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Unconventional Response: Steve Jobs, The Crazy Ones

Ed Beakley — Fri, 07 Oct 2011 16:04:58 +0000

Day is Done – September 11th 2011

Ed Beakley — Mon, 12 Sep 2011 14:20:47 +0000

As the day closed on September 11 2001, we began the process of "doing what we know"- we had been attacked – strangely suprising to some in other lands, Americans strike back hard when treaded upon – so we went to war in the way we know how. The events of September 11, 2001 were of such magnitude, shock and so far outside the norm of how we perceived warfare, and our whole intelligence process was so much still Cold War mind set, we didn't "know what to do" ...really. We attacked, we fought, we used B-52s and smart bombs with special forces guys doing the targeting and riding with Afghans on horses. We learned, but we were still doing what we know not knowing what to do.

After the invasion of Iraq, that became apparent - who exactly were we fighting, how many groups, were they connected? We learned, the hard way. Army General Petraeus and Marine General Mattis rewrote the counterinsurgency manual – many had long fought even using the term insurgency. Americans fought, Americans died, some learned. But it has been a tough think. What kind of war have we been fighting: guerrilla warfare, non conventional, unconventional, fourth generation, irregular? Is the answer counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, what? The debate on whether what applied in Iraq applies in Afghanistan still ebbs and flows – below the surface for most Americans.

It's gets hard when the protagonist stop wearing blue and red uniforms to understand the true nature of warfare. Yet, old principles still abide, Clausewitz's trinity does indeed still hold:

primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;

the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam;

element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason...."

(This set of elements is usually labeled "emotion/chance/reason"; sometimes "violence/chance & probability/rational calculation"; or, even more abstractly, "irrationality/nonrationality/rationality.")

So questions still persist; Are we better off ten years later, have we gained the imagination so lacking pre 9-11, are our leaders really prepared to make the decisions necessary in a world so ill defined, indeed, are we capable of knowing what to do rather than doing what we know?

Like most Americans over the past week I've searched the blogs, read the opinion pieces, the stories of the folks most directly involved, watched hours of commentators and ceremonies and dedications. I've searched and struggled to find words for this blog, given the focus on decision making in severe crisis.

Below are three articles and links to the originals that surround the idea of learning and focusing so that we as a people – top to bottom – can know what to do. They are well worth your time.

One introductory comment, then the rest stand on their own needing no help from me. The first article is about Rick Rescorla. His story has been featured here before. (See Sheepdog of Morgan Stanley) He may be the only person who knew what to do on September 11 2001. Learning from the first WTC attack, he prepared those at Morgan Stanley for what he was sure would be another attack. Ignoring Port Authority notice to remain in place after the attacks, he evacuated Morgan Stanley employees. Were it not for him, the losses at the twin towers would have been not 2800 but 5300.

Knowing what to do is possible – it takes constant learning and the will to stay the course. Day is done, what next?

Rick Rescorla, Hero: Vietnam to 9/11

By: Bud Alley Date: September 11 , 2011

Late Sunday, June 1st, 2001, my wife, Caroline and I pulled into the front of Rick and Susan Rescorla's condo. In keeping with his ebullient personality, Rick had hung his signature First Cavalry jacket on the porch light. Always larger than life, he bounded down the steps with a welcoming smile and bear hug.

He was that kind of guy, absolutely fearless and totally selfless.

A singer of songs in the face of the enemy, he calmed his men on Landing Zone X-ray as they awaited a North Vietnamese attack at dawn–and later after the attacks of 9/11.

That was Rick. Big guy–must have been over 6'2", Bunyanesque in life. He was a hero to all of us, fellow lieutenants and enlisted.

In Vietnam, while serving with the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry in 1965, he invented what became officially known as the LURP team. And later, he was featured on the cover of We Were Soldiers Once…and Young.

In later years, I got to know Rick as a man of insatiable scholarly curiosity and intellect as well as a father.

