Archive for the 'Unconventional Crisis' Category

PWH in 2014 – Retrospective: Socialization of Unconventional Crisis and the Readiness Factor; Next Steps

This is the first post in some time and is intended as a start for the next steps in investigation on decision making in severe crisis. In his 2011 book TEMPO; Timing, Tactics and Strategy in Narrative -Driven Decision Making, Venkatesh Rao provides a process of moving emergent thinking, exploration, sense-making and resultant new models […]

Filed in Adaptive Leadership,Culture of Preparedness,Intersections,Unconventional Crisis | Comments Off

Day is Done – September 11th 2011

As the day closed on September 11 2001, we began the process of “doing what we know”- we had been attacked – strangely suprising to some in other lands, Americans strike back hard when treaded upon – so we went to war in the way we know how.  The events of September 11, 2001 were of such magnitude, […]

Filed in 4GW,Adaptive Leadership,Culture of Preparedness,Learning,Resilient Community,Terrorism,Unconventional Crisis,War and Remembrance | Comments Off

The Earth Strikes Back: 2011 Version- Tsunami

Boundary Condition #1 (4) UPDATE 16 March: See the comments below from PWH’s contributors and advisors One significant element of an unconventional crisis as compared to other large catastrophes is the complex maps of actors – Catastrophic crises systematically involve an enormous variety of stakeholders, on an international scale. Pictures from Japan: http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2011/03/world/hires.japan.quake/index.html?hpt=T1 Preparation? Readiness? […]

Filed in 2011 Boundary Conditions,Disaster in Japan,Unconventional Crisis | Comments Off

Boyd’s Way: More than Rapid – OODA Loops

Boundary Condition #4 (2) From Searching for John Boyd:  … as PWH continues to research and provide discussion on decision making in severe crisis, Boyd and his “way” is the final  of four boundary conditions.  I intend to use the OODA notion of time cycles and competitive behavior as a “lens,” first for analysis of my  […]

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Unconventional Crisis: Impact on Decision Making

Boundary Condition #1 (3) The previous post (2), presented the parameters defining an unconventional crisis as developed by Dr. Erwan Lagadec.  Here in the following table and discussion we  provide comparison of the characteristics that differentiate decision making, leadership and operational response in relation to both routine emergencies and conventional disasters and to unconventional /hyper complex catastrophic […]

Filed in 2011 Boundary Conditions,John Boyd,Unconventional Crisis | Comments Off

Unconventional Crisis: Parameters

Boundary Condition #1 (2)           “Conventional crises rarely require high levels of inbuilt resiliency from our systems. This is because such events tend to affect circumscribed “ground zeros,” and therefore can be tackled by bringing to bear the “normal” assets and strategies of the unscathed outside on the impacted area.  On the other hand, catastrophic […]

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2010: The Earth Strikes Back

Boundary Condition #1 (1) The idea of Intersectional ideas – those resulting from combining concepts from multiple fields or areas of specialization gained through education and experience – has been previously introduced with it’s own PWH section. This is the first of several year ending posts intended to set the stage for intersectional discussions for […]

Filed in 2011 Boundary Conditions,Culture of Preparedness,Elements of Essential Information,Intersections,Learning,Unconventional Crisis | Comments Off