Boundary Condition #1 (4)

UPDATE 16 March: See the comments below from PWH's contributors and advisors

One significant element of an unconventional crisis as compared to other large catastrophes is the complex maps of actors – Catastrophic crises systematically involve an enormous variety of stakeholders, on an international scale.

Pictures from Japan: http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2011/03/world/hires.japan.quake/index.h tml?hpt=T1

Preparation? Readiness? Thinking the unthinkable?

Initial earthquake damage, then explosions and massive fire, then 30 feet of water, then flooding., nuclear meltdown, massive radiation in the atmosphere. Where does response start, where is the forward edge of battle, where is the center of gravity? How does leadership define and shape this "battlespace?"

 This most applies does it not? Unconventional Crisis: Parameters

Comments below reflect e-mail discussion that resulted from the recent announcement of the PWH blog Round #2 of the 2011 Boundary Conditions. They address  "unconventional crisis" in context of the catastrophic events ongoing in Japan:

Boundary Condition #1 (3)

The previous post (2), presented the parameters defining an unconventional crisis as developed by Dr. Erwan Lagadec.  Here in the following table and discussion we  provide comparison of the characteristics that differentiate decision making, leadership and operational response in relation to both routine emergencies and conventional disasters and to unconventional /hyper complex catastrophic level events:

Summary of Contrasting Features of Routine and Crisis Emergencies

 (Modification from Leonard and Howitt, Against Desparate Peril: High Performance in Emergency Preparation and Response, John F. Kennedy School of Government. Harvard Business School, 2007.)

The last box under "defining competence" notes "recognition of novelty. Novelty is not only an endemic property of our environment, it is also a fundamental characteristic of social systems and activities. Unconventional crisis create uncertainty as do complex systems.  As uncertainty is central to unconventional crisis, andindeed seems pervasive in our time, it is imperative for organizations to create the ability to operate comfortably in this condition.  Novel input requires adaptability or creation of novelty in response. (Boyd 1992, Osinga 2007)

Discussion of novelty will be a recurring thread thoughout the various boundary condition discussions. For now consider the following:

• The novelty of the situation implies that there is less than complete understanding of the circumstances—or even of which circumstances are relevant. Responders do not necessarily know which facts and observations are relevant and, therefore, which to collect.


• Scripts developed for routine situations may be applicable, but, by definition, there is no comprehensive "playbook" from which the response can be directed;  The existence of significant novelty implies that significant customization or improvisation is likely to be needed. (Clarke, 1999)


• Given the uncertainties born of novelty and the corresponding lack of available comprehensive routines, decisions cannot reliably be driven by pattern recognition (because, by definition, the patterns are not available).  Decision making must proceed through a standard analytical process: the identification of objectives, the development of alternatives, the prediction of likely results from different approaches, and the choice of a best action.


• Because newly improvised approaches or previously untried combinations of existing routines may be implemented, execution is likely to be much less precise than in routine circumstances, which call for more tolerance of imperfections and errors in execution;


• Since new actions may be taken, skills will not have been comprehensively developed for either the design or the execution of the required response. While training in the skills necessary to use existing routines as elements of the newly developed response will be useful, the need for the relevant skill base for components of what is being invented and improvised cannot reasonably have been foreseen and will not be available.  Adaptability will be THE key skill required for both operational and political actors (including departmental participants in EOCs, etc) – a learning requirement.


• A leadership approach generally oriented to producing collaboration that works for directing the development of understanding and the design through invention and improvisation of a new approach—followed by a more authority-driven approach during the execution phase.

Concluding remarks

The level of personnel training, system performance and system-system interoperability acceptable for routine or conventional crisis events does not guarantee usefulness when the environment becomes hyper- complex and severely stochastic.  Nor does the 1) training and experience of key decision makers in the lower end of the spectrum, nor 2) "planned for in the playbook script" leadership insure that the magnitude and novelty of the emerging catastrophe does not overwhelm communities and emergency management, or simply negate "the plans" and won't destabilize the entire response structure. 

Unconventional/Hyper-complex/Catastrophic level events are often noted as Low Probability, High Impact events.  But we should keep in mind that these events are actually Absolute-Certainty, Low-Predictability, High-Impact incidents that take place all the time. (Essmaeel, comments on PWH, 2009)

Hyper complexity makes it near impossible for "traditional" leaders to plan, let alone coordinate response efforts.  Extrapolation of training and system evaluation suitable for routine emergencies and conventional disasters as suitable for unconventional or catastrophic operational response is an intrinsically flawed strategy.