We occasionally exchanged small tokens like knives or articles with one another. All who knew him were amazed at his generosity. As we left following dinner that June night, Rick handed me something in an expensive cloth bag. He knew I had spent my career in the box business. He said, "Look at it later."

Ten years ago on September 11th, at about 6:30 pm, I made the hardest phone call I ever made in my life–to Rick Rescorla's wife Susan.

I hoped against hope that he had not gone to work that day in the World Trade Center. I hoped he and Susan had taken the opportunity to enjoy one of their day trips to the Jersey countryside. But somehow deep down inside, I knew I had lost a friend.

Inside that bag he had given me that June was a beautiful wooden box, the kind you keep on your dresser, with your watches, your precious jewelry, and your memories. His box is still on my dresser and not a day goes by that I don't thank God for the privilege of counting Rick Rescorla as a friend.

Later that winter, I visited Susan and she took me to the Raptor Center to show me the living memorials she had endowed in Rick's memory. There were two American Bald Eagles that had been rescued from injury. How perfect and magnificent they were–sitting proudly on their perches, so like Rick. Survivors. Poised. Erect. Unbroken. The message in their eyes: "We Will Never Surrender."

Rick, head of security for Morgan Stanley, managed to evacuate the 2500 employees of the South Tower on 911. There are photos of him singing to calm the evacuees. Rick was last seen climbing back up the stairs to make a final sweep before the building collapsed.

Rick's physical remains have never been recovered but his spirit will never die.

His statue is now permanently placed on the grounds of the National Infantry Museum along with a piece of steel from the building.

Ten years ago a petition began to circulate calling for him to receive the Presidential Medal of Freedom. It went viral and garnered thousands of names. Conversations with the White House staff were held, but nothing ever came of it. Now, as we pause to recall those who stood up on 911, there is a pall cast by the lack of recognition of Rick's valorous sacrifice.

Those of us who knew Rick and served with him in combat are still trying to see that he gets the national recognition he deserves. He has been honored in his native England, his hometown of Cornwall, and by his friends who contributed to the Columbus Georgia memorial.

The man who saved more people on one day by his actions has not been awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

If he had been fighting on foreign soil, he would have received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Damn shame ten years later, our leaders have not honored this immigrant citizen who so magnified our American values.

CP Note: *Watch "Voice of the Prophet," an interview with Rick Rescorla, done with Robert H. "Bob" Edwards' son Robert Edwards, who fought at Ia Drang with Rick. In the interview, Rick all but predicts the attacks of 9/11.

The Nine Eleven Century?

By Mark Safranski at ZENPUNDIT

Ten years ago to this day, almost to the hour of which I am writing, commercial jetliners were highjacked by al Qaida teams armed with boxcutters, under the direction of Mohammed Atta, were flown into the towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, believed to be headed to the US Capitol building, crashed in Pennsylvania when passengers led by Todd Beamer heroically attempted to stop the highjackers. The whole world watched – most with horror but some with public glee - on live television as people jumped out of smoke-engulfed windows, holding hands, to their deaths. Then, the towers fell.

From this day flowed terrible consequences that are still unfolding like the rippling shockwave of a bomb.

We look back, sometimes on the History Channel or some other educational program, at the grainy, too fast moving, sepia motion pictures of the start of World War I. The crowds wildly cheered troops with strangely antiquarian uniforms that looked reminiscent of Napoleon's day, march proudly off to the war that gave Europe the Somme, Gallipoli, Passchendaele and Verdun. And the Russian Revolution.

After the armistice, the victors had a brief chance to reset the geopolitical, strategic and economic patterns the war had wrought and in which they were enmeshed. The statesmen could not rise to that occasion, failing so badly that it was understood even at the time, by John Maynard Keynes and many others, that things were being made worse. World War I. became the historical template for the short but infinitely bloody 20th century of 1914-1991, which historians in future centuries may simply describe as "the long war" or a "civil war of western civilization".

There is a serious danger, in my view, of September 11 becoming such a template for the 21st century and for the United States.

