Boundary Condition #3 (2)

Preserve harmony, create chaos and achieve victory by continually keeping the enemy off balance through a superior capability to adapt. Sun Tzu

Today, February 22^nd 2011 is George Washington's birthday.  As a country we don't really pay homage to our first President, commander of the Continental Army or Father of the Nation.  Rather what we do, is have Presidents Day which is intended to honor both Washington and Lincoln, and in reality is a Federal Holiday, day off for many, and opportunity for mass sales, the last being the most noted aspect.

For Project White Horse, this is an opportunity to continue discussion of the 2011 boundary condition focused on Washington's leadership in trying times.  The first post discussed the Battle of Trenton and its significance in American history in making the Declaration of Independence more than just fine words surrounding an abstract idea of "we the people."

In the best noted modern research The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution, Ira Gruber concludes:

"Trenton and Princeton were supremely important in destroying the illusion of British invincibility, making patriots of potential loyalists, and spoiling Howe's hopes for an end to the war and a start to a lasting reunion. Both General and Admiral Howe were forced to rethink their entire plan.  General Howe wrote "I do not now see a prospect for terminating the war but by a general action, and I am aware of the difficulties in our way to obtain it."

Indeed as David Hackett Fisher says in his Pulitzer Prize book, (the major source for this post) Washington's Crossing, "By the Spring of 1777, many British officers had concluded that they could never win the war. At the same time, Americans recovered from their despair and were confident that they could not be defeated. That double transformation was truly a turning point in the war."

What had occurred here since the dark days of mid-December when even many who signed the Declaration had become resigned to defeat? 

The answer lies in a little known portion of the Revolutionary War encompassing the "Forage War" or petit guerre, wherein the actions of both the Continental Army and the Jersey militias resulted in 2,887 of Howe's British and German troops killed, captured or seriously wounded.  By the end of that winter campaign more than half of all British and Hessian troops who had joined Howe's army in 1776 were casualties – killed, wounded, captured, missing, dead of disease or so severely ill as to be officially reported as ineffective.  On January 31^stHowe had asked for 20,000 more troops but was informed by his government that he could expect 7,800.  After Trenton and Princeton, after the January to March petit guerre, the British effort faced a chronic shortage of strength that continued throughout the remainder of the war.

While the Revolutionary War is not representative of unconventional crisis as defined, the period after the Continental Army retreat from New York in the summer of 1776 until the spring of 1777 does reflect a time of severe crisis, and one in which the total nature of the situation completely reversed.  The elements of decision making and leadership that at the same time created novelty and confusion for the other side while enhancing vitality and growth for itself is certainly consistent with the previous post on the thoughts of John Boyd and therefore seem fair game for a study of decision making in severe crisis.

David Hackett Fischer historical analysis Washington's Crossing  provides the most research and critical analysis of the period surrounding the Battle of Trenton and the following period. This book is the major source for this effort.  In even a casual reading of Fischer's final two chapters, the idea of control of tempo and time as a weapon jumps off of the page.  For almost three months the British and Hessian commanders were never able to get out of a reaction mode after Trenton.

Fischer's analysis reflects well John Boyd's ideas, not only control of tempo but also the aspect of OODA as a learning process for vitality and growth.  In support of using Boyd's way as instructive for decision making in severe crisis and in accord with Chet Richards question, "What type of organizations operate at rapid OODA loop tempos?" the elements of OODA will be used to organize Fischer's conclusions.  None of his conclusions are altered, they are just rearranged.  As such, the intent is to suggest lessons for possible implementation for severe crisis decision making and leadership.  All errors are mine and should not reflect on David Hackett Fischer's original work.

Analysis

Observation >    And of course, the best force multiplier is good intelligence.  Lack of intelligence on British movement in New York was a major factor in the American loss in the New York campaign. In New Jersey, Washington was the central figure in developing a system of intelligence, personally recruiting agents with orders to report to him alone. He employed Nathaniel Sackett of the New York Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies to construct an entire network in New York with both male and female agents of every rank and station.  He also asked Continental generals and militia commanders to run their own agents.  Although encouraging some degree of separation of these networks for security and broad based sources, his attitudes toward intelligence-gathering were different from those in closed societies, who sought to monopolize intelligence and prohibited efforts they did not control. Washington was comfortable with an open system permitting and even encouraging a high degree of autonomy. 