References

Beakley, James E, Evaluation of Interoperability Capability for the Department of Homeland Security, June, 2010

Clarke, Lee, Mission Improbable: A critical look at how governments and corporations plan for accidents and disasters, University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Concept Development: An Operational Framework for Resilience, Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, Arlington, VA., 2009

Elkus, Adam, Science, Defence and Strategy; Without strategy, the science of war overtakes the art of war, http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/adam-elkus/science-defence-a nd-strategy, Jan 2010

Ellis, Aaron, What the Hell is strategy, anyway? http://thinkstrat.wordpress.com/2010/06/12/what-the-hell-is-strategy-a nyway/, June, 2010

Henderson, Joseph V., The Virtual Terrorism Response Academy: Training for High Risk, Low Frequency Threats, Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, 2004

Lagedec, Erwan, Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the Age of Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity, Center for Transatlantic Relations – The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.c., 2007

Leonard, Herman B. and Howitt, Arnold M., Political Control and Operational Command: Building a Balanced Disaster Response System, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006

Leonard, Herman B. and Howitt, Arnold M., Against Desperate Peril: High Performance in Emergency Preparation and Response, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2007

Leveraging Exercise Programs in a New Fiscal Environment, CNA, Alexandria Virginia, 2009

Orr, George E., Major United States Air Force, Combat Operations C3I: Fundamentals and Interactions, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1983

Quarantelli, E.L., Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina, Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 2006

Re-Evaluation of National Security Ordered,  (Article), New York Times, 16 Feb. 2009

Boundary Condition #1 (2)

          "Conventional crises rarely require high levels of inbuilt resiliency from our systems. This is because such events tend to affect circumscribed "ground zeros," and therefore can be tackled by bringing to bear the "normal" assets and strategies of the unscathed outside on the impacted area.  On the other hand, catastrophic or hyper-complex events will destabilize entire systems, forcing leaders and public alike to abandon "normality" altogether, and look for a coherent fallback position. However, it is eminently difficult to organize an orderly general retreat, especially when leaders must redefine a new line of defense while on the run, and from the ground up. Miracles at Dunkirk are precisely that: miracles. Even before the planning phase, and more fundamentally, the makeup of our systems itself must anticipate the destabilizing effects of unconventional events by weaving resiliencies (visible or "hidden") into their fabric." Erwan Lagadec

Unconventional Crisis was discussed briefly in the previous post which introduced the four boundary conditions for PWH 2011 effort.  Indeed, it is really the driving element. While 2010: The Earth Strikes Back summarized UC-type incidents in the past year, here we will provide more in depth explanation.

In the 2007 Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the Age of Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity, Erwan Lagedec noted that In recent history, there is no doubt that the "three horsemen of the Apocalypse" best illustrating the impact and consequences of catastrophic events, for leaders, analysts, and popular culture alike, are September 11, the 2004 Tsunami, and Hurricane Katrina. Most certainly, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti easily qualifies as the fourth horsemen.

Recent catastrophic crises repeatedly have overwhelmed traditional mechanisms for crisis planning and management, and made them instantly obsolete, in several respects.

• The challenge of the "unthinkable" – This series of events has clearly shown that complex Western societies today are not equipped to confront major crises effectively…


• The culture of leaders – Generally speaking, in all countries and sectors, they have proved culturally incapable of taking the "unthinkable" seriously, let alone react effectively when it actually occurred…


• The identity of leaders – The public sector's traditional monopoly on planning and response efforts time and again has shown its limits when confronted with unconventional events. The priority now must be to define new allocations of tasks and responsibilities among the public, private, and humanitarian sectors, as well as the wider…


• Complex maps of actors – Catastrophic crises systematically involve an enormous variety of stakeholders, on an international scale. These include spontaneous, unanticipated coalitions … that can wield extraordinary and unexpected power, especially through the channels of "old" and "new" media alike


• New processes for crisis recovery – Today's unconventional crises generally do not contrast a single "Ground Zero" with an unscathed "outside" from which response can be safely organized: on the contrary, they destabilize systems in their entirety.

Therefore, instead of a clear succession of phases from planning to response to reconstruction (each under the leadership of a different agent, which withdraws and transitions to the next when its job is done), leaders now must tackle the three together, in other words build reconstruction dynamics into their contingency plans (as events in Iraq demonstrated) – all the while taking into account that leaders and responders themselves might be among the victims of unconventional crises.

