You are touching upon my core efforts and I have a lot to say…but I will only make one comment that needs to be said…

“The stark reality of it all is the avoidance of realities and ‘unpleasantness’ at the expense of a tragedy when the former arrive in one form or another.”

FE - respectfully, agency leaders don’t “avoid realities” but rather have a different set of weighting rules for what is a problem and what is not…they honestly and with full integrity believe that what their agencies can do today is quite sufficient and people like you and I are barking up the wrong tree….

The reason being that our emergency services ARE very effective in handling familiar emergencies for the most part…and they should be, especially given the fact that the cost us 4:1 in comparison to the second most expensive tier systems (Canada, Australia, UK, Germany, Japan etc.)....

I have lectured about the normal heuristics underlying this approach….So I have no criticisms against these follks…they are using the same flawed brain machine that you and I use and just like them I often reach equally flawed conclusions…

I am very optimistic, though…for tangible reasons that belong in another post.

Can you train for that, and the mind numbing sensation and the rattling knees when you go to action? Once in, all changes, but the before and the thereafter are the “twisters” and maybe the reason why performance changes so unpredictably. Lots of writing about it, nothing conveys the reality, and all becomes either a nauseating pulp or academic drivel. Naval firefighting as introduction to true manliness?? Irrepressible stench of burning oil, searing heat, and battling the hose. The reality of it? Far worse. And the stench too. Stays with one forever.
In the end – HOW to prepare/train for the reality of real life (I think, one can not)?

Who does Mumbai if it happens at home? Law enforcement? Largely unable. Special forces a la SAS in London? By the time all political moves to allow for that will have taken place, the place will burn to the ground. Then WHO? The stark reality of it all is the avoidance of realities and “unpleasantness” at the expense of a tragedy when the former arrive in one form or another. Who to blame for it. Politicians are an easy and habitual target, but they, in turn respond to their constituencies. Constituencies? Their main problem right now is how to retain their employment and keep roof over the head? Responders? They operate largely as they are told by copious, at times conflicting, reams of paper thrown at them from the elusive “above.”

Shall action be taken in form of a flank attack, devising a specific alternative through interaction of the concerned “at the bottom”, then pushed up? Might be among the most powerful career-stoppers ever? Seek allies outside? The ranks are too closed and too unwilling to allow outsiders get the real glimpse of what happens. SO WHAT THE BLAZES DO WE DO? We can’t sit on our hands and wait. As GI said, too important,

Now lets take this cold truth to the next level – imagine the same warrior mental dynamics in action when an attack is ongoing (not consequence phase yet) ON DOMESTIC SOIL….so that we are handling a Mumbai type of event near our homes…not Falujah….changes a lot of things…right?

This has been the nub of the issue for me since the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici theatre started in the Nineties.

Are we training to that mindset? Hearing people talking about a deliberate attack as nother “criminal” or “HAZMAT” incident seems to indicate otherwise, in spite of all the money spent on sensitizing folks to the harsh reality.

.....another thing I used to train ‘rookies’ going into combat for the time was firefighting training and all live fire ranges ….Navy shipboard firefighter training is particularly good for you train with real fire not blanks or laser tag. Makes a big difference when you take rounds the first time. Lastly, each day in combat is different….some days personnel are incredibly brave blazing away then the next day the very same personnel never fire a round and are slow to act.

My experience is in restrictive living environments violent mentally ill and challenged folks, from time to time we have issues, that come from their rights to be in the community. We support them with staffing and support while they are out and about. On bad days entire neighborhoods have been in an uproar, with police involvement, staff injuries and frightened neighbors. I train my staff for everything I have seen, but the most important training is to get them to work with the adrenaline rather than against it when crises arise. We have several techniques to do this, but there is little time to go into this now and the training does produce solid results, but we can always do better.

I think most would agree with Ranger’s earlier sentiment. “I cannot begin to guess what first responders would do in the face of a
bio/pandemic…”

Dag makes a realistic point concerning human nature with the following statements. “Judging responses based largely on psychology on historical precedence is dangerous, because the psyche of the past generation was formed by different reality, required a different degree of mental resilience to severe assault, and responded differently. We do not have “mass casualty” environments like in WW1 for example, and I doubt if ANY soldier today would cold bloodedly go right into the face of a machine gun…..”