With the efforts and results of multiple sources, the maneuvers of militia and regular Continental Army units were made much more effective. The best example may be the "Forage War" as the central focus of the Winter Campaign.

While Lord Cornwallis provided uniforms and food for his troops out of his own personal fortune, the British had a critical shortage – feed for its animals.  Washington was quick to pick up that small numbers of men could do real damage to the British, reporting to Congress that intelligence reports "confirm their want of forage.. If their horses are reduced this winter it will be impossible to take the field in the spring."

Orientation>   Throughout the Revolution, George Washington's strategic purposes were constant: to win independence by maintaining American resolve to continue the war, by preserving an American army in being, and by raising the cost of the war to the enemy.  He was always fixed on these strategic ends but flexible in operational means.  No single label describes his operations. 

He learned to control initiative and tempo in war. Along with his officers he did more than merely surprise the Hessians garrison at Trenton the morning after Christmas.  As the winter campaign continued beyond the Second Battle of Trenton and the Battle of Princeton, they improvised a series of surprises over a twelve week period, seizing initiative and keeping it. Recognizing the impact of the New Jersey militias, which at times frustrated him due to his lack of complete control, and realizing how effective many small engagements could be in reducing the fighting strength of the British and German regiments, he ordered most of his Continental troops to reinforce the Jersey Militia.

Understanding the critical role the Continental Army played not only in fighting battles but just in surviving as a fighting force, Washington himself did not take to the field in that critical January to late March '77 time frame. Rather he was busy with recruitment of the new three-year regiments and expansion of the army for the spring campaign.  Much of his time and energy went into relations with the members of Congress and leaders of the states. Critical war fighting decisions were on going in the Forage  War, and Washington was at the center, but functioning as a leader of the republic, always listening, inspiring, guiding, urging his officers always to be the drivers of events, never "to be drove."  Continental brigadiers and militia commanders received independent commands with very broad instructions. Washington's lieutenants like Horatio Nelson's captains, knew what was wanted of them.  Not only did it drive the British, force them to move in more troops than they could actually house and feed, it allowed the American army to learn and gain strength beyond numbers.

Decision>   After Trenton and the surprise disengagement at the Second Battle of Princeton on January 2^nd leading to the next day victory at Princeton, the thoughts of British commanders who in mid December thought they were on the verge of finishing the Continental Army were no longer about attacking but being attacked. Cornwallis ordered retreat and Howe's generals began blaming each other.  The British had no desire nor saw any advantage to seeking battle in the winter.  Washington realized he could make a major impact with small attacks and limiting the potential of British mobility in the spring.  The context of decision making changed drastically for both armies.

Throughout the British maintained the rigid hierarchal structure and command process of a European Army.  By comparison, Lord Cornwallis ignored the advice of very able subordinates at the Second Battle of Trenton, while Washington listened and took the advice that led to the night disengagement and further victory at Trenton.  While he did not begin the petite guerre begun by the Jersey militia, he cognized its potential and made a crucial decision to support it with Continental troops.  Time and again, while the British were forced to react, Washington's lieutenants, understanding their generals overall intent made the decisions to attack or disengage so as to continue to drive the British and German armies.

Another key decision, despite multiple incidents of maltreatment American troops by the British and Hessian armies, was Washington's directions as to treatment of prisoners after the Battle of Trenton – they were to be accorded the same rights of humanity for which American's were fighting.  Supported by John Adams, American leaders believed that it was not enough to win the war.  They also had to win in a way that was consistent with the values of their society and the principles of their cause.  What Adams created in words and policy, Washington put into action.  In comparison, British and Hessian commanders only selectively offered "quarter" to American troops attempting to surrender, and treatment of prisoners was routinely horrific.  And as American success grew by in large British attitude and actions hardened, with unwanted consequence that resistance by Americans, some loyalists, grew stronger.  Washington staked out the moral high ground, to the surprise of British and Hessian prisoners. Not all American leaders agreed, but in general the Continental Army's adoption of Adam's "policy of humanity" enlarged the meaning of the American Revolution.

While morale plummeted on one side, the Americans now knew how to fight and knew they could win.  The performance has been judged one of the most brilliant in history.

