sides of the question whether that makes us more or less capable in the event of crisis.
This post continues the comments on resilient communities and actionable intelligence from RC#25 related to thread #2 focused on what we can learn from the response to "Katrina." It's significance is that the comments address "intelligence" – generally thought of in terms of acts by humans, either criminal or warfighter – as a function of needs in response to a non-human generated disaster.
The issue is not so much what is most efficient or effective (though obviously important), but rather what can be learned from an intersection of experience from Marines and firemen and cops and brain surgeons in light of unconventional crisis, unconventional responses.
Filed in 4GW, Adaptive Leadership, Intelligence, Resilient Community, Team of Leaders | 8 responses so far
PWH beginning comment for thread #2
In considering RC-AI, reflect upon the following from Dr. Erwan Lagadec, Foreign Policy Institute Fellow at the Paul H. Nitze School of of Advanced International Studies:
This culture, indeed, serves complex systems well when they have to address conventional crisis. It ensures that minor destabilizations do not compromise the coherence of chains of command, the coordination of stovepiped sectors, or the rationality of decision-making processes… the important thing, in this respect, being that “you should not be exchanging business cards when crisis hits.”
... unconventional events will overwhelm this culture and the lines of defense which it has laid out. When catastrohic or hypercomplex crises hit, a culture that is geared towards preserving the coherence of chains of command and behaviors through inflexible prescriptions is not a strength, but a lethal weakness – as it impedes the creativity, indeed the audacity necessary to respond to chaotic and unprecedented events. Suddenly all frameworks of reference are blurred, including sometimes the identification of the problem… the leaders’ own turf becomes unrecognizable, as it dawns on them that they now find themselves behind enemy lines, that the crisis is calling the shots, and that they need a new map of the environment – which they do not have.
... indeed, it is no exaaggeration to claim that systems will rather go down than challenge their culture in order to adapt to the new groundrules set by unconventional events.
...Time and again, following such events, official reports take good note of the fact that systemic “frontlines” were overwhelmed like so many Maginot lines. Yet, these reports rarely extract themselves from the same cultural paradigms:...lack of resources, lack of communication, lack of coordination, and simply ask for more assets and more training in the future.
This does not challenge nearly enough prevailing leadership mechanisms.
I’ll be your Huckleberry
(PWH Note: This exchange is carried over from comment #7 and reply comment #10 from RC#25, and begins the thread linking actions during Katrina to use of actionable intelligence.)
From GI Wilson
... ICS builds on the local commander on scene and goes from there but no doubt the local incident commander is in charge. Break, when Gen Honore showed up on the ground in NOLA kicking ass and breaking life and survival back into people that was local but globally seen. Wonder what “theater intel he had when untangling a jammed intersection and hand holding the some incredible characters.
From Dag von Lubitz
Had theater intelligence worked properly, General Honore would not need to be in New Orleans, thousands of poor sods would not have either died or been ruined, and the General would not need to talk about Railroad Street. (See RC#24)
There was NO intelligence – neither conceptual nor literal, and it took one man with brains, initiative, immense skills, and do NOT forget that – humanity – to sort the nonsense out. Actually because of the lack of theater intelligence I had the privilege of being in a potent mess as well. We didn’t get it then, we don’t get it now. What you need at the ground level is a well and quickly functioning brain. What may keep you from ever being on the ground level is the said theater intelligence and its sub-pieces. Not always, but often enough.
From GIW
not sure if I agree…I was in Iraq and one of Seabee sailors was from NOLA was talking to a relative on the ground via cell getting lots of intel as well as watching the news….are you suggesting that intelligence would have preempted Katrina….I think it is what you do with the info locally and way too many stayed despite the warnings…..............not despite no intel.
From Lt. Fred Leland (Law Enforcement and Security Consulting http://www.lesc.net/ )
Information gathering is key at both the “theater” and “local” levels…where we are weak – and I will speak for the law enforcement profession – is in the sharing of information. It does no good for those in the command post having “critical Intel” if it does not get filtered down to the frontline. Sounds rather basic I know but if those in charge have the information they better make damn sure it gets to the people who need it. That’s the biggest problem with Intel gathered, it does not frequently get passed on.
My experience however has been what comes from the street (local) is key to developing good strategy and tactics for handling whatever the problem is, if the information is followed up on. Local issues spread like wild fire and that info being feed up and shared at all levels is key to the overall Intel gathering and sharing process.
