So now you have an event that is transboundary in three different ways: geographic/logistical, political/jurisdictional, and legal/bureaucratic. The first is a logistical question: how do you get the physical resources (personnel, food, water) where they need to be when they need to be there when resources are limited and the need is geographically widespread? The second is political: how do you facilitate decision-makers and elected officials in seeing themselves as part of an emerging multi-layered event – “the big picture” – while still focusing on the local response? The third is legal and bureaucratic: how do you get agencies and departments to move beyond the silo or turf mentality and work collaboratively to facilitate the overall mission goals? Note: If you add just one lawyer into the mix at each level (and I say this as a member of the California bar, though I will happily hear evidence to the contrary), there is increasing likelihood that bureaucratic paralysis will become complete stalemate. So a complementary point for the third is: how do you get lawyers to facilitate rather than hinder response while still ensuring that the rule of law governs response actions?

PWH Note: Dr. Egan’s remarks are carried over to comments on #3)

Transboundary refers to almost every incident I respond to on a daily basis and every national incident my team responds to. We are a federal asset working with locals, states, tribal nations and other federal agencies. Often we teach local officials about NIMS and interagency relations. Other times we find officials who are well versed in working in a transboundary environment. When allowed to be effective, we can (and have) pre-position food water etc, and can begin delivery as soon as a storm clears to even the most remote areas, working with locals to assure their needs are met. All 16 national IMTs were placed in the south in 2005 and at times, were the only or the first responders that locals saw. My point is that systems do exist that work, but they are not applied the same across the U.S.

PWH note: This is part of a longer input by Capt. Meinema which will be presented in whole as a next essential element of information.

As you can see, SOME disasters are local, but the greater the scale of the disaster, the less “locality.” Like in war, individual squad level firefights determine cumulatively whether the operation progresses or turns into a rout, but blinding oneself to the fact that it all can be solved at the squad level is a disastrous fallacy. Other elements are involved, many vastly more complex, and the level of preparedness and response that will be required may also have unprecedented “whole-of-the-government” complexity. Hanging on to comfortable slogans can be the prelude to your rout. For those in doubt, the recently published book by Gen. Honore (Survival) offers some good lessons on the subject.

Incidentally, please note that the appended paper (shortly to emerge as a White Paper published by DoD/DHS) also speaks of the utility of ToL in addressing “transboundary” events (i.e., developing preparedness, response, and recovery.). Adherence to the principles of the concept (understood as its sensible adoption and adaptation to user’s requirements/operational reality) may be instrumental in saving the day when all seems to be falling apart around our ears.

The paper contains a reference to ToL manual published by EUCOM.( http://www.projectwhitehorse.com/pdfs/EUCOM%20ToL%20Guide%20MAR%202009.pdf) Most cordially recommended for both theoretical and practical perusal. If EUCOM can benefit of ToL in situations that are at times “non-solvable” by conventional means, so can both homeland security and defense. Neither is more complex, even if many would like to have it so.