We must ask what accounts for whether the first response process will be able to provide effective mitigation of unfolding disaster incidents. How can that effort best be organized to respond to significant emergencies? What must be done in advance to create the capacities needed in the face of disasters?  To start, we must recognize the differences between crisis/disaster types and the different set of challenges in planning, execution, and required forms of leadership.  Additionally, we must accept that we will most probably require new and innovative analytical methods and metrics

Dependent upon your source, there are multiple and overlapping terms defining the various levels of the "threat environment" in use for emergency management – planning, mitigation recovery.  Here we  will distinguish between the following conventions:

1. Routine Emergencies and Conventional disasters. 


2. Unconventional/hypercomplex disasters and catastrophes

Each presents a different set of challenges in both planning and execution and requires consideration of different forms of leadership and decision making.  There will be differences in agencies involved, forms of organization, in skills required and skill building at various levels and, resourcing and preparation.  In addition, as events become worse, political and value choices must be addressed and response will now include the private sector, non-profit organizations and spontaneous communal action. This paper submits that the differences are such that these sometime low probability – high impact, or absolute certainty low predictability events require a unique planning and response strategy.

For our purposes, strategy and thinking strategically is:

• to identify priorities, translating those priorities into goals to be achieved, and developing a plan to achieve them by matching goals with resources and figuring out how and when to use those resources to best advantage.


• to understand how an action or an event impacts on your priorities, goals and plan; and if the impact is negative, working out how to remedy the situation.


• to recognize how significantly strategy is impacted by how well the environment of struggle is understood and how well we can adapt to shifting, sometimes non-predictable circumstance. (Ellis, Aaron, 2010)

Routine Emergencies and Conventional disasters.

Many types of emergencies occur every day and are routinely mitigated by local first responders.  In certain areas hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes and fire are seasonal or typical of the area.  The manifestation is well understood and planning well thought out and resourced.  While they move past routine emergencies based on magnitude of destruction and/or significant loss of life, physical response assistance goes no higher than county or state mutual aid and need for federal assistance is basically limited to financial aid.  Command and control during the event and recovery follows the locally developed "playbook."  A Category 3 level (CAT 3) hurricane is a good example of a large emergency or conventional level disaster event, with potential for significant damage, yet normally well understood with only small possibility of response being overwhelmed at the local level.

For routine/conventional disaster consider the following:

• Overall understanding of the nature of the situation is high and so knowledge of facts and what needs to be observed is high.


• Decision makers have high correlation of the event with past experience, quickly recognize patterns that trigger response decisions.  This is Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPDM)


• Playbooks and included scripts of action are valid requiring little customization


• Functional organizations, skills required vs. trained in skills have high correlation and mitigating action can be implemented with high confidence of success


• Leadership within the Incident Command System is well understood and established for effective, efficient, operations conduct with minimum risk associated.

Unconventional/hyper-complex disasters/catastrophic events 

Researchers note that there are "disasters that go beyond typical disasters." The latter have come to be noted as "catastrophes."  Most notably would be 9/11, the 2004 Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and in 2010, the earthquakes in Haiti and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

By virtue of unusual scale, a previously unknown cause, or an atypical combination of sources, responders face challenges that are indeed novel, the facts and implications of which cannot be completely assimilated in the moment of crisis. (Leonard and Howitt, 2007)

These events are not only characterized by high stakes—the likelihood of major losses (to life, limb, property, heritage, or other highly valued social or private assets) – but they have shared striking similarities, inasmuch as they foster destabilization of leaders in charge of response and reconstruction efforts, and the whole of communities. (Lagadec, 2007)

Catastrophes generally exhibit a high level of uncertainty about just what the outcomes will be and a high degree of contingency - significant variability in the possible outcomes that may result under different choices of action. Much is at stake, and the results will depend on what we do—but we do not know for certain which course of action will be best.

These events are thus distinguished from more familiar or routine emergencies and conventional disasters by the presence of significantly new circumstances and different kinds of intellectual challenges, thus the use of the terminology unconventional crises. (Lagadec, 2007, 2009)

The main characteristic of unconventional events is that they are exceedingly difficult to map. This can be due to (a) the technical complexity of response efforts; (b) an unusually complex geography of affected areas; (c) the potential for a crisis suddenly to affect systems and interests that initially seemed remote ; (d) a bewildering kaleidoscope of stakeholders; or (e) confusing, overwhelming, or, conversely, insufficient information. With high degree of difficulty in "mapping" the operational environment, we now require decision making under circumstance with hyper complex characteristics or parameters:

1. Most or all of the community built structure is heavily impacted.  In addition, in catastrophes, the facilities and operational bases of most emergency organizations are themselves usually hit.


2. Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role, and this often extends into the recovery period. Related to the observation just made, local personnel specializing in catastrophic situations are often unable for some time, both right after impact and into the recovery period, to carry out their formal and organizational work roles. Many leadership roles may have to be taken by outsiders to the community. 