In this dialog Hurricane Katrina was mentioned. Now I was not there so this is a bystanders opinion from reading AARs and reports. It seems to me If the information (Intel) being filtered down for five days prior on the hurricane’s approach was taken seriously as to the level of threat (HIGH) it posed and the information at the local level on the dams and other infrastructures readiness (lack thereof) etc. was passed from local up to FEMA and across the local area, possibly there would have been a more robust response, from both local citizens who chose to stay instead of heeding the warnings (ACTIONABLE INTEL) and from those responding in the aftermath?
Intel is a up-down-left-right “gathering and sharing” process – one compliments the other. Again in my view I don’t care where the INFO comes from (most good info comes from people not even in the business, for example a person on the street) as long as it has a potential of being actionable Intel, pass it on, up or down and let those on the ground corroborate …the sharing of information is the biggest problem that effects responses.
I have seen this information sharing process fail at a local level with law enforcement responses to a variety of calls on a much smaller scale than a Katrina or 9-11 type incident – someone knew something and it did not get passed on, or it was passed on and ignored… What I am trying to say is both theater and local Intel fails, because people are complacent and choose to keep information to themselves at both levels. I will not even get into the human traits we all must fight (egos and personalities) which are a big part of the problem as well, when it comes to gathering and passing on info!
OPENMINDEDNESS, WIILINGNESS TO CONTINUELY LEARN AND SHARE WHAT WE KNOW opens up avenues of INSIGHT (individual and organizational, local and hierarchical) which leads to INNOVATIVE IDEAS AT HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS and the INITIATIVE to get it DONE! This may sound a simplistic view on Intel but it does come down to the simple process of communicating what we know, to those who need it.
I have signed up for Groupintel I feel it will be helpful. Hell just talking about it has been…
From Battalion Chief Ranger Dorn, Ventura County, CA Fire Department
I guess I will offer a different perspective. There was a lot of information from NOLA both before and after landfall from Katrina. There was also intelligence. The use of both will be debated for years. The major downfall in my opinion, was the lack of both information and intel regarding the areas in both Louisiana and Mississippi that were far more at risk and were far worse off after the storm had passed. The media missed much of this and the local to state to federal system broke down (assuming it existed prior to the event). There were communities that did not see responders for days to weeks although NOLA saw many show up.
I responded to the Florida hurricanes in 2004 as well as the 2005 hurricanes and the difference was profound. Florida had a system to determine and share the intel regarding the storms. They made it actionable from the local level to the federal level. We were pre-staged in Atlanta before the landfall. We filled warehouses and set up field hospitals between hurricanes based on intel. This was a success that crossed functional as well as jurisdictional levels. I believe it was because they had an existing system of systems and one that was experienced handling disasters.
This brings me to our system of systems. As a firefighter, I do not need or want a deep intel analysis such as that required by law enforcement or the military. I do need important information/intel that can be used by my personnel to know when and where to use caution. Before joining the local TEW/TWG in 2000, ( much thanks to John Sullivan and our Sheriffs office for this) , CNN provided most of the intel we operated with. We do not need to know a lot, but we need to know what we need to know and at times we are the only ones who can identify what is important for us to know.
There is a much better flow now of the stuff we need. Getting intel to the person who will benefit from it the most is the challenge for us non- law and military folks. Training in how to recognize and handle actionable intel is missing in many public agencies as is training in how to recognize when you are being probed as part of a terrorist’s intel process. In an interactive system, law enforcement would alert us to potential probing, we would train our folks, they would recognize probing and alert law enforcement, who would then be able to act quickly. The unfortunate reality is at times our folks recognize it way after the fact when they mention “the guy with the camera and all the funny questions” to someone with a knowledge of probing.
A few opinions from another profession.
From GI Wilson
Ranger, like your comments and suggest failure to plan played a big role for ‘things not happening” as they should.
This paper (http://www.projectwhitehorse.com/pdfs/Planning%20-%20Wilson.pdf ) explores planning failure. It examines the factors and influences that lead public and private sectors to perpetuate planning failure. Three kinds of institutional failures (failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate) as described in Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch’s book Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War are instructive in addressing planning failure.
