If you have read all three parts, it has probably been obvious that the threads are intermingled. Of particular note for this thread are comments #6 and 7 in part 3 RC#27 based on discussion centered on this question:

By “operational” do you mean “theater” or “grand-tactical”?

Had theater intelligence worked properly, General Honore would not need to be in New Orleans, thousands of poor sods would not have either died or been ruined, and the General would not need to talk about Railroad Street. (See RC#24)

There was NO intelligence – neither conceptual nor literal, and it took one man with brains, initiative, immense skills, and do NOT forget that – humanity – to sort the nonsense out. Actually because of the lack of theater intelligence I had the privilege of being in a potent mess as well. We didn’t get it then, we don’t get it now. What you need at the ground level is a well and quickly functioning brain. What may keep you from ever being on the ground level is the said theater intelligence and its sub-pieces. Not always, but often enough.

John,
We are in agreement. I think differences appeared simply because we failed to define terms…

(PWH note: Part of this comment provides the introduction to Thread #3 and so has been removed and will be provided on RC#27 -Part 3)

As to the GroupIntel website: I agree with its philosophy, but my reservations stand. Where do you get the information and how do you sort/present it? Is it raw? Is it subject to political inclinations of the portal owners? Is it apolitical, hence potentially politically incorrect and wrath-evoking? What is, therefore, the ultimate purpose? Good intelligence is like scientific truth: it is objective. It gives you facts rather than what you want to see. That may, in turn, be exceedingly unpopular – truth often goes against the grit of personal beliefs or political attitudes.

However, if you wish to commit yourself to actions that will attain your objective, you must know the truth rather than likeable illusion. The rout of Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front was (among all other things) caused by the inability of OKW to accept truth – and sacking those who shouted it from the roof tops. The painful experience of Vietnam was the same. So was the initial near-collapse of the Iraq effort. Plenty of examples.

From what I saw at the first glance at the site, I was struck by a fairly chancy collection of material essentially from “our” sources. Breaking intel segment is badly outdated. Now, let me give you an example of problems – the DNI report in the context of Gaza:

> Am not sure you are aware of the fact that there are strong suspicions Israelis used DIMEs (for those unfamiliar with the term – in essence tungsten powder based munitions) in addition to possible use of WP. That is, actually, breaking intelligence, even if potentially highly unpopular. If true, the antiIsraeli sentiment in the region will greatly increase, with quite predictable consequences for both them and us.

> Start from contemplating the Geneva convention and the use of such weapons against areas inhabited by civilian population – the argument that these areas are also infiltrated by Hamas is just not good enough. We have hung enough SS officers who used the similar reasoning in the past not to make too fine a point out of the difference. However, if we do not respond to this somehow, the fact will also lead to changes in foreign perception of the “new US,” and will invoke pressures we may not want to face.

> If such pressures are exercised, what will they be, and how will they affect Mitchell’s new role? And, possibly, Holbrook’s as well. What shall our stance be if the reports are confirmed (independent surgeons who happened to be there at the time of invasion are a bit terrified with what they see, but still reluctant to talk loudly)? Do we side with the Israelis (the only face there that still smiles at the word USA) or the Islamic world which may then see it as an encouragement to try and batter our friend (and all what may ensure from THAT!)

> What will therefore emerge from all the mess, and what are short- and long term consequences both over there and also for us at home? Can that be used as a motivation good enough for some or another fool to come here with a dose of plague? Or genetically engineered respiration-killing virus against which we have no defense at all?

> How will these events affect our policy in the region, at home, at our borders, and what will the popular response to such policy, ourselves, and our trustworthiness as objective mediators of peace be in that region? At home? What actions must we take if at all? Who is to analyze all that, and what conclusions are correct, if any? And, altogether how do we prepare and respond?

As you can see, pontification is a wonderful thing, but there are hard-core issues at hand, and if anything at all is to come out of this and similar efforts, a gentlemanly discussion in a gentlemanly circle is neither helpful nor really badly needed: its outcome is a new question – “SO WHAT?” While the problem faces all of us involved in this circle, the owners of the site need to address it as their foremost task.

It is, as Ed says, HOW that needs to be specified, and in order to offer most service, whatever is being used needs to be offered as multi-sourced “raw data” as the subject for a discussion that leads to a precise set of recommendations (or conclusive statement) rather than an exchange of lose opinions on the subject peddled forth and back by a group of “involved citizens.”.

To revert then to General Smith and his book: cohesiveness of effort is essential. Which leads me to the argument made above: ToL may help us to attain this state since, despite appearances, it is an extremely well disciplined process which we may consider implementing.

All points well taken! Remember a key premise of the TEW’s IPO doctrine is:

Local < -> Global < -> Local

Assessment of current and future ops potentials with alternate COA assessment for competing hypotheses…

Sirs, FYI and please note this just from my limited personal experience and just one man’s take in some nasty places…..ALL the “theater intel” I got in Iraq 2004, 2005, 2006 did shit for me in the back alleys of Fallujah and in the streets of Ramadi

......been there and done that including getting kissed by IEDs…same same in Somalia 1992 and 1993….has nothing to do with generals or general…..has everything to do with the fact few actually walk in the valley of death where more often than not what we did locally had great impact theater wide and globally because of the CNN effect and the “strategic corporal”

.....the burned to a crisp contractors hanging from Fallujah bridge was a local event that started a chain reaction that led to Fallujah I and II. The bombing of the MAU HQS in Beirut killing 200 plus Marines and Sailors was a local event that unhinged everything before it and globally….does local only counts in horse shoes not in intelligence ? ICS builds on the local commander on scene and goes from there but no doubt the local incident commander is in charge.