On the tenth anniversary of 9/11, as we remember the fallen and the many members of the armed services of the United States who have served for ten years of war, heroically, at great sacrifice and seldom with complaint, we also need to recall that we should not move through history as sleepwalkers. We owe it to our veterans and to ourselves not to continue to blindly walk the path of the trajectory of 9/11, but to pause and reflect on what changes in the last ten years have been for the good and which require reassessment. Or repeal. To reassert ourselves, as Americans, as masters of our own destiny rather than reacting blindly to events while carelessly ceding more and more control over our lives and our livelihoods to the whims of others and a theatric quest for perfect security. America needs to regain the initiative, remember our strengths and do a much better job of minding the store at home.

The next ninety years being molded by the last ten is not a future I care to leave to my children. I can think of no better way to honor the dead and refute the current sense of decline than for America to collectively step back from immersion in moment by moment events and start to chart a course for the long term.

Pull out the chocks. Let's roll

Posted on 10 Sep 2011 by Starbuck

Say what you will about the messenger, but "Courtney" was right. September 11th was a watershed event for an entire generation of Americans; one which would dominate their worldview for much of their adult lives.

Sure, some might scoff at the jubilant crowds gathered around the White House after news leaked of Osama bin Laden's demise at the hands of US Navy SEALs. But while September 11th may not have been as militarily significant as, say, Pearl Harbor, it was no less visceral: New York and Washington weren't mere US territories thousands of miles from the shores of the US, as was Hawaii in 1941. The Pentagon and World Trade Center were fixtures in the lives of everyday Americans; and in the 21st Century, live footage of the conflagration could be piped into every home in America in vivid color. And though only a tiny portion of America would serve in uniform in the decade to come, the effects of the attacks would permeate nearly every aspect of our lives: the economic downturn, terror alerts, airline security, even the ubiquitous news ticker, now a staple on nearly every cable news station.

But above all, there was the culture of fear.

Osama bin Laden, for all of his malfeasance, certainly didn't pose the same existential threat to the United States as Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. Yet, his escape from the wrath of the US military, and his wraith-like presence for nearly a decade gave him the allure of a boogeyman. And, like many boogeymen, simply whispering "Osama bin Laden" or "9/11? could frighten and cajole Americans into rash and irrevocable actions: torture at Guantanamo, the invasion of Iraq, and trillions sunk into wasteful security programs.

Yet, for all our mistakes, al-Qaeda erred even greater.

The invasion of Iraq might have been a massive recruiting boon for al Qaeda and its Iraqi affiliate, but by the end of 2006, the organization had overplayed its hand. Local sheiks, and even former al-Qaeda members eventually joined US forces in a counter-offensive against al-Qaeda in Iraq, having been sickened by the violence unleashed by Zarqawi and his minions. The movement, dubbed "The Awakening", was seen by many as a turning point in the war in Anbar Province.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, remotely-piloted drones pounded away at the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, keeping senior al-Qaeda figures at bay. Finally, the organization was dealt a deadly blow when US Navy SEALs mounted a spectacular raid into a compound in Abbotabad, Pakistan, killing the former al-Qaeda leader who had spent nearly a decade presumably under house arrest, under the watchful eye of the Pakistani government. Months later, a fierce drone campaign picked off al-Qaeda's number two operative.

And though US officials are rightly cautious over alleged terror plots timed to coincide with the tenth anniversary of 9/11, they're nowhere near the size or scope of 9/11.

Reduced to underwear bombs, al-Qaeda is a mere shell of its former self.

But though we may have crippled al-Qaeda, we've been weakened, too. Thousands of American troops have been killed in wars abroad, and tens of thousands more have been horribly wounded. Our national debt has surpassed fourteen trillion dollars–roughly our yearly Gross Domestic Product. Unemployment is rampant, and our collective confidence is shattered. Our public image has been bruised, and partisan rancor cuts so deeply that we cannot even agree upon a decent memorial to commemorate the victims of 9/11, even ten years later.