Action>   In the Winter '77 Campaign/New Jersey Campaign and Forage War, American troops repeatedly defeated larger and better trained regular forces in many different types of warfare: what we now label special operations, maneuver warfare including a night river crossing and assault on an urban garrison, a fighting retreat, a defensive battle in fixed position, a disengagement to a night march into the enemy's rear, a meeting engagement, and a prolonged petite guerre – the small war.  The British on the other hand were on the wrong side of tempo, constantly harassed, forced to bring in more troops which exacerbated housing and feeding and spread of disease.  Despite the maintenance of rigid command structure, British and German field commanders understood what was happening and attempted to lure the American militia and regular army into head on attacks or set ambushes for the attacks on foraging.  But under mission type orders, Washington lieutenants continued to maintain initiative, disengage where necessary and even ambush the ambushers. By the spring of 1777, many British officers had concluded they could never win the war.

Synthesis

In the most desperate of struggles, Washington listened to and trusted his lieutenants, provided broad instructions with few direct commands, learned to leverage the emerging American culture and adapted.  Not easy with the militias or their leaders, observation led to an orientation around usefulness of small units and harassing style warfare.  Leveraging boldness, flexibility and opportunism, initiative and tempo, speed and concentration, and intelligence, he and his commanders defined a way of warfare that would continue throughout the war.  Specifically leveraging "implicit direction, they drove the decision cycle in true reflection of John Boyd's OODA Loop, finding a way to defeat a formidable enemy, not merely at Trenton and Princeton but over and over through twelve weeks of continuous combat.  Fischer notes:

In New Jersey, American leaders learned to make time itself into a weapon.  They did it by controlling the tempo and rhythm of the campaign.  Day after day through the winter campaign, the Americans called the tune and set the beat.  By that method, they retained the initiative for many weeks and kept British commanders off balance.  The material and moral impact was very great, especially when a small force was able to control the tempo of war against a stronger enemy.  Events happened at a time and place of their choosing.  From all this another American tradition developed.

The context is pure John Boyd not only related to fast transients but also in context of Boyd's theme for vitality and growth: insight, orientation, harmony, agility and initiative. Indeed in Washington's Crossing, Fischer's arguments mirror John Boyd's as represented by Chet Richards in answering his question "What kind of organizations operate at rapid OODA loop tempo:

Organizations whose leaders have, over time, imbued certain qualities into the fiber of their very being, with these four qualities"

• Superb competence, leading to a Zen-like state of intuitive understanding.  Ability to sense when the time is ripe for action.  Built through years of progressively more challenging experience. Magic.


• Common outlook towards problems. Includes mutual trust.  Built through shared experience. Superb competence and intuitive understanding at the organizational level. Values, doctrine, teamwork, mission.


• Concept that answers the question, "What do I do next?" in ambiguous situations.  Gives focus and direction to our efforts.  Key function of leadership.


• Understood and agreed to accountability. Conveyance to team members what needs to be accomplished, get their agreement to accomplish it, then hold them strictly accountable for doing it – but don't prescribe how.  Requires very strong common outlook.

In Patterns of Conflict, John Boyd defined a "unifying vision" as follows:

A grand idea, overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances – yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or adversary systems.

 Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

( From The Counter Terrorism Puzzle; A Guide for Decision Makers, used with permission of the author, Dr. Boaz Ganor, the Associate Dean of the Lauder School of Government, at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, and the founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism )

The above graphic placing terrorism in context of war and the definitions below of many of the terms used throughout the "What kind of war" series are intended only as reference, not as anyone's formal authorized definition.  They have been gleaned from multiple sources.  Of particular note should be the degree of overlap and ambiguity.

Definitions: Special Operations, Asymmetric Warfare, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, The Long War, Fourth Generation Warfare, Hybrid Warfare:

Special operations are military operations that are considered "special" (that is, unconventional).

Special operations are typically performed independently or in conjunction with conventional military operations. The primary goal is to achieve a political or military objective where a conventional force requirement does not exist or might affect the overall strategic outcome. Special operations are usually conducted in a low-profile manner that typically aim to achieve the advantage of speed, surprise, and violence of action against an unsuspecting target. Special ops are typically carried out with limited numbers of highly trained personnel that are able to operate in all environments, utilize self-reliance, are able to easily adapt and overcome obstacles, and use unconventional combat skills and equipment to complete objectives. Special operations are usually implemented through specific or tailored intelligence

Asymmetric warfare is war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly.

