There was a time when Americans seemed to view suicide attacks as a sign of the complete conviction of the enemy, an immutable dedication to their cause that many people found terrifying and cause for soul-searching.  "What could we have done to provoke such anger?" Yet with time, American views of suicide attacks have matured and become more grounded. 

Firstly, Americans in particular are far less afraid of suicide attackers and extremely unlikely to capitulate with anyone who attacks on American soil.  Suicide attackers hit American soil.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, they have become commonplace. 

Secondly, most importantly, wild use of suicide attackers is seen not as evidence that we are attacking the "wrong people" whose dedication to their cause is unstoppable, but as concrete evidence that we are attacking the right people and that they should be destroyed. ... Overuse of suicide attackers does not appear to cause Americans to cower, but to evoke Americans to want to kill the perpetrator. (March 25, 2010 – Michael Yon)

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian casualties cause the people to turn against the side perpetrating the casualties. This photo was taken after a suicide bombing in Mosul, Iraq, in May 2005. The neighborhood had been pro-insurgent. After this bomb in the midst of children, the neighborhood turned against the terrorists. The little girl's name was Farah. She died shortly after this moment. (Michael Yon Photo)

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While asking "what kind of war is it?" it's important to reflect on the old adage "you may not be interested in war, but WAR is certainly interested in you!" if you're not a follower of Michael Yon, you should be. (From his site) "Michael Yon is a former Green Beret, native of Winter Haven, Fl. who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004.  No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars.  Michael's dispatches from the front lines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation.  His work has been featured on "Good Morning America," The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world."

His 25 March, 2010 "dispatch" from Afghanistan on suicide bombers closes with:

In 2009, one report indicated there were 148 suicide bombings or attempts in Afghanistan.  Suicide murders continue to occur a short drive from here that are not meeting the above requirements.  Taliban continue to hit all manner of targets, and regularly slaughter non-combatant men, women and children.  Within a week subsequent to the publication of this dispatch, suicide murderers will likely kill innocent people here.  The Taliban's efforts at repackaging themselves as kinder, gentler mass-murderers is failing.  Their suicide bombing campaign is backfiring.  The Taliban are losing their cool.  Something is in the air.  The enemy remains very deadly, yet the scent of their weakness is growing stronger while our people close in. (emphasis added)

For further reading on the issue of cults read Hakim Hazim's American Realism Revisited: Lethal – maybe enlightening -Minds & Latent Threats ("There is no shortage of militant cults, and, unfortunately, those who are eager and willing to follow them. Hazim invites you to take a journey and gain insight into lethal minds and latent threats facing our country today.")

See Targeted for death -  the killing of Hamas' Mahmoud Mabhouh.  (See  background report on the operation itself)

Los Angeles Times' Marjorie Miller sought the views of an array of military and human rights lawyers on the legality and legitimacy of targeted killings.

So what kind of war or warfare or confrontation or conflict against non-state actors is war amongst the people? How do you fight, how do you survive, how does a country do both and yet maintain its sense of right and wrong?

Over the jump, key thoughts from the above article.

 If new to this site or the What Kind of War series please see the first article: EEI #15 So What Kind of War Is It?

Philip Alston
U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings

If a foreign intelligence agency was responsible for the killing of Mabhouh, the matter should clearly be classified as an extrajudicial execution. There is no legal justification for the cold-blooded murder of a man who, if alleged to have committed crimes, could have been arrested and charged. Political murders of this type undermine the fabric of international law as well as stoke the fires of conflict

Amos Guiora
Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

I have long advocated person-specific operational counter-terrorism as a means to protect the state and to protect innocent lives… targeted killings are lawful, predicated on the following caveats.

When is a person a legitimate target in the context of lawful, preemptive self-defense? There is a requirement for an intelligence picture suggesting significant future action that endangers national security.

There are four categories of legitimate targets in the suicide-bombing infrastructure: 1) the mastermind—quarterback—who identifies targets, recruits the bombers and plans the action; 2) the suicide bomber; 3) the person responsible for logistics—the driver, the person who makes the bomb and facilitates the bombing. 4) the financier

People who object to targeted killing often seem to have a covert premise that amounts to functional pacifism—yes, of course you can protect yourselves, but any practicable ways of doing so are, sorry, illegal.