As a nation we can be shallow, petty, and selfish. But deep down, we can learn to sacrifice and cooperate.

Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, our rallying cry was "Let's roll": a call not just to punish the perpetrators of this odious act–rightly so–but also to rebuild.

Ten years later, it's time to start rebuilding. For nearly a decade, our national wheels have been chocked with pernicious emnity and fear mongering. It's time to finally pull out the chocks and roll.

Essential Element of Information for a Culture of Preparedness: They called him “Coach”

Ed Beakley — Sat, 05 Jun 2010 18:29:10 +0000

If one is to discuss leadership, what it requires to "decide and act" in severe crisis, the journey should start here.

A real love for the hard battle, knowing it offers the opportunity to be at your best when the best is required.

Competiveness: John R Wooden

More reading about Coach Wooden and his "pyramid of success:"

The Official John R. Wooden site

Biography at Wikipedia

Pyramid of Sucess (PDF printable)

and finally

"Failing to prepare is preparing to fail" in his own words follow the "Favorite maxims" tab to "never stress winning"

EEI# 31 What kind of organizations…? Those that incorporate and ingrain Red Team culture

Ed Beakley — Fri, 19 Mar 2010 21:56:58 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

Alternative analysis is the super-class of techniques of which red teaming may be considered a member… these techniques are designed to help debias thinking, enhance decision making, and avoid surprise. (From Red Team Journal)

http://redteamjournal.com/

As noted in The 2010 Announcement post, Project White Horse focus for 2010 will explore "what kind of organizations and indeed groups of organizations can operate at the required tempo demanded for survival when faced with worst case, unconventional crisis, or hyper complex events – the "CAT 5's."

Now, consider just a quick bit of background to link red Team Journal's effort with Project White Horse perspective.

Considering that the PWH focus on decision making in unconventional crisis/hyper complex events has at its core the thread and ideas of "alternative analysis," the concept of integrating red teaming into organizational learning as significantly impacting the survival process is offered as absolutely critical – an essential element of understanding for a culture of preparedness. As such Red Team Journal is offered as an important resource. Note that the writing of Assistant Editor Adam Elkus has been featured multiple times on PWH, most recently in EEI #25 "What kind of War… Science, Defence, and Strategy … and John Boyd."

Defined by Red Team Journal – "loosely, red teaming is the practice of viewing a problem from an adversary or competitor's perspective. The goal of most red teams is to enhance decision making, either by specifying the adversary's preferences and strategies or by simply acting as a devil's advocate." For a quick look at red teaming and the writers see About.

A year ago PWH introduced a specially focused "carve-out," the INTERSECTIONS page, stemming from Frans Johansson's The Medici Effect and his model for gaining understanding, and developing innovative action -the intersection:

Intersectional ideas are those resulting from combining concepts from multiple fields – areas of specialization gained through education and experience – as compared to those created traditionally by combing concepts within a field – noted as directional ideas. Success in intersectional idea generation is dependent upon breaking down barriers of association that would more than likely indicate a "non relationship" or at best limited context between or among fields.

As part of INTERSECTIONS in Training Decision Makers to the 'Ace' Level, it was noted that There are two critical elements missing from most current HLS/HLD training programs. First is the notion of dedicated opposing force and second, the need to include non-scripted decision making situations. Most training events and drills are based on availability of resources – both human and physical - necessary for the management of, or the consequences of, a specific disaster type. As discussed in previous articles, these mostly pre-scripted drills fail to address crisis development, eliminate the Observation and Orientation stages of the Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) Loop by pre-determining their characteristics, thus eliminating uncertainty, and therefore, bypassing the essential element of critical command thinking.