"Asymmetric warfare" can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the "weaker" combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.  Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution.

Terrorism is the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion. At present, there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts which are intended to create fear (terror), are perpetrated for an ideological goal (as opposed to a lone attack), and deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants (civilians).

Some definitions also include acts of unlawful violence and war. The history of terrorist organizations suggests that they do not select terrorism for its political effectiveness.  Individual terrorists tend to be motivated more by a desire for social solidarity with other members of their organization than by political platforms or strategic objectives, which are often murky and undefined.

Guerrilla warfare is combat in which a small group of combatants use mobile military tactics in the form of ambushes and raids to combat a larger and less mobile formal army.

The term means "little war" in Spanish and was created during the Peninsular War. The concept acknowledges a conflict between armed civilians against a powerful nation state army, either foreign or domestic and uses tactics such as ambush, sabotage and mobility in attacking vulnerable targets in enemy territory. The tactics of guerrilla warfare were used successfully in the recent 20th century by among others the People's Liberation Army in the Chinese Civil War, Fidel Castro's rebel army in the Cuban Revolution, and by the Viet Cong, the North Vietnam Army in the Vietnam War, the Kosovo Liberation Army in the Kosovo War and the Bosnian War . Most factions of the Iraqi Insurgency, Colombia's FARC, and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) are said to be engaged in some form of guerrilla warfare — as was, until recently, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

Irregular warfare (IW) is warfare in which one or more combatants are irregular military rather than regular forces. Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare, and so is asymmetric warfare.

Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric warfare approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of a nation and its strategic partners.  Concepts associated with irregular warfare are not as recent as the irregular warfare term itself.

Unconventional warfare  is the opposite of conventional warfare. Where conventional warfare is used to reduce an opponent's military capability, unconventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.

On the surface, UW contrasts with conventional warfare in that: forces or objectives are covert or not well-defined, tactics and weapons intensify environments of subversion or intimidation, and the general or long-term goals are coercive or subversive to a political body.

The Long War is a term used by the administration of US President George W. Bush referring to US actions against various governments and terrorist organisations, as a reaction to the September 11 attacks. Other designations are the "War on Terrorism", the "War on Terror", the "Global War On Terror (G.W.O.T.)" and the "Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism (GSAVE)". It has been criticized as a justification for perpetual war.

Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is conflict characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian.

The military doctrine was first defined in 1989 by a team of United States analysts, including William S. Lind, used to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. In terms of generational modern warfare, the fourth generation signifies the nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times.  The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent non-state actor.  As such, fourth generation warfare uses classical tactics—tactics deemed unacceptable by more traditional thinking—to weaken the advantaged opponent's will to win.

Hybrid warfare incorporates a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorists acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.  These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects.  Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors.

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

War is always violent, taking its toll on soldier and civilian alike, always messy, always complex whether the battlefield be at  Thermopylae, Gettysburg, Iwo Jima, or Fallujah.  But I would offer however, that both warfighter and citizen alike of the "Greatest Generation" understood well that the Battle of Britian was fighter warfare, the Battle of the Atlantic submarine warfare, the war in the Pacific both aicraft carrier warfare and amphibious warfare. And of course whether island hopping or struggling through the snow at Bastogne, there was always the Soldier and Marine rifleman. Complex, yes, but also easier to understandand and put in context than the dynamics of events since September 11, 2001 in my opinion.

For this century we have created a somewhat confusing array of terms:  network centric warfare, fourth generation warfare, guerrilla warfare or counterinsurgency, all  mixed with conventional and unconventional warfare, all in context  with war on terrorism, and  further, now the attempt to differentiate with conventional warfare, there are irregular warfare and hybrid warfare.

While situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have forced rethinking, then rebuilding – since warfighting in Vienam - counter-insurgency (COIN) capability, planning for future wars – structure, rolls and missions, and technology – require serious thought on what the next threat might be – state on state war (as in WWII) with an emerging China or rebuilding Russia, or more of the same  – mix of insurgents, terrorists, or non-state actor mix along with state on state uniformed force on uniformed force.

This series of EEI posts suggests strongly that understanding this process and the outcome is not only necessary for our government and military (at all levels), but also for a prepared community in acknowledging, mitigating, and finally accepting some level of risk.  As Col Frank Hoffman (USMC, Ret) states in closing the following article "The Sept. 11 funding spigot is about to be turned off, returning the Pentagon to the need to rethink its priorities and make tough choices. We no longer have the resources to simply buy everything and eliminate every risk. We will have to consciously wrestle with this challenge in the upcoming QDR (Quadrenial Defense Review). The time for hard calls has arrived."

Col Hoffman's article discussing current thinking, planning and multiple approaches is well worth reading in full under Striking a Balance on Armed Forces Journal. Key points are provided below.  For  further information and different opinions see:

• "Hybrid Warfare" -Col Hoffman's defining concept in the PWH library


• Refresher on 4GW see Col G.I. Wilson's previous PPT/article. and Dr. Chet Richards article


• Discussion on COIN and Anti-COIN Revolution


• For a book review on David Killcullen's Acidental Guerrilla


• Counter insurgency focused blog: Abu Muqawama

Posturing the future force for COIN and conventional warfare (in part)

We are in another post-Iraq war debate about how to best posture our military investments for the future. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will center on the critical question about the evolving character of conflict. Exactly what kinds of wars are we expecting to fight, and how should we allocate scarce time and resources to maximize readiness and deterrence while minimizing risk? The not-so-subtle groundswell of resentment, if not outright bureaucratic resentment, coming from Defense Secretary Robert Gates' effort to allocate just 10 percent of the Pentagon's investment account for irregular warfare suggests that this will not be a simple matter.

Today's post-Iraq strategy and forces debate was first depicted in Andrew Bacevich's tart Atlantic Monthly essay, "The Petraeus Doctrine." He portrayed a stark choice between two competing camps in the U.S. military. At one end of the spectrum of conflict, he observed that there was a group which he derisively called the "Crusaders," who were promoting an emphasis on counterinsurgency and irregular threats as the proper focus for our armed forces. At the other end of the spectrum, he identified a competing school of thought, which he labeled the "Traditionalists." Bacevich personalized the ongoing debate by using two prominent contemporary authors, retired Army officer John Nagl and West Point's Col. Gian Gentile, as the polar protagonists.

This "black and white" option set created a false binary choice that is great for media consumption but represents a gross oversimplification and distorted conception of America's strategic options. It also created a caricature of the protagonists who offer much more sophisticated arguments when reviewed closely in context.

There are a variety of schools of thought on how to address this force posture problem. This assessment will examine a suite of four schools. In each school, the principal military threat and its probability and consequences will be identified. Additionally, the force structure requirements and posture shifts to support each school will be examined. The four schools include:

• Counterinsurgents, who emphasize the high likelihood and rising salience of irregular adversaries.

• Traditionalists, who place their focus on states presenting conventional threats.

• Utility Infielders, who balance risk by striving to create forces agile enough to cover the full spectrum of conflict.

• Division of Labor, who balance risk differently by specializing forces to cover different missions to enhance readiness.

(PWH note: The complete article discuuses each school in depth followed by analysis.  Here PWH just provides basic definition and Col Hoffman's conclusion)

Counterinsurgents

This school argues for a transformation based on today's fights. The advocates here believe that Iraq and Afghanistan represent far more than a passing blip in the evolution of conflict. They contend that massed formations comprised of traditional arms and large-scale conflict between conventional powers is not a realistic planning scenario. They contend that the most likely challenges and greatest risks are posed by failing states, ungoverned territories, transnational threats and radical versions of Islam.

This school contends that the purpose of having a military is not to perpetuate its preferred paradigms; it's about preparing for likely contingencies and securing America's interests. They worry that the U.S. military culture will reject the primacy or even necessity for competency in irregular warfare as operations in Iraq wind down. They argue that this would be a strategic mistake, more reprehensible than the institutional memory dump that occurred after Vietnam, and perhaps even more costly.

Traditionalists

The Traditionalists sit at the opposing end of the spectrum of conflict. This school seeks to re-establish the traditional focus of the armed forces on "fighting and winning the nation's wars." Its members focus on major, high-intensity interstate wars. They advocate against reorienting forces, especially ground forces, away from their traditional emphasis on large-scale, industrial-age warfare against states or an alliance of states.