For me personally the biggest fear in my field is not being assaulted. My biggest fear is a false accusation that would cost me my job and reputation if I cannot prove that something did not happen. So I insulate myself from this by always having someone else present. For others it is contracting some type of blood borne disease from a client. Yet many folks don’t even know what their fear is until the confront it, or they are deluded about their degree of courage. In short what one man fears another may dismiss. There is also the issue of culture, in my immediate living environment, gun shots in surburbia would be shocking, yet in my early years, they were expected.

One point that we have to remember as well is that we have people who are hardened, irreverent, itching for a fight, yearning to cause massive casualties and carried along by virulent ideas of revolt against whatever. In my field the Virginia tech massacre was an example of such madness and spillover. He was the poster boy for Health & Welfare’s current state.

Summarizing the relevant non-neuro parts, please allow me to open another “can of worms.” consider this:

What is a “decision”? Is there really such a thing as “indecision”?

What is “crisis”?

After being scarred by real-crisis decision-making processes that took place from the tactical to the international levels I ask “what decisions that are to be made” and Who are the “decision makers” in these all-engulfing, other-than-routine incidents? What prepares them to decide? I made many mistakes in my own decision making and they taught me the most.

In a democracy – how far-reaching should the decisions put in the hands of hired-appointed employees be? Thinking of how we “raise” our employees throughout their agency careers: do we really prepare them to make required grand-strategic, bold decisions with international implications? In my experience many agencies tend to be inflated, territorial, rigid, expensive and hyper-tactically-oriented agencies, and so should be the kind of decisions left to them to handle. But – some of us still speak of them as the only “decision makers.”

Regretfully, we (federal government) have abandoned homeland security to narrowly – focused tactical organizations and absolved the high-level policy makers from responsibility. So, in practice – we have placed the burden on the shoulders of non-representative technocracy.

What is it in past experience or constitutional traditions that assures us tacticians should/could handle social/community level/value based decisions? How exactly is a police officer/firefighter/paramedic/technician (regardless of rank) authorized/qualified to make a Strategic level decision, and I mean real “strategic” not in the sense used in ICS or other tactical environments?

I referred to Civil Society as one “secret weapon” in this battle, including the decision process. Citizens are our reason d’etre, and they can become the SOLUTION, not the problem. In medical school we used to bitterly joke in reference to the bloated egos of some of our professors that hospitals would run better if they had no patients … listening to some tactical types I wonder if for them the country would run better if
there were no citizens….

Preparedness/Training/Exercise: Are we really short on training or is it the attitude that sees at HS as a “cash cow” or an opportunity to pad one’s resume? For example, speaking of “streamlining” the training process I contend that for the typical LE, FS, HZ at least for 51% it means – “everybody should follow my lead so give me the money.”

As boring as these points are – I have found, time and again that their mundane and trivial nature trumps even the most brilliant of operational insights. I cant begin to describe the web of self-promoting infighting that stands in the way of good decision-making. Given these traumas I have taught myself to shy away from Army War College thesis Style analysis and statements that sound great but are meaningless unless
translated into real-world (underscore “real”) environment.

So again – as far as our discussion goes – what are we referring to? It seems to me, by inference that everybody is speaking from the techno-tactical and operational level….most insights presented so far seem to be presented from that perspective….is that this our focus?

From 26 yrs of involvement at both these major “floors” of the building – I can tell you that they are VERY different in their perspectives and processes….almost “parallel Monads” I find that almost all tactical operatives have selective knowledge or understanding of the strategic level….

I well remember that week-long training evolution. Good stuff!

I fear the upper echelons eschew the unfamiliar. They don’t want to appear inept in front of their troops. While I appreciate that inclination, leadership demands moving beyond it. I don’t think bottom-up pleas will work—they will be ignored. Nor is it likely top-down mandates will work—they will be ignored or more likey the task will be delegated (probably certain).

The answer then lies in peer-mandate. This is what happened in the UK. ACPO (the Association of Chief Police Officers) served as the catalyst for getting senior police prepared for complex command at Gold (strategic), Silver (operational), and Bronze (tactical) levels.