3. There may not be a "ground zero" with an unscathed reasonable proximity "outside" from which response can be safely organized.  Help from nearby communities cannot be provided.  Many nearby communities not only cannot contribute to the inflow, but they themselves can become competing sources for an eventual unequal inflow of goods, personnel, supplies and communication


4.  Most, if not all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and concurrently interrupted.


5. The presence of significant novelty implies that understanding of the situation, at least at the outset, will be relatively low, and that there will be no executable playbook/script or routine that is known or identifiable and that provides a comprehensive, reliable, and fully adequate response. Existing routines are inadequate or even counter-productive. Dealing with a crisis emergency thus means that the response will necessarily operate beyond the boundary of planned and resourced capabilities. It will necessarily be unplanned (or, at least, incompletely planned), and the resources and capabilities will generally be (or seem) inadequate.


6. By their inherent nature – high stakes, urgency, and associated fear and stress—unconventional disaster events are necessarily political as well as operational matters. All disasters of course involve, at a minimum, local political considerations, but here the political and mass media arenas become even more important.   And it is a radically different situation when the national government and the very top officials become directly involved.  Diffusion of rumor is high, organizational weaknesses of responding organizations surface and questions of "who's in charge?" reiterated.  In significant crisis events, both political and operational officials will have important—and different—roles to play.  Hyper complex unconventional catastrophe events, in which the operational decision makers and responders are operating beyond the bounds of what they have planned, practiced, and are resourced for—will necessarily confront senior decision makers with conflicts of values. Values are intrinsically political in nature and should involve determinations by people with the political legitimacy to authorize, warrant, and defend the choices made.


7. If the true nature of the crisis is emergent vice immediately recognizable – difficulty in recognizing the novelty and therefore a break from normal operating pattern required – responders and decision makers may fail to note serious inadequacies or need for assistance.  Not only will all the other factors impact the decision/response process but the emergent challenges arise in context of organizations and teams that are already deployed within the operational response.

(Lagadec, 2009, Leonard and Howitt, 2007, Quarantelli, 2006, Von Lubitz, 2009, PWH articles, 2006-2010)

How these parameters impact decision making is the subject of the next post.

______________________________________________________

References

 Lagedec, Erwan, Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the Age of Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity, Center for Transatlantic Relations – The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.c., 2007

Also see follow-on post – Unconventional Crisis (3): Impact on Decision Making

Boundary Condition #1 (1)

This was the year the Earth struck back.

Earthquakes, heat waves, floods, volcanoes, super typhoons, blizzards, landslides and droughts killed at least a quarter million people in 2010 — the deadliest year in more than a generation. More people were killed worldwide by natural disasters this year than have been killed in terrorism attacks in the past 40 years combined.

How deadly? Through Nov. 30, nearly 260,000 people died in natural disasters in 2010, compared to 15,000 in 2009

How extreme? After strong early year blizzards — nicknamed Snowmageddon — paralyzed the U.S. mid-Atlantic and record snowfalls hit Russia and China, the temperature turned to broil – the year may go down as the hottest on record worldwide or at the very least in the top three

How costly? Disasters caused $222 billion in economic losses in 2010 — more than Hong Kong's economy

How weird? A volcano in Iceland paralyzed air traffic for days in Europe, disrupting travel for more than 7 million people. In a 24-hour period in October, Indonesia got the trifecta of a deadly magnitude 7.7 earthquake, a tsunami that killed more than 500 people and a volcano that caused more than 390,000 people to flee. That's after flooding, landslides and more quakes killed hundreds earlier in the year. And in the United States, FEMA declared a record number of major disasters, 79 as of Dec. 14. The average year has 34. A list of day-by-day disasters in 2010 compiled by the AP runs 64 printed pages long

And put man in the equation, what then? It was also a year of man-made technological catastrophes. BP's busted oil well caused 172 million gallons to gush into the Gulf of Mexico. Mining disasters — men trapped deep in the Earth — caused dozens of deaths in tragic collapses in West Virginia, China and New Zealand. The fortunate miners in Chile who survived 69 days underground provided the feel good story of the year.

2010's world gone wild: Quakes, floods, blizzards

By SETH BORENSTEIN and JULIE REED BELL, Associated Press Seth Borenstein And Julie Reed Bell, Associated Press Sun Dec 19, 5:31 pm ET

Earthquakes, heat waves, floods, volcanoes, super typhoons, blizzards, landslides and droughts killed at least a quarter million people in 2010 — the deadliest year in more than a generation. More people were killed worldwide by natural disasters this year than have been killed in terrorism attacks in the past 40 years combined.

"It just seemed like it was back-to-back and it came in waves," said Craig Fugate, who heads the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. It handled a record number of disasters in 2010.

"The term `100-year event' really lost its meaning this year."