The question was then asked "Can the "train to the ace level" concept behind Top Gun, Red Flag, National Training Center at Ft Irwin, i.e. the combat training center or "CTC" concept be applied to hyper complex crisis, worst case disaster command control learning, can ace decision makers be developed?" The following sub-pages continue to address various aspects of this question that include "red team" type functions and capabilities:

II. Training Decision Makers to the 'Ace' Level [Part 1]

II. [Part 2] Scenarios – To the 'Ace' Level

II. [Part 3] Methodology – To the 'Ace' Level

These are considered "open/living threads. PWH target audience will remain oriented at a community "team of leaders" inclusive of not only emergency management and first responders, but also private sector, and citizens, as required for survival of that community when faced with events that are inherently severely de-stabilizing – marginalizing prior planning and anticipated response structure. Understanding risk – assessment, mitigation, management and the eventual acceptance level is crucial for a resilient community and part of a culture of preparedness. By way of starting examples these Red Team Journal articles seem most appropriate

The Defense Science Board Calls for More Red Teaming "Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception. Secretary of Defense direct the use of red teaming throughout DOD by developing and employing best practice guides, intellectual focus in professional military education, and more aggressive use of red teams in exercises."

Interposing Tactics " ... we are now seeing a new form of granular conflict, where the essence of tactical supremacy is achieved through coordination of multi factor, and multidimensional attacks and defense by individual force elements interposed against each other. ... will continue the process of dissolving force elements beyond the individual level to a new level of autonomous actions, which will lead to totally chaotic battles. The winner will be the force composed of individuals who are better at operating in this environment.

An Introduction to Reciprocal Net Assessment ... good decision making is more than just reacting to threats in time to avoid them; good decision making involves avoiding surprise and creating it. The RNA approach can help analysts and decision makers do both. (and) is useful primarily as a complement to existing methods of red teaming, competitive and intelligence analysis, deception and counterdeception analysis, and business and military wargaming.

Modeling and Simulation of Red Teaming This and future position papers will explore possible ways to use M&S to augment or replace traditional red teams in some situations, the features Red Team M&S should possess, how one might connect live and simulated red teams, and existing tools in this domain.

Please make Red Team Journal part of your "resilient community" reading.

EEI#30 Leadership – First follower

Ed Beakley — Sun, 07 Mar 2010 16:43:37 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

We continue to discuss the idea of "team of leaders." This video well worth your time. Thanks to John Robb at Global Guerrilllas. See his site for comments.

But let's take this one step further into the context of "What kind of war" determination as impacting how we approach "the war" once we have determined "what kind." Consider the comments from the Blog – Challenge COIN; Perspectives on the evolving U.S. Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism doctrine. What works, what does not, and what we think we know: "COIN/CT Lessons from drug induced dancing."

... The main lesson to walk away with is how crucial it was to easily mimic the dance. Were this a difficult dance, the originator would have been nothing more than an observed solo performer. Also the role of the first follower made it acceptable for a few more people to join. Once the first follower's friends join in, the tipping point is then reached at 1:15. From then on, people join in groups and the originator or "leader" is irrelevant as the movement has a life of his own. Only the music ending stops everyone from dancing, not the "leader."

Now take that template and apply it to al Qaeda in Iraq. What sort of impact would killing or capturing the leadership have today? This is precisely why the classic insurgency texts emphasized the need to destroy an insurgency at its onset. Otherwise it becomes an integrated part of a society for at least a generation if not longer. So how do we end the al Qaeda-styled movements? Find the music and turn it off…

EEI#19 “What kind of war?” – continued (5 of?) – Boundary Layers

Ed Beakley — Sun, 10 Jan 2010 08:03:37 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

A "lesson in aerodynamics" might be of interest as painting- hopefully- a useful "picture" of the period from shortly before the September 11, 2001 8th hour, 46th minute, 40th second impact of American Airlines Flight 11, on through the remainder of the day as initial reaction and response took place, and on into the 12th as intial world level response was planned.

Boundary conditions – the set of conditions specified for the behavior of the solution to a set of differential equations at the boundary of its domain – are important in determining the mathematical solutions to many physical problems.