The public and private sectors’ planning failures stem from a wide range of reasons. These encompass, lack of resources, funding, imagination, and simply not planning ahead. The challenges of planning failures are nonetheless foreseeable. This paper contends a combination of flawed mental models (e.g. lack of imagination, faulty assumptions, analysis paralysis), lack of risk awareness, preference for the status quo, and factors such as groupthink and “turf” battles contribute to planning failure.
I pray we do not take this road again… fix it then go back to our old ways again…seems to be a cycle we are enraptured with.
... I dimly recall FEMA under “Whit” ( a lawyer no I believe) made a huge turn around and one thing that jumps out that he did was to get FEMA units responding in the field connect to an uplink of sat com. Has their connectivity to go up and out….local to global.
James L. Witt as the FEMA director was the first FEMA head guy (top boss man) with experience as a state emergency manager (i.e. this local experience). He initiated sweeping reforms that streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations, insisted on a new emphasis regarding preparedness and mitigation, and focused agency employees on customer service. The end of the Cold War (a global focus) also allowed Witt to redirect more of FEMA’s limited resources from civil defense (global orientation) into disaster relief (local events), recovery (local efforts) and mitigation ( local in most respects) programs.
Witt.was able to connect local to global (and vice versa) and FEMA understood that info and intel flowed both ways….John Boyd used to tell when we discussed the OODA Loop that bureaucracy and high level officials never understood that and when it happened, it was very painful at the top…al la Brown in Katrina.
Am I making sense ? By the way not a FEMA SME but seems like a good case study of Witt’s efforts.
From Fred Leland
Making sense sir, yes indeed, reform is what we are talking about and I agree it would make a great case study of these efforts. I guess my question would be “how many local communities are walking the talk and preparing????”
My sources in this area are not positive, a lot of talk but very little action, although there are exceptions where a proactive approach to preparedness is taking place. Sad to say more the exception than the rule. The bigger locals have done some work and preparation, but the suburban areas even just outside the cities are still way behind. Work to be done! Starting with waking those up with the complacent mind.
From Ranger Dorn
There needs to be a connection between intel, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment and most importantly risk management, training and planning before we get to the questions of response. A response without a framework or foundation will only be as good as the best efforts of those involved. A mall shooting or an earthquake in a community that has done nothing will have more impact across the responder spectrum as well as upon the populace than will an event they have prepared for. I hope this is common sense, but I have seen the lack of integrated preparedness across the country.
On another note, there is a draft Intel and Investigation guidance document that is out for comment right now. Might be a good read for those interested or who may want to comment. Look for it in the Federal Register. The document is dated November 25, 2008
RE: FEMA
The folks I respond with have been doing hurricanes with FEMA for many years and the one constant is that every one is handled differently.
2004 and 2005 hurricanes were under the same administration, but were vastly different. I think the issue is two part. The local and state preparedness is the primary factor in a successful response in my opinion. That way FEMA is not the key factor. FEMA has indeed changed, but a constant has been the use of ready reserves to represent FEMA interests to many communities. I have observed them having much power, little training and minimal if any common sense at times. At other times they have been experienced professionals. I remember one FEMA person announcing that he was in charge of Logistics for FEMA. It turned out he drove the satellite link up truck with a portable toilet in tow. That was his only logistical responsibility.
Once again, it is locals who get the job done by knowing what assistance to ask for and integrating responders into a viable system.
When it does not work, people like General Honore have to step in and fill the vacuum.
From Dag von Lubitz
Ranger,
Indirectly, I think, you stress the role of theater intelligence. This can and typically is broken down into segments that provide relevant tactical intelligence and background so that, in case you need more, you know where to get it, how to get it, and what you may get out of it.
The general concept of how “things should work” hovers within the overall concept of ToL (Team of Leaders). Separation among all agencies participating in any type of complex effort is such that the effort is never really cohesive but consists of individual, largely uncoordinated actions which, if we are lucky, will bring us where we want to be, and if not
m we can always tell CNN that “problems have been recognized and shall be corrected next time.” Once again, ToL shortcuts these problems, since within its umbrella there is no waiting time for official actions. ToL members interact in real time, and solutions are generated typically prior to problems becoming major, hampering issues.Also, because a lot of generation has bottom-up permeation (and hence many of the approaches have a chance of being field-tested) you end with generation of knew actionable knowledge, best practices, and provide major input into strategy formulation (actually the “bottom” largely shapes it, with the objectives determined by the “top” – a bit oversimplified but good for the present purpose