And we have ourselves to blame most of the time, scientists and disaster experts say.

Even though many catastrophes have the ring of random chance, the hand of man made this a particularly deadly, costly, extreme and weird year for everything from wild weather to earthquakes.

Poor construction and development practices conspire to make earthquakes more deadly than they need be. More people live in poverty in vulnerable buildings in crowded cities. That means that when the ground shakes, the river breaches, or the tropical cyclone hits, more people die.

Disasters from the Earth, such as earthquakes and volcanoes "are pretty much constant," said Andreas Schraft, vice president of catastrophic perils for the Geneva-based insurance giant Swiss Re. "All the change that's made is man-made."

The January earthquake that killed well more than 220,000 people in Haiti is a perfect example. Port-au-Prince has nearly three times as many people — many of them living in poverty — and more poorly built shanties than it did 25 years ago. So had the same quake hit in 1985 instead of 2010, total deaths would have probably been in the 80,000 range, said Richard Olson, director of disaster risk reduction at Florida International University.

In February, an earthquake that was more than 500 times stronger than the one that struck Haiti hit an area of Chile that was less populated, better constructed, and not as poor. Chile's bigger quake caused fewer than 1,000 deaths.

Climate scientists say Earth's climate also is changing thanks to man-made global warming, bringing extreme weather, such as heat waves and flooding.

In the summer, one weather system caused oppressive heat in Russia, while farther south it caused flooding in Pakistan that inundated 62,000 square miles, about the size of Wisconsin. That single heat-and-storm system killed almost 17,000 people, more people than all the worldwide airplane crashes in the past 15 years combined.

"It's a form of suicide, isn't it? We build houses that kill ourselves (in earthquakes). We build houses in flood zones that drown ourselves," said Roger Bilham, a professor of geological sciences at the University of Colorado. "It's our fault for not anticipating these things. You know, this is the Earth doing its thing."

No one had to tell a mask-wearing Vera Savinova how bad it could get. She is a 52-year-old administrator in a dental clinic who in August took refuge from Moscow's record heat, smog and wildfires.

"I think it is the end of the world," she said. "Our planet warns us against what would happen if we don't care about nature."

The excessive amount of extreme weather that dominated 2010 is a classic sign of man-made global warming that climate scientists have long warned about. They calculate that the killer Russian heat wave — setting a national record of 111 degrees — would happen once every 100,000 years without global warming.

Preliminary data show that 18 countries broke their records for the hottest day ever.

"These (weather) events would not have happened without global warming," said Kevin Trenberth, chief of climate analysis for the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo.

That's why the people who study disasters for a living say it would be wrong to chalk 2010 up to just another bad year.

"The Earth strikes back in cahoots with bad human decision-making," said a weary Debarati Guha Sapir, director for the World Health Organization's Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. "It's almost as if the policies, the government policies and development policies, are helping the Earth strike back instead of protecting from it. We've created conditions where the slightest thing the Earth does is really going to have a disproportionate impact."

Here's a quick tour of an anything but normal 2010:

HOW DEADLY:

While the Haitian earthquake, Russian heat wave, and Pakistani flooding were the biggest killers, deadly quakes also struck Chile, Turkey, China and Indonesia in one of the most active seismic years in decades. Through mid-December there have been 20 earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 or higher, compared to the normal 16. This year is tied for the most big quakes since 1970, but it is not a record. Nor is it a significantly above average year for the number of strong earthquakes, U.S. earthquake officials say.

Flooding alone this year killed more than 6,300 people in 59 nations through September, according to the World Health Organization. In the United States, 30 people died in the Nashville, Tenn., region in flooding. Inundated countries include China, Italy, India, Colombia and Chad. Super Typhoon Megi with winds of more than 200 mph devastated the Philippines and parts of China.

Through Nov. 30, nearly 260,000 people died in natural disasters in 2010, compared to 15,000 in 2009, according to Swiss Re. The World Health Organization, which hasn't updated its figures past Sept. 30, is just shy of 250,000. By comparison, deaths from terrorism from 1968 to 2009 were less than 115,000, according to reports by the U.S. State Department and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The last year in which natural disasters were this deadly was 1983 because of an Ethiopian drought and famine, according to WHO. Swiss Re calls it the deadliest since 1976.

The charity Oxfam says 21,000 of this year's disaster deaths are weather related.

HOW EXTREME:

After strong early year blizzards — nicknamed Snowmageddon — paralyzed the U.S. mid-Atlantic and record snowfalls hit Russia and China, the temperature turned to broil.

The year may go down as the hottest on record worldwide or at the very least in the top three, according to the World Meteorological Organization. The average global temperature through the end of October was 58.53 degrees, a shade over the previous record of 2005, according to the National Climatic Data Center.