The senior UK police I have worked with are light years ahead of their US counterparts at all levels of critical incident command. In part this is due to sustained operational experience (historically the IRA and now AQ affiliates), but in large measure it is due to professional norms. We must develop those here! We need a peer-proponent to advocate senior command education, training, and mentorship. This will include command colleges, personnel exchanges with military and police worldwide, and exchanges between police and fire (at a minimum).

I’m sure the next (few) 9-11 scale events will drive this, but a “peer-proponent” involved in the IACP, IAFC, NSA, or Major City Chiefs would work better!

Reply from Dag von Lubitz
I am sure you may recall Gen. Brown’s remark about “initial command support.” Critical. Without that bottom up initiatives fail. Mandated initiatives – we have seen their fate too, so there is no need to discuss. Peer initiative that you mention is, essentially, “command support” since ACPO has such role in so many different ways. Mind you, UK situation is facilitated by vastly lesser fragmentation and significantly higher “jointness.” Much of their thought re training derives from the armed forces with which they cooperate very closely (the “Irish tradition”) and with which many policemen are affiliated through reserve component, territorials service, etc. Our own environment would greatly benefit from such influences but, unfortunately, forever finer granularity of the field is diligently en- and reinforced by the political top echelons. Situation is not hopeless, and all may change pretty soon.

How do we get a level of in depth training like this to meet with the needs of training higher level officials who will take charge? Our responders can have all the skills in the world, but be wasted if those in charge do not know what is available or how they may be utilized. I believe we have more capabilities since 9-11 as responders, but I am not sure the
response system is complete.

I’ve been monitoring this thread for the last few days. There is a lot at stake here, at many levels.

I will raise a few issues and make a few suggestions based on my experience and perspective. Essentially, I have spent the last 15 years seeking to move the ball forward regarding decision-support and operations for catastrophic terrorism and natural disasters in a major metropolitan region. This has included both intelligence and operations as an operator, analyst, fisrt line supervisor (sergeant) and middle manager (lieutenant). It also includes training personnel at all levels of multiple organizations, and even running a multidisciplinary, interagency task force.

I think we need to educate, train, and mentor personnel at all levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) to perform crises decision-making in a complex environment against a range of threats.

This will require both individual and team preparation (education, training, mentoring), as well as cross-training in specialties other than ones own (i.e., intelligence specialists in operations and operations folks in intelligence, etc.) It will also require training across disciplines (I have trained cops, fire, hazmat, public health and EMS personnel to work in integrated intelligence analysis and mission-planning teams. It becomes clear when doing so that “teams” of leaders—and analysts—are needed to meet the complexity and uncertainty found in “Cat 5” events.).

These efforts have to start small, and be amplified with iterative evolutions of increasing complexity. They also need to be tested with drills and exercises (also of varying degrees of iterative complexity, with new functions, roles, and players added.)

Once the team and/or individual is proficient, they need to be challenged at the next level of complexity, as well as in interaction with the other echelons of play. I also believe that playing against a “red team” and “playing with other echelons in cooperative and competitive manuver helps hone skills. Finally, I belive the team has to be challenged with performance decrements (lost, injured, and dead (simulated at least in training and exercises) team members, degraded coms, austere conditions, irate commanders, executives, and politicians, etc. To be able to meet the real challenges we are preparing them for.

The days of a “gentleman’s course” must be over (sadly they are not, especially above a certain rank or rate). My preference is to prepre my team to operate to perform mission critical tasks with a third of optimal capacity.

this preparation should prepare personnel to work a position one up and one down from their normal tasking.
This should also include evolutions at home and in expeditionary settings—I’ve learned much deployed or seconded to other agencies and jurisdictions. (Doing an IPB/IPO—intel preparation of the battlespace or intel preperation for operations—work up or COA—course of action—analysis in another city opens one’s eyes!)

I believe these are essntial elements of preparing for the next attack (or campaign) or catastrophic event. This will require meta-leadership (and meta-analysis). I hope we can stimulate the will to do so, and inspire or subordinate leaders (not to mention our bosses) to embrace these challenges!