More specifically, concerning flight, the condition is noted as the boundary layer – the layer of reduced velocity in fluids, such as air and water, that is immediately adjacent to the surface of a solid – the wing – past which the fluid is flowing. Truth is the air moving at different speeds around the upper and lower surface of the airfoil, thereby creating lift, rides not on the wing itself but rather on the boundary layer. Friction generated with the surface by the air's movement creates the slower moving layer with the air not only riding but additionally holding the layer to the surface.

If the angle of incidence of the airfoil in relation to airflow is increased, whether initiated by the pilot or by impact of turbulent air, the layer flow can slow to the point of turbulence ( loss of laminar flow) and in this disruption, the flowing air can no longer stay attached to the layer/airfoil, drag over comes lift and the wing is no longer in stable positive flight – not flying it stalls.

Characterized and understood by most under the context "lack of imagination," the 9-11 attack was planned, enabled and occured successfully because the initial conditions – the boundary conditions – that existed on 11 Sept were ideal for the al Qaeda attackers. They were those of the Cold War, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as strategy, and what do do with the supposed peace dividend as the only global suoper-power. Not appropriately factored in were events such as the Khobar Towers attack, the first WTC bombing, or bombing of USS Cole, nor the emergence of non-state, religous and ethnic players suddenly attempting to control their own destiny in the wake of the USSR's demise and demise of acceptance of the state boundaries imposed at the end of WWI. The conditions "of war" were metaphorically laminar for both American Flight 11's high speed attack on the World Trade Center and for al Qaeda. A new set of boundary conditions with a great deal of turbulent flow in the layers around any future activity now existed. The fact that "what kind of war" has never been adequately addressed is evidence that "new norm" indicates only partlial recognition of the flight environment for the ship of state.

Further, not recognized even as clearly, the initial 11 and 12 September plus later responses -

[the attack against the Taliban, invasion of Iraq, the Global War on Terrorism, the implementation of population-centric COIN tactics – and continued dithering (evidence offered in this series) on everything about "the war on terrorism" from its name to what do to with prisoner enemy combatants, to how to fight, where to fight, who or what to fight with, who gets to know what, to how much money goes to each city or state to how to keep explosives off of airplanes] -

are direct result of operating with the wrong or at least insufficiently defined and understood boundary conditions. With the Cold War mind set prevailing to enable the attack, the WWII, big war (tanks, fighter jets, war by technology) mind set defined the boundary layers of our planning for response. All did what they know. Initial Spec Ops with horses and B-52s with precision bombs, and the run up the Tigris and Euphrates by Marine and Army forces worked well. Since then our metaphorical wing-of-war has seen more of the air flow shown at the end of the graphic than the beginning. Indeed not all airfoils are usable in all types of flight conditions.

Since Sept 11, 2001 the airfoil of our ship of state continues flight in turbulence – mostly resulting from trying to make the plans of another time and place meet a changed and ever changing 21st century circumstance. As stated in daVinci's Horse #5 and in the lead article in this series by Dr. vob Lubitz, we persist in doing what we know, rather than taking the apparently difficult path leading to knowing what we should do. Unstable air, unstable flight, indeed.

Rectifying the current situation – beginning by answering the question: "what kind of war is it?" – cannot be based on what we would like it to be considering our current defense posture, planning, and investment, nor can it be built on urban legend or myth. Retired Coast Guard Commander and recently selected president of the Center for National Policy, Dr. Stephen Flynn elaborated on this subject in the Washington Post on Sunday January 3, 2010. 5 Myths about keeping America safe from terrorrism:

With President Obama declaring a "systemic failure" of our security system in the wake of the attempted Christmas bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner, familiar arguments about what can and should be done to reduce America's vulnerabilities are again filling the airwaves, editorial pages and blogosphere. Several of these arguments are based on assumptions that guided the U.S. response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks—and unfortunately, they are as unfounded now as they were then. The biggest whopper of all? The paternalistic assertion that the government can keep us all safe without our help

Please continue to EEI#20, the sixth article in this series, for the complete article.