This school does not ignore the frequency of irregular warfare or dismiss its persistent nature; it just believes that such scenarios are not amenable to military intervention and that these contingencies should not be the focus for the American military. Traditionalists want to retain the Pentagon's current procurement profile and its emphasis on "the Big Guns" for a future they predict will be conventional in nature and for which a large and expensive military is strategically necessary.

This school is particularly wary about the newfound embrace of messy, protracted counterinsurgencies such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are rightfully concerned about the degradation of combat skill sets within the Army and Marine Corps because of the severe operational tempo of today's conflicts. However, they also overlook the need to "win the wars we are in," as Nagl has noted.

Utility Infielders

The third and most prevalent school, at least among American ground force commanders, is the Utility Infielder school. This school recognizes the need to deal with strictly conventional tasks and irregular threats. It seeks to cover the entire spectrum of conflict and avoid the risk of being optimized at either extreme. Instead, it seeks to spreads this risk across the range of military operations by investing in quality forces, educating its officers for agility in complex problems, and creating tough but flexible training programs.

The Utility Infielder school is officially represented in the Army's new doctrinal manual, FM 3-0, which declares, "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that must be given priority comparable to that of combat (offensive and defensive) operations." This construct rejects the narrow mission profile of the Traditionalists and claims the Army must train its units in the application of "full-spectrum operations" to ensure it provides a balanced, versatile force to provide to joint and combined-force commanders. These "full-spectrum operations" emphasize the importance of adaptive, flexible forces able to fight and win in combat, whether facing a terrorist entity or the modern forces of a hostile nation. However, the real priorities of this school might be found in this crucial statement: Full-spectrum operations "will take us into the 21st century urban battlefields among the people without losing our capabilities to dominate the higher conventional end of the spectrum of conflict."

Division Of Labor

There are a number of analysts that reject the fundamental premise of the Utility Infielders school. This alternative school argues that irregular and conventional warfare are markedly different modes of conflict that require distinctive forces with different training, equipment and force designs. This camp places a great emphasis on preventing conflict, on stability operations and on investing in indirect forms of security forces with a greater degree of specialization for security cooperation tasks and war fighting. Because this school specifically divides and specializes roles and missions between the services, it can be labeled the "Division of Labor" option.

A team from Rand Corp. has proposed a different approach that rationalizes roles and missions, and offers a means of guiding future defense investments. This study is worthy of serious examination. This team notes that: "The imperative to promote stability and democracy abroad will place the greatest demands on the Army, the Marine Corps, and special operations forces (SOF). The most plausible regional wars that U.S. forces might be called on to fight — involving Iran, China (over Taiwan), and North Korea — call for heavy commitments of air and naval forces and, in the first two cases, fewer U.S. ground forces."

(Concluding comments)

False choice

The current bifurcation of the spectrum of conflict between irregular and conventional wars is a false choice and intellectually blinds us to a number of crucial issues. We need to assess our assumptions about frequency, consequences and risk far more carefully and analytically. The QDR's options are not simply preparing for long-term counterinsurgency operations or high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do both and do them simultaneously against enemies far more ruthless than today's.

Future opponents will exploit whatever methods, tactics or technologies that they think will thwart us. Canonical conventional scenarios do not help us prepare for such threats. We need to better posture our forces, reduce the risks we face and allocate scarce resources against threats that pose the most operational risk. I have contended that state-on-state, high-scale combat cannot be ignored, but hybrid threats are profoundly asymmetric and present the greatest operational risk to U.S. forces and to the attainment of America's strategic interests over the near to mid-range.

This reconceptualization will have significant implications for military force design and posture. In a perfect world, our military forces would be robustly sized, and we would build distinctive forces for discrete missions along the conflict spectrum. We would have separate counterterrorism forces, a force for protracted counterinsurgencies, expeditionary forces and heavy conventional forces for those rare but existential interstate conflagrations. The training and equipping of these forces would be well-matched to their expected operating environments and threats. But we do not live in a perfect world, and we need to prepare and shape our forces with a greater degree of uncertainty and with fewer resources. "We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight," Gates said on the Hill in May, "not just the wars we have been traditionally best-suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries."

The Sept. 11 funding spigot is about to be turned off, returning the Pentagon to the need to rethink its priorities and make tough choices. We no longer have the resources to simply buy everything and eliminate every risk. We will have to consciously wrestle with this challenge in the upcoming QDR. The time for hard calls has arrived.