Los Angeles had its hottest day in recorded history on Sept. 27: 113 degrees. In May, 129 set a record for Pakistan and may have been the hottest temperature recorded in an inhabited location.

In the U.S. Southeast, the year began with freezes in Florida that had cold-blooded iguanas becoming comatose and falling off trees. Then it became the hottest summer on record for the region. As the year ended, unusually cold weather was back in force.

Northern Australia had the wettest May-October on record, while the southwestern part of that country had its driest spell on record. And parts of the Amazon River basin struck by drought hit their lowest water levels in recorded history.

HOW COSTLY:

Disasters caused $222 billion in economic losses in 2010 — more than Hong Kong's economy — according to Swiss Re. That's more than usual, but not a record, Schraft said. That's because this year's disasters often struck poor areas without heavy insurance, such as Haiti.

Ghulam Ali's three-bedroom, one-story house in northwestern Pakistan collapsed during the floods. To rebuild, he had to borrow 50,000 rupees ($583) from friends and family. It's what many Pakistanis earn in half a year.

HOW WEIRD:

A volcano in Iceland paralyzed air traffic for days in Europe, disrupting travel for more than 7 million people. Other volcanoes in the Congo, Guatemala, Ecuador, the Philippines and Indonesia sent people scurrying for safety. New York City had a rare tornado.

A nearly 2-pound hailstone that was 8 inches in diameter fell in South Dakota in July to set a U.S. record. The storm that produced it was one of seven declared disasters for that state this year.

There was not much snow to start the Winter Olympics in a relatively balmy Vancouver, British Columbia, while the U.S. East Coast was snowbound.

In a 24-hour period in October, Indonesia got the trifecta of terra terror: a deadly magnitude 7.7 earthquake, a tsunami that killed more than 500 people and a volcano that caused more than 390,000 people to flee. That's after flooding, landslides and more quakes killed hundreds earlier in the year.

Even the extremes were extreme. This year started with a good sized El Nino weather oscillation that causes all sorts of extremes worldwide. Then later in the year, the world got the mirror image weather system with a strong La Nina, which causes a different set of extremes. Having a year with both a strong El Nino and La Nina is unusual.

And in the United States, FEMA declared a record number of major disasters, 79 as of Dec. 14. The average year has 34.

Through September, the 2010 disaster death toll had already surpassed such notable years as 2004, when the South Asia tsunami struck, and 2008, when Myanmar was hit by a massive cyclone and China suffered a devastating earthquake.

A list of day-by-day disasters in 2010 compiled by the AP runs 64 printed pages long.

"The extremes are changed in an extreme fashion," said Greg Holland, director of the earth system laboratory at the National Center for Atmospheric Research.

For example, even though it sounds counterintuitive, global warming likely played a bit of a role in "Snowmageddon" earlier this year, Holland said. That's because with a warmer climate, there's more moisture in the air, which makes storms including blizzards, more intense, he said.

White House science adviser John Holdren said we should get used to climate disasters or do something about global warming: "The science is clear that we can expect more and more of these kinds of damaging events unless and until society's emissions of heat-trapping gases and particles are sharply reduced."

And that's just the "natural disasters." It was also a year of man-made technological catastrophes. BP's busted oil well caused 172 million gallons to gush into the Gulf of Mexico. Mining disasters — men trapped deep in the Earth — caused dozens of deaths in tragic collapses in West Virginia, China and New Zealand. The fortunate miners in Chile who survived 69 days underground provided the feel good story of the year.

In both technological and natural disasters, there's a common theme of "pushing the envelope," Olson said.

Colorado's Bilham said the world's population is moving into riskier megacities on fault zones and flood-prone areas. He figures that 400 million to 500 million people in the world live in large cities prone to major earthquakes.

A Haitian disaster will happen again, Bilham said: "It could be Algiers. it could be Tehran. It could be any one of a dozen cities."

Haiti – Essence of Decision – Operation Unified Response

In attempt to establish a framework for discussion of the many facets of the Haiti disaster, and as a precursor  to addressing the question – What kind of a community or organization –or indeed, group of organizations – can survive and thrive in unconventional, uncertain and severe crisis environments? - multiple articles from varying perspectives on Operation Unified Response  are being posted on  DaVinci's Horse,  the Facebook Page.

•  Note:You do not have to be a Facebook Member to view the page and follow the links to articles.Facebook may present an interim page with requirement to click  Continue.  To go to DvH , after following a link click the page tab rather than using the back arrow.