The graphic "Boundary Layer Separation" is from Computational Fluid Dynamics and Visualization

EEI#16 “What kind of war” – continued (2 of ?) – On War, On Crime – the Intersection

Ed Beakley — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 16:45:02 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

"At this stage, the drug cartels are using basic infantry weaponry to counter government forces," a U.S. government official in Mexico said. "Encountering criminals with this kind of weaponry is a horse of a different color," the official said. "It's not your typical patrol stop, where someone pulls a gun. This has all the makings of an infantry squad, or guerrilla fighting."

[From INTERSECTIONS II (Scenarios for Training to the Ace Level) – 4. The 'Cat 5? Next Door: Drug Cartels' New Weaponry Means War describing the on-going drug based vilolence in Mexico. ]

In "What Kind of War Is It," EEI#15, it was offered for consideration four broad types of user/method 4GW operations that include mixes of terrorism, insurgency, small unit tactics, media warfare, and cyber warfare. These methods can be characterized as manifesting themselves as follows:

1) war-within-war to include counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (Iraq, Afghanistan)

2) expeditionary attacks (Mombai, World TradeCenter/Pentagon)

3) lone wolf attacks (murders at Ft Hood)

4) adaptation of 4GW concepts and methods by criminal elements and gangs (Mexico's drug war).

As a continuation of "essential elements of information for a culture of preparedness," and several previous posts under EEI on the impact of current high level government decisions on how we fight in future conflict, the following three articles/links discuss the over-here aspects of continuing war, warfare, violence in the context of fourth generation warfare (4GW). Discussion of counter operations then continues on the INTERSECTION pages: III. Crime and Fourth Generation Warfare- A really bad Intersection.

On War #323 Milestones by Bill Lind

Excerpt: One of the ongoing themes of this column has been gangs and the role they play in a Fourth Generation world. Here in the United States they already serve as an alternative primary loyalty (alternative to the state) for many urban young men. Gangs will likely be a major player in 4GW because gang members are expected to fight. Those who won't do not remain gang members.

The November 15 Washington Post had a story about gangs in Salinas, California, that deserves close attention from 4GW theorists. ... what is interesting in the Post's article is not the gangs themselves. It is a new response to the gangs. Salinas has brought in the U.S. military to apply counter-insurgency doctrine to a situation on American soil.

Border Zones and Insecurity in the Americas by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Excerpt: Border zones are incubators of criminal instability and violence. Weak state presence and the lucrative drugs trade is combining to challenge state sovereignty in acute ways. Consider Mexico, where the northern frontier with the US and southern border with Guatemala are contested zones. The bloody center of gravity of Mexico's drug cartels is the 'plazas', the drug smuggling corridors that link the borders….While some have fretted that these zones could harbor jihadi terrorists, the real danger lies in the violence produced by bloody competition over these lucrative areas and the spread of criminal reach and power throughout the state and across frontiers.

The 'Lone Wolf Problem' poses security challenges for feds - Dallas Morning News

Excerpt: What made the Fort Hood case so hard to prevent, Zarate said, "was that Maj. Hasan allegedly acted alone, in lone wolf fashion, and may have used his medical research to mask his own inner turmoil and attraction to a violent ideology."... It is impossible for the government to identify and, if necessary, take pre-emptive action on every person who espouses violence – to separate the wheat from the chaff.

"In many ways, the lone wolf insider threat is the most challenging and difficult of problems for the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities," said Juan Zarate, former deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism for President George W. Bush.

Please continue further: III. Crime and Fourth Generation Warfare- A really bad Intersection.

EEI #11 Don't get stuck on complacent (stupid)

Ed Beakley — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 17:58:26 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

"Man is a peculiarly constructed animal who cannot read the handwriting on the wall, until his back is up against it." Unknown

TAMPA - Retired Army Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, speaking at the America Association of State Troopers Law Enforcement Training Conference asked law enforcement officials Monday if they're ready for a hurricane.