But targeted killing can be an important, discrete, discriminating way of projecting lethal force. Sometimes people mistakenly think that any time you're using force, it must be better to do it in the open, transparent and acknowledged. However, the ability to use force can allow you to take out someone who is a genuine threat without raising the circumstances into open, overt, large-scale war, which could have drastically worse consequences for everyone…

"armed conflict" in a legal sense—and perhaps surprisingly to the non-lawyers—isn't the only basis for using force in international law. The U.S. and many other countries have traditionally relied on at least the international law of self-defense, permitting uses of force even though the fighting does not rise to the level of an "armed conflict" against a nonstate actor.

My view is that there's no question but that the Dubai operation, if it was Israel, is illegal. Under international law, it's a basic rule that you don't operate in another state without its consent. This is a pretty clear violation of Dubai's sovereignty, presumably without the Emirates' consent; Dubai seems to have a murder case on its hands.

So let's talk consequences: Imagine a Chechen leader, considered extremely threatening by Russia, makes his way to the United States. Russian authorities decide they cannot seek his extradition from the United States back to Russia for any number of reasons, and because he is perceived as such a great threat, Russia mounts an operation to kill this person in the United States. Are we OK with that?

The Dubai killing could be a harbinger of a lawlessness in which any state that sees a threat out there can use force in another state to stop it. International law may not always be enforceable, but it provides a sense of settled expectations about how states are to behave. If Israel did it, and if we consent to its use of force in this situation, then what is the principled response to another state's similar action in the United States or elsewhere?

... In the pre-9/11 era, the U.S. would have considered such a targeted killing to be an "assassination," which, under a presidential executive order in effect since the Ford administration, was prohibited if done by U.S. intelligence officers. Indeed, the CIA could not even share intelligence with a foreign intelligence service, including our close allies, if there were any chance it could be used to target and kill an identified terrorist.

Today, that executive order is still on the books.
Our moral code and policy pronouncements once reflected an understanding that such treacherous killing was not how a great nation should defend itself—unless, like Israel, its very survival is at stake. At one time, the United States did not kill in the shadows—until we became as afraid for our lives as the Israelis have been for decades. But are we really afraid now for our survival as a nation? How can a bunch of thugs reduce us to this?

Targeted assassinations can be justified when the target is a legitimate enemy who is actively engaged in planning or organizing or carrying out criminal or terrorist activities, and when it's possible to hit the target without killing innocent people. Also, when it's not possible to bring the targeted person to justice in a normal way; when he isn't living in a zone of peace where law and order prevails and policemen make arrests, but when he is living in something more like a zone of war. When those conditions are met, I think this is a legitimate response to international terrorism.
... It should be the policy of the United States in Afghanistan, and probably in Pakistan too, that after you carry out one of these raids, you should be prepared to defend it. You're using the coercive power of the state in a lethal way, and in a democracy—in a country committed to the rule of law—actions of that sort should be subject to some kind of public scrutiny. 

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

There seems to be a trend toward treating events of terrorism as if they were specifically a law-enforcement problem , rather than  enemy operations in the context of war and warfare. Both require application of force  "but for force to be effective the desired outcome of its use must be understood in such detail that the context is defined as well as the point of application." (The Utility of Force; The Art of War in the Modern World by General Sir Rupert Smith)

The issue here is not crime or war, the context is rather that war plays out "amongst the people" – not only in the villages of Afghanistan, but as readily in the airports, cities, communities, and courtrooms of all nations.  The application of force, -whether by police or military – AND  of law are essential.

Consider the following  3 new points (original list provided in EEI# 15) based on the Christmas Day attempted airline bombing:

• In the wake of the failed Christmas Day airplane bombing, President Obama ordered speedy reviews of how the air security system failed and the Transportation Security Administration began enhanced screening for passengers traveling through 14 nations.


• Eight years after WTC and Pentagon attacks, actionable intelligence still can't seem to get across intelligence agency boundaries so as to create "action."


• Nigerian-born Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab who tried to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear as a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam, Netherlands, made its approach to Detroit, Michigan has been read his Miranda rights.