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

 As stated previously this site is not specifically focused on war and warfare, and most specifically, it has never been intended as one providing political commentary.  The "kind of war" – as essential element of  information- series is being extended because today's war,  how we define it, and how we defend our country in that defined context is a critical element of survival in our tightly coupled system in unstable equillibrium  world. (PWH Edition #8, DaVinci's Horse 5 by Dag von Lubitz)

To whatever extent you  believe or not von Clauswitz's "war as extension of politics by other means," the political arenas of the world and war are certainly intertwined beyond separation.  In this kind of war – whatever "this"  is -  a critical difference beween kinds is noted by the fact that there is no political entity on the other side to negotiate with to come to terms for cessation of conflict.  The war then continues so long as one side desires to carry out attacks. This is very distinctly different from the kind of war of Roosevelt's World War II or Lincoln's War Between the States.  How then do we win in the "war on terrorism", how then do we make this end?  What are the boundary conditions of victory, defeat, co-existence, survival?

— Charles Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist. © 2010, The Washington Post Writers Group. He is a noted conservative writer and the Townhall.com article below  is very obviously a political OPED, but no matter your political affiliation or opinion on the current administration's action, his points of distinction about "kind of war" need to be considered critically.

War? What War?

The Obama administration refuses to admit that we are at war.

By Charles Krauthammer

Janet Napolitano — former Arizona governor, now overmatched secretary of homeland security — will forever be remembered for having said of the attempt to bring down an airliner over Detroit: "The system worked."

The attacker's concerned father had warned U.S. authorities about his son's jihadist tendencies. The would-be bomber paid cash and checked no luggage on a transoceanic flight. He was nonetheless allowed to fly, and would have killed 288 people in the air alone, save for a faulty detonator and quick actions by a few passengers.

Heck of a job, Brownie.

The reason the country is uneasy about the Obama administration's response to this attack is a distinct sense of not just incompetence but incomprehension. From the very beginning, President Obama has relentlessly tried to downplay and deny the nature of the terrorist threat we continue to face. Napolitano renames terrorism "man-caused disasters." Obama goes abroad and pledges to cleanse America of its post-9/11 counterterrorist sins. Hence, Guantanamo will close, CIA interrogators will face a special prosecutor, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will bask in a civilian trial in New York — a trifecta of political correctness and image management.

And just to make sure even the dimmest understand, Obama banishes the term "war on terror." It's over — that is, if it ever existed.

Obama may have declared the war over. Unfortunately, al-Qaeda has not. Which gives new meaning to the term "asymmetric warfare."

And produces linguistic — and logical — oddities that littered Obama's public pronouncements following the Christmas Day attack. In his first statement, Obama referred to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as "an isolated extremist." This is the same president who, after the Ford Hood shooting, warned us "against jumping to conclusions" — code for daring to associate Nidal Hasan's mass murder with his Islamist ideology. Yet, with Abdulmutallab, Obama jumped immediately to the conclusion, against all existing evidence, that the bomber acted alone.

More jarring still were Obama's references to the terrorist as a "suspect" who "allegedly tried to ignite an explosive device." You can hear the echo of FDR: "Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 — a date which will live in infamy — Japanese naval and air force suspects allegedly bombed Pearl Harbor."

Obama reassured the nation that this "suspect" had been charged. Reassurance? The president should be saying: We have captured an enemy combatant — an illegal combatant under the laws of war: no uniform, direct attack on civilians — and now to prevent future attacks, he is being interrogated regarding information he may have about al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Instead, Abdulmutallab is dispatched to some Detroit-area jail and immediately lawyered up. At which point — surprise! — he stops talking.

This absurdity renders hollow Obama's declaration that "we will not rest until we find all who were involved." Once we've given Abdulmutallab the right to remain silent, we have gratuitously forfeited our right to find out from him precisely who else was involved, namely those who trained, instructed, armed, and sent him.

This is all quite mad even in Obama's terms. He sends 30,000 troops to fight terror overseas, yet if any terrorists come to attack us here, they are magically transformed from enemy into defendant.

The logic is perverse. If we find Abdulmutallab in an al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen, where he is merely preparing for a terror attack, we snuff him out with a Predator — no judge, no jury, no qualms. But if we catch him in the United States in the very act of mass murder, he instantly acquires protection not just from execution by drone but even from interrogation.

The president said that this incident highlights "the nature of those who threaten our homeland." But the president is constantly denying the nature of those who threaten our homeland. On Tuesday, he referred five times to Abdulmutallab (and his terrorist ilk) as "extremist(s)."

A man who shoots abortion doctors is an extremist. An eco-fanatic who torches logging sites is an extremist. Abdulmutallab is not one of these. He is a jihadist. And unlike the guys who shoot abortion doctors, jihadists have cells all over the world; they blow up trains in London, nightclubs in Bali, and airplanes over Detroit (if they can); and they are openly pledged to wage war on America.