From the St. Petersburg Times: (Inpart) Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, the man widely credited with restoring order to a chaotic post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans, has a word of warning for Floridians who believe they have hurricanes figured out.

"The people in Florida think they're smarter than the people in Louisiana," the retired Army general who commanded Joint Task Force Katrina said Monday, addressing law enforcement officers at Tampa Airport Marriott. "No, you're not. You just haven't been hit by a Katrina."

Speaking before the National Law Enforcement Training Conference, which goes through Wednesday (August 12, 2009), Honore said complacency is the greatest challenge communities face when it comes to disaster preparedness.

His new book, SURVIVAL: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disasters, (Atria Books, 304 pages, $25.00) – part memoir, part how-to manual – focuses on the responsibility of the individual to be ready in the face of disaster.

"My concern with Florida is the last time you really got smacked hard was Andrew," Honore said."I'm telling you," Honore said, "there's an a—whipping coming for Florida."

Besides raising the flag over hurricane readiness, Honore predicted the H1N1 flu, or swine flu, will pose an increasingly significant challenge to the United States in the coming months and year, especially as football season begins, drawing large crowds together on a regular basis.

"We're not ready," he said. "I don't think we've spent the time getting the country ready and I don't think the country has spent the time getting the states ready."

Local governments, he said, need to start warning citizens now about how they will administer vaccinations to various populations and age groups once a high-demand vaccine is developed and, more than likely, is in short supply.

Additionally, there needs to be a culture shift in the American workplace, he said. Employees who experience symptoms associated with the pandemic strain should be encouraged to stay at home without risk of being penalized by their bosses.

"We've been talking about this for years," he said of the pandemic. "This is no stranger to people familiar with pandemic scenarios. But what we haven't done is talk to the public.

For the complete article see St. Petersburg Times. For more information on General Honore see here.

EEI #9 Operational Art for Policing

Ed Beakley — Sun, 26 Jul 2009 20:05:57 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

The military, facing a complex and intractable mixture of "wicked problems" on the battlefield, has responded with a doctrinal revolution in the production and practice of operational theory. But most police agencies don't incorporate the "operational level of maneuver" into their planning and concept of operations. We face a constellation of complex "high-intensity policing" problems such as counterterrorism, transnational organized crime and gangs that demand development of a true operational art and doctrine, rather than current focus on tactical response. The police service desperately requires an understanding of operational theory and must develop operational doctrine to successfully address contemporary threats.

We propose a model for urban police operational art that has a five-dimensional view of the operational space, focusing in particular on the doctrinally neglected elements of cyberspace and temporality.

Our intention is to summarize and clarify a wide array of military thought, incorporating it into an operational framework for police operational response. In particular we will examine the military theories of Robert Bunker, Robert Leonhard, and William McRaven

In the current edition of PWH, in the introduction to Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege it was noted that the concepts provided break through thinking on survival in urban "war amongst the people." Authors John Sullivan and Adam Elkus continue their "intersectional" thinking with two additional pieces in this series.

Toward Operational Art for Policing at GroupIntel

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space, at Small Wars Journal

EEI #5 – “The Big Picture”- the Nexus between Education and Grand Strategy

Ed Beakley — Thu, 16 Jul 2009 18:23:55 +0000

Essential Elements of Information for a Culture of Preparedness

Why would our societal orientation in complex, dynamic, fast moving situations be good when our educational system trains people only to think through simplified, linear, sequential problems? Strategic thinkers need to be able to see "the big picture" and handle uncertainty, or they cannot be said to be strategic thinkers.

The ship of state has been steered, over the last forty or so years, into an epistemological cul-de-sac and we are headed for the rocks. America needs a grand strategy for a competent citizenry in order to reach the point where it can again have a grand strategy to deal with an unruly world.

If ever there was an essential element of information for a culture of preparedness Mark Safranski—aka "Zenpundit" discusses it here. Please see: Zenpundit