 The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Year War essentially made war and warfare a function of the state and was in part at least an attempt to limit or control devastation among non-combatants.  The 1949 Geneva Conventions set the standards in international law for the humanitarian treatment of the victims of war and established the qualifications for being considered a lawful combatant  – must have conducted military operations according to the laws and customs of war, be part of a chain of command, wear a "fixed distinctive marking, visible from a distance" and bear arms openly.

Does not the above list  give one pause to think, that maybe, just maybe in light of those long standing and current established rules and protocols, we are laboring most vigorously,  quoting General George Patton, to make circumstances meet the plans and rules, rather than adapting as necessary to a very complex and dynamic set of events. Former CIA Chief of the bin Laden Issue Station, Michael Scheuer, asked are we in a war or chasing Thelma and Louise?  The answer would appear to be BOTH, and without succinct definition of the specific kind of war as back-plane for understanding events as they occur and without either usable definition or following rules, we're continually trying to shoe horn square pegs in round holes.

It seems appropriate here to reflect upon some of the introductory words in General Smith's The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern world:

On every occasion that I have been sent to achieve some military objective in order to serve a political purpose, I, and those with me, have had to change our method and reorganize in order to succeed.  Until this was done we could not use our force effectively.

... it became obvious to me that the extant theories of military organization and application and the unfolding realities were wide apart.  No more was I part of a world of wars in which the civilian and military establishments each had its distinct role in distinct stages.  The new situations were always a complex combination of political and military circumstances, though there appeared to be little comprehension as to how the two became intertwined – nor far more seriously from the perspective of the military practitioner, how they constantly influenced each other as events unfolded…. I realized we were now in a new era of conflict – in fact a new paradigm –

... from armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic confrontation between a range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and using different types of weapons, often improvised.  The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war.  The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people.

The next post will provide some discussion of these terms by way of seeking at least a reference point of terminology .

 Speach by Robert Mueller, Director FBI, to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 28 Sept, 2007

Two weeks ago, not far from here, bells tolled at Ground Zero. We commemorated the sixth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. And we marked the passage of another year without a terrorist attack on American soil.

It is important to pause and reflect on how we reached this milestone, so that we can better understand what we must do to reach another one. This task grows more complicated with every passing year.

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the focus of the nation was crystallized. Our objective was clear:  We knew who, and where, our enemies were, and we had to go after them—from their training camps to their finances to their leaders. In many ways, the solution was straightforward. This is no longer the case.

Six years later, the fight against terrorism has evolved in ways both subtle and dramatic. It is far from over. The terrorist threats we face have changed, but they have not diminished.

Read FBI Director Mueler's speach: http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller092807.htm

From Ed Beakley

  Jewish Warriors August 21  Muslim Warriors August 22 Christian Warriors August 23 9PM EDT By Christiane Amanpour http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2007/gods.warriors/  ********************************************************************** ************************************ Military Jihad in Modern Times is Illegal 
By Dr Walid Phares   Senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C Director of the Future Terrorism Project of the FDD  Visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. His most recent book is Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West. 

World Defense Review
August 01, 2007  The argument that the Muslims have "sensitivities" regarding the issue of historical jihad, which therefore cannot be criticized or maligned, is at odds with the current structure of international relations and laws. 

As long as a world consensus exists on the nonreligious nature of international relations, the political and legal dimensions of the historical jihad cannot be played out in the international or public policy affairs of modern society.  One cannot argue, for example, that jihad is the equivalent of self-defense in the modern international system. Self-defense doesn't relate to any theological concept. But if self-defense in Islamic religious law covers oral insults to Islamic values, then Muslim governments or a future caliph could declare wars of "self-defense" based on mere statements made by individuals and groups (thus, the Danish cartoons would have justified jihad against Denmark in the name of "self-defense"). Similarly, if to some Christian sects self-defense could be linked to an "end-time" theology, or if future religious groups through self-defense could be a response to a divine order to reshape humanity by force, these interpretations could lead to a collapse of the planetary order. In sum, the basis of twenty-first-century peace is to abandon the racial, religious, and cultural legitimization of wars. International society, with its various nations and cultures, including the Muslim ones, has agreed on this since 1945, at least in principle.