Any government can through laxity let someone slip through the cracks. But a government that refuses to admit that we are at war, indeed, refuses even to name the enemy — jihadist is a word banished from the Obama lexicon — turns laxity into a governing philosophy.

On September 11, the evacuation was real. A fireball erupted in the nearby tower, and all of Morgan Stanley's employees were making their way down and out of the other tower. By the time the second hijacked airliner hit the south tower at 9:07 a.m., most of the company's employees were out. But Rescorla's work was not finished. Three employees were missing. Rescorla and two assistants went back to look for them. Rescorla was last seen on the tenth floor of the burning tower. He died when the building collapsed a short time later. But he had saved thousands of lives. Out of 3,700 employees, Morgan Stanley lost only six, including Rescorla.

Rescorla continued his concern and planned for and forced Morgan Stanley employees to practice evacuation like school children. Almost 3000 died on September the 11th, 2001, but 3700 lived because Rescorla ignored the Port Authority's direction to stay in place after American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the first tower, and evacuated his people. He had managed a crisis before it became a crisis – a disaster.
Please read Rick Rescorla's story – a story of the DAY - The Real Heros Are Dead

08:46:40

September 11, 2001

 Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

"Man is a peculiarly constructed animal who cannot read the handwriting on the wall, until his back is up against it." Unknown

 TAMPA - Retired Army Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, speaking at the America Association of State Troopers Law Enforcement Training Conference asked law enforcement officials Monday if they're ready for a hurricane.

 From the St. Petersburg Times:  (Inpart) Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, the man widely credited with restoring order to a chaotic post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans, has a word of warning for Floridians who believe they have hurricanes figured out.

"The people in Florida think they're smarter than the people in Louisiana," the retired Army general who commanded Joint Task Force Katrina said Monday, addressing law enforcement officers at Tampa Airport Marriott. "No, you're not. You just haven't been hit by a Katrina."

 Speaking before the National Law Enforcement Training Conference, which goes through Wednesday (August 12, 2009), Honore said complacency is the greatest challenge communities face when it comes to disaster preparedness.

 His new book, SURVIVAL: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disasters, (Atria Books, 304 pages, $25.00) – part memoir, part how-to manual – focuses on the responsibility of the individual to be ready in the face of disaster.

"My concern with Florida is the last time you really got smacked hard was Andrew," Honore said."I'm telling you," Honore said, "there's an a—whipping coming for Florida."

Besides raising the flag over hurricane readiness, Honore predicted the H1N1 flu, or swine flu, will pose an increasingly significant challenge to the United States in the coming months and year, especially as football season begins, drawing large crowds together on a regular basis.

"We're not ready," he said. "I don't think we've spent the time getting the country ready and I don't think the country has spent the time getting the states ready."

Local governments, he said, need to start warning citizens now about how they will administer vaccinations to various populations and age groups once a high-demand vaccine is developed and, more than likely, is in short supply.

Additionally, there needs to be a culture shift in the American workplace, he said. Employees who experience symptoms associated with the pandemic strain should be encouraged to stay at home without risk of being penalized by their bosses.

 "We've been talking about this for years," he said of the pandemic. "This is no stranger to people familiar with pandemic scenarios. But what we haven't done is talk to the public.

In The Resilience Doctrine, we argue that globalization is both unstable and inevitable, and that governments have little choice but to build collaborative platforms to manage risk. We conclude with a dozen guidelines for building an international system fit for the 21st century.

The introduction …

In a Time of Crisis – In the past year, we have witnessed a global emergency, with the world experiencing the worst economic meltdown since the 1930s. This crisis will not be a one-off. Over the next 20 years, we will be confronted with a series of systemic and interlocking risks that will cross national borders with alacrity. As a result, the divide between domestic and international policy will largely be erased.

To carve out a strategic response to these risks requires huge effort. Our assumptions about the world were formed in another age and are ill-suited to contemporary challenges. The international system, meanwhile, is inveterately short-term in its outlook, national governments are myopic and complacent, and the media is unforgiving towards politicians who fail to conform to the dictates of an increasingly frenetic news cycle.

Leaders therefore need a new lens through which they can view the task of creating security in the 21st century. The projection of power, and attempts to balance the power of others, no longer provides a useful perspective. Instead, the concept of resilience should be at the heart of a new doctrine for managing transnational risk and global instability.

Resilience offers a guiding principle for informing strategy and animating alliances. It also provides a yardstick for measuring success. At present, much of what governments do internationally inadvertently increases vulnerability. This must change if globalization is to be saved from itself.