Break, when Gen Honore showed up on the ground in NOLA kicking ass and breaking life and survival back into people that was local but globally seen. Wonder what “theater intel he had when untangling a jammed intersection and hand holding the some incredible characters
....sorry 13th cup of coffee and really got excited over this email thread…..good shit here….S/f

JS: I think you are mostly in agreement with my assertion that regional ops-intel fusion is essential. In the TEW context, regional is theatre-specific. The trick is linking the knowledge gained in one theatre when threats intersect. There are many kinds of intelligence, and I believe that calls for “meta-analysis.”. My major underlying point is that “fusio” has become a buzz word and current reporting for situational awareness has largely trumped decision-support and knowledge generation

GIW: John, it’s more like RE-current reporting and recycling info for situational awareness and why do we do it like CNN and Fox hourly news over and over…..because we can do it….John, you nailed the crux of the problem….we need to learn to get along with less volume of info …need to learn to get 75% of the very vital info…..great example is a five line brief compared to Pentagon power point of pretties and glitters… all eye ball candy low on real info

JS: The question is how do we change it. We’re trapped in the “Enemies of Intelligence” status quo defined by Richard Betts (in his fine book with the same name).

I agree with the fact that intelligence has to be able to touch the street. John’s comments concerning the specialists and generalists are important as well. This current site could become a very useful and current tool that creates diverse streams of useful information.

No. Good intelligence must be theater specific and its gathering must be treated as such (there are plenty of historical proofs for that).

Local intelligence will help you address a local issue but not a general problem with all its underlying local issues. Sullivan is more correct: experts need to deal with specialized issues, but generalists need to merge these into “theater visions” – you know, the word “general” and “generalist” have the same root. And, after all, not every expert can be a general, but most generals have enough expertise to be able to see a bit further ahead, and to have what Germans (and Boyd) call Fingerspitzengefühl – a hunch/intuitive perception of reality (a very lousy translation of the word but those of you who speak German know the true meaning).

To be specific: your local intelligence will tell you Mr. X is willing and ready to blow himself up for the sake of cause/ideology Y. That MAY help you prevent the event. On this occasion. It will not prevent you from finding out what is compelling enough about cause Y for Mr. X to commit a rather terminal and irreversible act.

Neither will it help you understand the roots of cause Y which will, most likely, lead to your exacerbation of errors and strengthening of the said cause thereby leading to repetition of events initiated by Mr. X. In the end, you will lose because you will have failed to put tiny and seemingly unconnected strands into one sturdy rope. Seeing you will fail to understand the true meaning of what you see.

Two good books to read in order to grasp all that: one by TL Lawrence (of Arabia – “Severn Pillars…”) which documents fairly well the error of treating actionable intelligence as a matter of locale, and the problem that the British created for everybody else (including themselves) later on. The second is Bradford and Brown “America’s Army…” which gives essentially a black and white cook-book recipe of how to avoid similar errors, use all sources, move on, and create “actionable understanding.”

Beakley, Patricelli, and I made the most capital error in our former publications by halting our analysis on “actionable knowledge” which is the synonym of “actionable intelligence.” You need actionable understanding to be effective and be able to do anything at all in a manner that will make any sense, and assure you a successful outcome. Fail that, and you will have had it. Hence, a very strong recommendation the book becomes a “standard reading.”

For most military types it’s a breeze. For civilians, there is a dictionary at the end. For all, it is a piece of badly needed enlightenment on how to think, how to deal with multiple streams of knowledge, how to be flexible, how to see vastly further ahead, and how to avoid following a pre-set mind rut. Also, it is also the way of the future. Hopefully, the President will avail himself of this text as well.

the desire to have an all knowing, single fusion effort will fail in the long-term

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John and Ed, what you say is correct. I contend all actionable intel is local (like politics) and the TEW concept furthers that idea and is a tweaker of large fusion/intel centers dumping…yes…no…?

Thanks for the comments on GroupIntel!

The network is based on the TEW network model and seeks to stimulate the “co-production of intelligence” by networked sensing and analysis.

You are right, the desire to have an all knowing, single fusion effort will fail in the long-term. There is a need for a balance between generalist and specialist analytical shops. The generalists need to work the seams between issues, domains, and threat vectors. The specialists need to develop in-depth understanding of a specific threat (e.g., terrorism) in specific gepsocial context. The two threads (generalist, specialist) need to interact.

Trying to do all contributes to poor analysis, lack of context, scant area expertise, and an overemphasis on current reporting of the political threat of the day. The TEW network was attempt to provide regional early warning and ops-intel fusion for terrorism (and emerging threats). That focus is still needed, but since we lost the bureaucratic, rice bowl battles, we are applying the concepts in an informal, virtual space.

This space has room for both generalists (so they can scan the threat horizon and monitor evolving threat streams) and specialists (so they can add forecasting to the mix). Shortly, we will add comaprtmented, private analytical spaces for specific projects. The site (reaaly suite of inter-locking sites) was developed by Matt Devost a long-time collaborator in TEW expansion efforts.

I hope all cc’d here consider joining and participating in the GroupIntel Network.

Ed is right, the fight for the future is on and we can’t wait another generation for the bureaucracy to catch up!