Read the Article

http://www.defenddemocracy.org//in_the_media/in_the_media_show.htm?do c_id=512471  

 From Ed Beakley, Project White Horse 084640 Director and Editor

Research and writing for both the website and in-work book are based upon the premise that the effects of 1) information technology, 2) the flattening of the world through globalization, 3) Mother Nature, and 4) the emerging and steady state non-state nature of warfare, combine to create a unique and extremely troublesome problem set for decision makers at all levels in the 21^st Century. Much has been written, websites and organizations abound on each of these subjects individually, indeed to the point of information overload. In that light,Project White Horse 084640 focuses on providing some perspective and articles focused on increasing learning related to building resiliency for citizens and First Responders.

I submit to you that the education and experience that our fathers and grandfathers needed to understand their world in the face of Germany and Japan in World War II and then the USSR in the Cold War was sufficient for debate and action, and indeed survival. I firmly believe that our experience base, educational background, and gained knowledge from the computer age is necessary but insufficient for a different kind of "four horsemen" in this new century. An active learning, unlearning, relearning process is required.  

Given the quarterly nature of the website additions, I have determined to provide on occasion links to articles I find of particular interest in the research and consider as relevant to developing resiliency in the face of the frontier at our doorstep.  As always your thoughts are most desired.

 By Frank Borelli

Not long ago I read through the book, "Terror At Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America's Schools" by John Giduck  The book so convinced me that we in law enforcement are training for the wrong threat (Active Shooter) that I doubted my own thought process. So, to double check my understanding, this past week I attended a presentation by John Giduck given at a conference in Washington, DC. What I found was that not only did I understand the book correctly, but the situation is worse than I actually perceived it. 

Through his presentation, Mr. Giduck explains the terrorist thought process and how the attacks / sieges they've committed have been motivated, planned and performed. Yes, I said "sieges". As Mr. Giduck explained:

Read the Article 

http://www.borelliconsulting.com/articles/multerdoctrine.htm 

Some truths are so obvious that to mention them in polite company seems either pointless or rude. What is left unstated, however, can with time be forgotten. Both of these observations apply today to the American way of war. It is obvious that a military can only fight well on behalf of a society in which it believes, and that a society which believes little is worth fighting for cannot, in the end, field an effective military. Obvious as this is, we seem to have forgotten it. 

Remembering will help us in several ways. First, it will show us that the greatest asymmetry in our struggle with radical Islam is not one of arms or organization or even of ideology in any simple sense, but one of morale in the deepest sense. Second, it will provide an insight into the state of civil-military relations in our own country, which is a growing problem many of us refuse to acknowledge. And third, it will show us why some kinds of wars—"in-between" wars, I call them—have become inherently difficult for the United States to fight and win. 

 As Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz said: While a good society should certainly never want to go to war, it must always be prepared to do so. But a society will not fight for what it believes, if all it believes is that it should never have to fight. 

Read the article 

http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=289&MId=14 

Despite our rather rosy hindsight view of World War II, there was considerable dissent at the time about the war's aims, conduct, and strategy. But virtually no one disagreed that it was indeed a war or that the Axis powers were the enemy/aggressors. 

Contrast this with the war on terrorism. Some dispute the notion that the conflict can be defined as a war; others question the reality of the threat. Far-left critics blame American industrial interests, while a lunatic fringe sees September 11, 2001, as a massive self-inflicted conspiracy. More seriously, people disagree about the enemy. Is al-Qaida a real threat or a creature of Western paranoia and overreaction? Is it even a real organization? 

Is al-Qaida a mass movement or simply a philosophy, a state of mind? Is the enemy all terrorism? Is it extremism? Or is Islam itself in some way a threat? Is this primarily a military, political, or civilizational problem? What would "victory" look like? These fundamentals are disputed, as those of previous conflicts (except possibly the Cold War) were not.

British General Rupert Smith argues that war—defined as industrial, interstate warfare between armies, where the clash of arms decides the outcome—no longer exists, that we are instead in an era of "war amongst the people," where the utility of military forces depends on their ability to adapt to complex political contexts and engage non-state opponents under the critical gaze of global public opinion.

The new threats, which invalidate received wisdom on so many issues, may indicate that we are on the brink of a new era of conflict. Finding new, breakthrough ideas to understand and defeat these threats may prove to be the most important challenge we face. Read the article

http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm